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Abstract 
 
State compliance with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
arrest and surrender orders, Article 29(d) and (e) obligations, remains under explored in 
international criminal tribunal (ICT) scholarship despite the fact compliance with ICTY 
orders often proved not forthcoming from the states of the former Yugoslavia.  This 
thesis will attempt to identify causal phenomena behind compliance with ICT arrest and 
surrender orders through an exploration of compliance on the part of the diverse spectrum 
of states and non-state governing entities across the former Yugoslavia.  Because 
International Relations (IR) scholarship identifies competing causal mechanisms to 
explain compliance and non-compliance outcomes, which range from a rationalist focus 
on material incentives and disincentives to norm-centric approaches, there will be an 
exploration of both ideational and material explanatory variables.  Moreover, as 
mainstream neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories are unable to cope with 
entities where an autonomous state is not an ontological given, this thesis will be divided 
into two constituent parts.  Part I will address the question of state compliance and 
include the three state case studies, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, while Part II will 
address the question of compliance in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, 
both of which do not conform to traditional models of the Westphalian state.  This thesis 
will argue that the study of compliance is limited by the state centricity of international 
law and the rationalist failure to integrate ideational structures into the study of 
compliance. 
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Preface 
  
 
‘We are in Your Hands’ 
 
In December 1998 the president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), Gabriella Kirk McDonald, reported the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to the United Nations Security Council for ‘unabashedly’ breaching its 
obligations to the Tribunal under Security Council Resolutions 827, 1160, 1199, 1203 
and 1207.  After detailing Belgrade’s litany of non-compliance acts, which included the 
denial of visas to ICTY personnel, Kirk McDonald urged the Council to take enforcement 
action.  She pleaded, ‘[n]ot only does the Tribunal depend upon you, all member States 
look to you for the exercise of your Chapter VII authority which they ceded to you with 
the adoption of the UN Charter.  We are in your hands’ (McDonald 1998).  Despite Kirk 
MacDonald’s testimony, the Security Council failed to confront Belgrade’s non-
compliance with Tribunal orders and instead Belgrade’s recalcitrance persisted 
throughout 1999 and hardened during the course of NATO’s Operation Allied Force.  
Then, six months after Kirk McDonald appeared before the UNSC and in the midst of 
NATO’s 78 day air campaign for Kosovo, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour secured 
the certification of an indictment against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević.  The 
indictment of a sitting head of state by an international criminal tribunal was an ambitious 
act given that recalcitrant local governments across the former Yugoslavia proved 
reluctant to transfer lowly members of municipal police forces or low ranking military 
officers.  Needless to say the prospect of a sitting head of state taking up residence at the 
Tribunal’s Scheveningen detention facility on the outskirts of The Hague seemed a 
remote prospect in 1999, even for those working within the Tribunal’s Office of the 
Prosecutor.1 
 
                                                 
1 At the time of the ICTY’s indictment of Slobodan Milošević, Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt believed 
that Milošević would never be surrendered to The Hague, and therefore preparation of evidence for an 
eventual trial was not a priority within the Office of the Prosecutor (Arslani & Pavić 2007). 
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Despite the difficulties encountered in securing cooperation from states and international 
organizations with a presence in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, as of 1 January 
2008 only four individuals under ICTY indictment remained at-large: Goran Hadžić, 
Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić and Stojan Župljanin.  In fact, between 1 January 2000 
and 1 January 2008, 83 individuals were transferred to Scheveningen, including Slobodan 
Milošević himself who arrived in The Hague on 28 June 2001.  Among others transferred 
included former government ministers or senior officers from the armed forces of 
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb republic and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  The rapid pace of transfers left the Tribunal unable to cope with the growing 
number of accused awaiting trial in the Tribunal’s detention facility and required the 
creation of a third trial chamber within the ICTY’s facilities on Churchillplein square.  In 
a sense, the Tribunal was overwhelmed with its own success in securing the transfers of 
accused. 
 
The dramatic shift in the ICTY’s ability to secure custody of persons under Tribunal 
indictment has been the subject of much anecdotal debate amongst legal professionals 
and scholars of International Law and International Relations.  Goldsmith and Posner 
concluded that state compliance with Tribunal orders was a response to the projection of 
‘American power’ (2005, p. 116), while former ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
suggested that 90 percent of the accused in Tribunal custody were transferred due to 
European Union conditionality, which linked cooperation with the Tribunal to the 
accession processes of states in the former Yugoslavia (2007a).  On the other hand, 
Payam Akhavan, a former legal officer with the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, argued 
that the Tribunal’s indictments exercised a normative compliance pull over the states of 
the former Yugoslavia (2001).  Goldsmith and Posner, Del Ponte and Akhavan present 
three competing causal pathways to compliance, which focus on power, interests and 
norms respectively.  Despite these competing explanations for compliance, to date there 
are no comprehensive studies of compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  
Questions such as why do the subjects of ICTY legal obligations, in some cases states 
and in others international organizations, comply or not comply with Tribunal orders 
remain under explored.  This thesis will attempt to fill this gap in international criminal 
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justice literature through a comprehensive exploration of compliance with ICTY arrest 
and surrender orders across the diverse spectrum of states and non-state governing 
entities within the former Yugoslavia.  Was the ICTY in the hands of the UNSC as Kirk-
McDonald suggested?  Or was compliance the outcome of enforcement action by third 
party states acting outside the UNSC?  Perhaps compliance and non-compliance 
outcomes did not correspond to material incentives and disincentives but rather reflected 
international criminal justice norm internalization? 
 
In order to begin to respond to the above questions, this thesis will explore compliance 
with ICTY arrest and surrender orders on the part of states and territories under 
international administration that emerged from the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  Field research and interviews for the following case studies was carried out 
in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and The Hague in March 2006, January 2007 and 
December 2007.  Documentary sources including ICTY documents and reports, NGO 
reports and public statements by local government officials were all utilized to assess 
levels of compliance and non-compliance on the part of states and international 
organizations.  Interviews were carried out with members of staff of the ICTY Outreach 
Offices, Registry and with ICTY Legal Officers.  Also, interviewed were present and 
former representatives of regional NGOs, the Croatian and Serbian foreign ministries, 
UNMIK, EUFOR and the OSCE (see Appendix XIII).  Because of the politically 
sensitive nature of questions pertaining to tracing causal pathways to compliance on the 
question of compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders both within the former 
Yugoslavia and in The Hague, the anonymity of interview subjects who requested that 
their identities not be revealed in this thesis has been protected.  Those who did not 
request anonymity are referenced by name and institutional affiliation. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
International Criminal Tribunals: the Politics of State 
Compliance 
 
There is no such thing as justice in international relations… 
 
General Homma Masaharu, Japanese Imperial Army, statement preceding execution by the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
1
 
 
 
[I]mpunity cannot be tolerated, and will not be.  In an interdependent world, the Rule of Law 
must prevail. 
 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during a visit to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia in 1997
2
 
 
 
1. Introduction: From Nuremberg and Tokyo to The Hague 
 
The United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) establishment of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 marked the first time since 
the Nuremburg and Tokyo military tribunals, held in the immediate aftermath of the 
Second World War, individuals responsible for serious violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) were brought to trial before an international court.  The act of 
bringing individuals to trial before international judicial bodies at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
for not just the crime of aggression and crimes of war, but also crimes against humanity,3 
represented a cursory attempt to move beyond the mere codification of IHL to the 
                                                 
1 Quoted in (Dower 1999, p. 516). 
2 Quoted in (Chartier 2006, p. 6). 
3 Nuremberg and Tokyo represented the first time individuals were successfully brought to trial for crimes 
against humanity; however, Bass points out antecedent, and unsuccessful, attempts at conducting 
international war crimes trials occurred following World War I when an effort was made to bring to trial 
Ottoman officials responsible for the Armenian genocide and the German Kaiser, who was presumed to be 
responsible for the outbreak of the First World War (2002, pp. 58-146).  Also, at Nuremberg the crime of 
genocide had yet to be defined and was therefore treated as a crime against humanity; however, the 1998 
Treaty of Rome for the International Criminal Court established genocide as a distinct crime. 
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creation of a judicial IHL enforcement mechanism.  The recognition of jus cogens law, 
and erga omnes obligations by the post-war military tribunals meant IHL enforcement 
had been at least partially wrestled from the exclusive jurisdiction of individual states and 
signaled the beginning of a renegotiation of the relationship between international 
criminal law and hitherto dominant post-Westphalian conceptions of state sovereignty.  
While some scholars have interpreted the legacy of Nuremberg and Tokyo as providing a 
foundation for a paradigmatic shift away from state sovereignty based conceptions of 
international society (Cassese 1998; Hagan 2003, pp. 19-20; Meron 1998), this thesis will 
impart that triumphal interpretations of international criminal justice serve to obscure the 
continued dependency of international criminal justice regimes upon the state system and 
thus fail to adequately engage with the question of state compliance with tribunal orders.4  
After all, Nuremberg and Tokyo’s appeals to jus cogens law and erga omnes obligations 
did not translate into the creation of a permanent international judicial body with the 
authority to adjudicate crimes against humanity and violations of the laws of war.  
Instead, an international criminal judicial infrastructure only emerged in February 1993 
when the UNSC adopted Resolution 808, which called for the creation of an international 
criminal tribunal to prosecute individuals for serious violations of IHL on the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia.  Four months later the Security Council adopted Resolution 827, 
which established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 
 
Despite the fact the memory of Nuremberg was invoked before the UNSC at the ICTY’s 
creation in 1993,5 the historic memory of the post-Second World War tribunals is of 
limited utility when exploring the politics of compliance with international judicial 
bodies.6  In 1994 the ICTY recognized this fact in its annual report to the UNSC: 
                                                 
4 Bassiouni and Cassese present state sovereignty and international criminal justice as mutually exclusive 
and as inherently in conflict (Bassiouni 2003a, p. 18; Cassese 1998, pp. 11-17). 
5 Preceding the UNSC vote on Resolution 808 in February 1993, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine 
Albright noted, ‘The Nuremberg Principles have been reaffirmed.  We have preserved the long-neglected 
compact made by the community of civilized nations forty-eight years ago in San Francisco to create the 
United Nations and enforce the Nuremberg Principles’ (Scharf 1997, p. 54).  A decade later, however, 
Albright would recall a significant difference between the ICTY and the Nuremberg tribunal, ‘Unlike the 
accused at Nuremberg, those suspected of war crimes in the Balkans were not surrendered leaders of a 
broken power’ (2003, p. 182). 
6 References to the ‘legacy of Nuremberg’ have become cliché in ICTY literature and among ICTY 
personnel with even former ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour recalling the memory of Nuremberg was 
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It is well known that the Allied Powers that set up the international tribunals at 
Nürnberg and Tokyo wielded full authority and control over the territory of 
Germany and Japan respectively and, in addition, had already apprehended the 
defendants when the trials commenced. Consequently, those tribunals did not need 
the cooperation of the defendants’ national authorities or those of other countries 
for the prosecutors’ investigations and collection of evidence (1994, p. 27).  
 
As judicial proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo commenced only after the total military 
defeat of Germany and Japan, the post-World War II military tribunals were not 
confronted with the task of securing custody of accused persons from recalcitrant states.7  
Moreover, the creation of a judicial body with limited temporal and territorial jurisdiction 
in the aftermath of an armed conflict where the vanquished parties were judged by 
representatives of the victorious states proved significantly less problematic than the post-
war attempt to establish a permanent international criminal court.8  Unfortunately for the 
post-war International Law Commission (ILC), which was tasked with drafting a statute 
for an international criminal court under the auspices of the United Nations, the onset of 
the cold war consigned the further development of an international criminal tribunal 
system to relative dormancy (Ferencz 1980, pp. 15-16; Maogoto 2004, p. 6).9  
 
2. From Law Creation to Law Enforcement 
 
UNSC Resolution 827 imbued the ICTY with a mandate to prosecute individuals for 
serious violations of IHL.  IHL can be broadly defined as ‘…a branch of the laws of 
armed conflict which is concerned with the protection of victims of armed conflict, 
meaning those rendered hors de combat by injury, sickness or capture, and also civilians’ 
(McCoubrey 1990, p. 1).  It is thus distinct from jus ad bellum, and focuses solely on jus 
                                                                                                                                                 
mentioned daily during her time in The Hague (Hagan 2003, p. 18).  Meanwhile, differences between the 
UNSC established ad hoc tribunals and the post-World War II military tribunals remain understated. 
7 Also, while both institutions placed individuals on trial for violations of crimes against humanity, the 
focus of the prosecutions at Nuremberg and Tokyo were on establishing the ‘crime of aggression.’  It 
should be noted that the crime of aggression was not crime for which an individual could be prosecuted 
before the ICTY. 
8 That is not to say the establishment of the post-WWII tribunals was unproblematic as there was 
significant opposition to placing captured German elites on trial and instead various alternatives were 
proposed that envisioned mass executions.  For a vivid discussion of the inter-allied debate concerning the 
fate of captured Nazis see (G.J. Bass 2002, pp. 147-205).  
9 Although the International Law Commission was requested to draft a statute for a permanent international 
court in 1948, this project was abandoned during the cold war.  However, the project of IHL codification 
continued, examples include the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and its two 1977 Additional Protocols. 
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in bello.10  IHL is said to rest upon the assumption that ‘…the legitimate scope of military 
action is not unlimited and that those who are or have been rendered non-combatant are 
entitled to impartial humanitarian concern…’ (McCoubrey 1990, p. 1).  It is generally 
recognized that the legal codification of modern IHL began with the ratification of the 
first Geneva Convention in 1864, which established legal protections for non-combatants 
in times of war (McCoubrey 1990, p. 6); however, codes of conduct during armed 
conflict have been identified in the writings of Sun Tzu, Herodotus, Homer and Plato.11  
Yet, despite this historic recognition of the existence of IHL norms, attempts at norm 
enforcement through the establishment of a permanent international criminal tribunal in 
the early 20th century were never realized.12  The interwar failure of the League of 
Nations to create a permanent international criminal court in the early 1920s for the 
purpose of bringing individuals to trial for violations of what Baron Descamps described 
as ‘the universal law of nations’ is illustrative of the extent to which the concept of state 
sovereignty acted as a barrier to IHL enforcement in the years preceding the Second 
World War.  The League of Nations was effectively blocked in its pursuit of an 
international criminal court by two legalist objections that were grounded in a defense of 
early 20th century conceptions sovereignty.  The first of these objections held that 
individuals were not subjects of international law, while the second argued the proposed 
universal jurisdiction of the court was without legal foundation (Brown 1941, p. 119; 
McCormack 1997, pp. 51-52).  Rather than being perceived as a mechanism that would 
facilitate conflict amelioration, during the inter-war years universal jurisdiction was 
regarded as presenting a significant threat to contemporary understandings of state 
                                                 
10 The crime of aggression, which did not fall within the ICTY’s prosecutorial jurisdiction, would fall 
within the former. 
11 Both Sun Tzu and Homer are cited by L.C. Green (1993, p. 19).  Whereas Sun Tzu, Herodotus and Plato 
are cited as making reference to international law regulating the conduct of armed conflict by Timothy L.H. 
McCormack (1997, pp. 33-34). 
12 Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles called for the creation of an international military tribunal to judge 
Germans suspected of violating ‘the laws and customs of war.’  Meanwhile, the Treaty of Sèvres also 
included war crimes clauses which envisioned the prosecution of Ottoman officials for crimes against 
Armenians and British citizens during and preceding the First World War (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 134).  
However, in both cases attempts at prosecutions were largely unsuccessful.  With regard to Germany an 
international tribunal was never established, and instead Germany was requested to initiate domestic 
proceedings against individuals suspected of committing war crimes during WWI (G.J. Bass 2002, pp. 58-
105), while Britain ‘walked away’ from pursuing war crimes prosecutions against Ottoman officials due to 
a fear of a nationalist backlash and acquiesced to the replacement of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) with the 
Treaty of Lausanne (1923) which contained no provisions for the prosecution of war crimes (G.J. Bass 
2002, pp. 106-146). 
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sovereignty and was even decried as, ‘…a danger to the sovereign rights of states, 
perhaps even a menace to peace’ (McCormack 1997, pp. 51-52). 
 
Legalist objections to the creation of international courts on the grounds of sovereignty 
were only muted during the course of the Second World War.  Indeed, after the horrific 
atrocities committed across Europe by Nazi Germany were exposed during and after 
WWII, demands for the punishment of individuals involved in war crimes and other 
crimes against humanity became too powerful for states to ignore.  McCormack notes, 
‘[t]he nature of some Nazi atrocities, even if not the scale or extent of them, was well 
known relatively early in the war.  Consequently, discussion about the need for some 
form of international tribunal … was widespread’ (1997, p. 55).   Moreover, the scale of 
Nazi atrocities prompted Justice Robert H. Jackson, the chief US prosecutor at 
Nuremberg, to note that the creation of the tribunal was legitimized through both the laws 
of humanity and the dictates of public conscience (May 2005, p. 35).  The appeal to 
certain ‘laws of humanity’ and ‘dictates of public conscience’ at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
established the foundation for a new code of international law, the Nuremberg principles, 
that reconfigured the relationship between the individual, state, and international 
community, while also recognizing the doctrine of universal jurisdiction for certain 
crimes considered jus cogens (Bassiouni 2003a, pp. 57-58; Bridge 1964, p. 1261; 
Broomhall 2003, p. 19).  Despite being a manifestation of ‘victor’s justice,’ Clark argues 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, ‘…firmly established in the legal consciousness the proposition 
that there are certain crimes which are of international concern or are crimes under 
international law’ (1997, p. 185).13  However, as previously mentioned, rather than 
heralding the emergence of an international criminal tribunal system, the onset of the cold 
war effectively blocked planning for the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court.14 
 
                                                 
13 Donnelly attributes the contemporary UN human rights regime to a ‘decisive break’ in perceptions of 
human rights that followed the Second World War (1986, pp. 614-615). 
14 Although the UN General Assembly resolved to freeze further discussion of an international criminal 
court until consensus could be reached on defining the crime of aggression in 1954, then again in 1957, 
(Bridge 1964, pp. 1268-1269), Soviet bloc states challenged the creation of an international criminal court 
on the grounds an international criminal court would be a violation of state sovereignty (Bridge 1964, p. 
1272). 
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Nevertheless, the concepts of universal jurisdiction combined with the rejection of state 
immunity enshrined in the Nuremberg principles remain relevant to IR scholars because 
these principles have the potential to transform the post-Westphalian state system.  By 
defining crimes against humanity as jus cogens, an erga omnes obligation on all 
governing authorities to investigate and prosecute such crimes either by local judicial 
institutions or before an international criminal tribunal was created (Bassiouni 2003a, pp. 
167-168; Broomhall 2003, p. 56).  Jus cogens norms therefore establish certain norms of 
behavior, which could potentially restrict the actions of states within their own national 
jurisdictions (May 2005, p. 24), and violations of jus cogens norms oblige the judicial 
intervention of other states or international tribunals.15  However, at this point, it is 
important to emphasize that there exists no international judicial body imbued with a 
mandate to exercise universal jurisdiction.  The subject of examination in this thesis, the 
ICTY, was temporally limited to 1991-200516 and territorially limited to the states which 
once made up the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Likewise, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was temporally limited to 
prosecuting serious breaches of IHL to a period which spanned a single year and 
territorially limited to a single state.  Even the ICC cannot undertake prosecutions against 
non-Statute of Rome signatory states without referral by the UNSC, a process that grants 
de facto immunity from prosecution to states such as Russia, China and the United States. 
 
2.1 Ad Hoc Justice  
 
It was only in the 1990s, as the end of the cold war coincided with the outbreak of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda that international 
criminal tribunals emerged as mechanisms to confront what were perceived as challenges 
to both existing laws and the perceived conscience of humanity.  Kerr notes that the 
explosive power of ITN television images broadcast in 1992 from Bosnia-Herzegovina of 
the Omarska camp, ‘reminiscent of Auschwitz and Belsen fifty years previously,’ stunned 
UNSC member states into adopting Resolution 771, which demanded an immediate end 
                                                 
15 Of course, this does not always take the form of an international prosecution as recognition of universal 
jurisdiction by national or state judiciaries could bring about the prosecution of third country nationals. 
16 The ICTY’s ‘completion strategy’ prohibits the Tribunal from certifying new indictments after 2005. 
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to violations of IHL in Bosnia-Herzegovina and called upon states and international 
organizations to begin collecting information on IHL violations across the former 
Yugoslavia (Kerr 2004, p. 34).17 
 
As the post-cold war international community attempted to confront the explosion of 
violence across the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s, ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals became the preferred option for policymakers reluctant to engage in the 
more costly military intervention to prevent or halt attempts at genocide or ethnic 
cleansing (Scharf 1997, pp. 30-36; Western 2004, pp. 217-231; Williams & Waller 2002, 
p. 844); however, unlike their post-WWII predecessors, the post-cold war ad hoc 
tribunals could not depend on an occupying military force to carry out their orders, and 
instead a complex relationship was negotiated with states or in some instances territories 
under international civilian and military administrations that fell under tribunal 
jurisdiction.  Although there has been a deepening entrenchment of an international 
tribunal system since 1993, the interaction between the states and non-traditional 
sovereign entities over which international criminal tribunals exercise jurisdiction has not 
been adequately explored in existing scholarship.  It is an exploration of tribunal 
interaction with external bodies whose cooperation is necessary for the fulfillment of 
tribunal judicial mandates that will form the core of the following thesis.  
 
2.2 Explaining Compliance 
 
The relative absence of literature on state compliance with international criminal tribunal 
orders for the arrest and surrender of persons accused of serious violations of IHL 
requires the creation of a research agenda that will address the relationship between 
international tribunals and territories over which tribunals exercise jurisdiction.  While 
there is a growing wealth of literature that describes the legal precedents and obligations, 
which underpin international tribunals (Bassiouni 1992, 2003a, 2003b; Broomhall 2003; 
Cassese 1998; Meron 1998), the interaction between international judicial bodies, states, 
intergovernmental organizations and non-traditional sovereign entities requires further 
                                                 
17 Scharf also makes a similar observation (1997, pp. 37-38). 
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study.  In fact, studies of state compliance with international legal obligations, which 
have long provoked intra-theoretical and inter-theoretical debate within and between the 
disciplines of International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL), have remained on 
the periphery of international criminal justice scholarship. 
 
In order to explain compliance and non-compliance with tribunal orders, this thesis will 
explore compliance with ICTY Article 29(d) and (e) obligations, arrest and surrender 
orders, on the part of states, intergovernmental organizations and non-traditional 
sovereign entities in the former Yugoslavia.18  By limiting this study to the ICTY, we can 
explore compliance on the part of multiple actors that have all interacted with the same 
legal regime, the Statute of the Tribunal, which imposed a binding legal obligation upon 
all UN member states to cooperate with the ICTY and comply with Tribunal orders 
without ‘undue delay.’  Moreover, assessments of state compliance were made annually 
by the ICTY, which submitted yearly reports to the UNSC on compliance on the part of 
both states and international organizations with a presence in the former Yugoslavia.  
Equipped with a Chapter VII mandate non-compliance on the part of a recalcitrant state 
was to trigger enforcement measures under Article 41 or 42 of the UN Charter.  The 
robustness of the ICTY’s Chapter VII mandate led former US Ambassador to the UN 
Madeleine Albright to warn, at the time of Resolution 827’s passage, UNSC sanction 
would be a consequence of non-compliance (Scharf 1997, p. 62).  
 
So as to fully explore the interaction between the ICTY, states and the diverse range of 
actors over which the Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, this thesis will include five case 
studies and is divided into two constituent parts.  Part One will consist of the first three 
case studies and examine state compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  Each 
case study will include an exploration of both the domestic and international politics of 
compliance so as to help disentangle compliance causality.  The subject of the first case 
study, Croatia, will provide an opportunity to explore interactions between this newly 
independent state and the ICTY (Chapter Two).  The second case study will include 
Serbia, a state which has consistently failed to comply with ICTY arrest and surrender 
                                                 
18 Article 29 outlines state obligations toward the ICTY.  See Appendix I. 
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orders (Chapter Three).   The third case study, Macedonia, offers a limited insight into 
the politics of compliance as the Macedonian state executed only a single arrest and 
surrender order, but nevertheless Macedonia’s voluntary cooperation with the ICTY 
forms a stark contrast to the accompanying four case studies (Chapter Four).  The fourth 
case study will introduce Part Two of the thesis through an exploration of compliance on 
the part of a multitude of non-traditional actors that range from international peace 
enforcement missions to sub-state entities by taking into account Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Chapter Five).  The complexity of securing compliance with the ICTY orders in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina arises from the fact that the ICTY is just one of various international 
actors that have played a significant role in the domestic politics of the post-war Bosnian 
state.  In addition, Bosnia-Herzegovina also includes de facto mini-states, the Bosnian 
Serb Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which operate as 
independent political communities.  Finally Part Two will be concluded by an 
examination of Kosovo’s interactions with the ICTY.  As with BiH, Kosovo is under 
international administration; however, unlike BiH, Kosovo lacks international legal 
recognition as a state (Chapter Six).19 
 
Before exploring the above case studies a review of existing tribunal scholarship will be 
presented.  This will be accomplished by providing an overview of existing literature on 
the ICTY and theoretical interpretations of the emerging international criminal tribunal 
system; however, it is important to emphasize that this is not a study of the emergence of 
international criminal tribunals but rather a study of compliance with international 
criminal tribunal arrest and surrender orders. Because literature on international tribunals 
spans the fields of International Relations (IR) and International Law (IL), there will be 
an exploration of both IL and IR theoretical interpretations of compliance with 
international legal obligations. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 falls after the period of time examined in 
Chapter Six (1999-2007).  Moreover, given the fact that all defendants under ICTY indictment were 
transferred to Tribunal custody preceding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Republic of Kosovo 
will not be confronted with enforcing an ICTY arrest and surrender order. 
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3. Tribunal Literature and Compliance: Bridging Theories of International Law 
and International Relations 
 
The remarkable achievements of the ICTY, which included gaining custody of a majority 
of those indicted,20 demonstrated the viability of international criminal tribunals as a 
mechanism for bringing war criminals to trial and facilitated both the entrenchment of 
international ad hoc tribunals and the eventual establishment of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) (Western 2004, p. 240).  Although the ICC’s creation marked a fundamental 
turning point in the pursuit of international justice through legal means,21 early 
scholarship on the ICTY was tinged with pessimism regarding the prospects for securing 
custody of accused persons from recalcitrant states.  Illustrative of this pessimism was 
Scharf’s quote from the ICTY’s first chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone, who lamented, 
‘[p]erhaps the real yardstick for assessing the success of the [ICTY], is whether it leads to 
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court’ (1997, p. 228).  In 1997, 
securing state cooperation from the states of the former Yugoslavia was perceived to be a 
yardstick too far. 
 
Even as late as 2002, Bass warned, ‘[b]ut with atrocities of such a nightmarish scale, and 
with a Western commitment that waxes and wanes, the outlook [for the ICTY] is still 
uncertain’ (2002, p. 275); however, as of December 2007 only four out of 161 individuals 
indicted by the ICTY remained at large and the emerging post-cold war international 
judicial infrastructure generated a growing body of IR literature that has attempted to 
explain the proliferation of international criminal tribunals.  Not surprisingly, IR literature 
on IHL enforcement reflects the diversity of theoretical approaches within the field, 
which range from realist state-centric approaches that are dismissive of international 
criminal tribunal exercising independent compliance agency, to neoliberal institutionalist 
approaches which interpret compliance and non-compliance acts through self-interest and 
                                                 
20 As of December 2005, of 161 individuals indicted by the ICTY 131 had appeared before the court 
('International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Key Figures of ICTY Cases' 2005). 
21 The symbolic value of a former head of state standing trial in an ICTY courtroom as the Rome Statute 
entered into force on 1 July 2002 did not go unnoticed by international relations or international legal 
scholars.  For example, Rachel Kerr describes scenes from the opening of the Milošević trial to begin her 
2004 book on the ICTY, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in 
Law, Politics and Diplomacy (2004, p. 1). 
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rational choice, to constructivist approaches that explain compliance through the lenses of 
norms and rule following. 
 
3.1 Realism and Neorealism: International Justice or Realpolitik 
 
In constructing a realist approach to international law, E.H. Carr references Hobbes’ 
definition of law as command, ius est quod iussum est (1964, p. 176).  Carr’s conception 
of domestic law as arising from a domestic coercive order serves to mitigate prospects for 
the entrenchment of international law in the absence of a global sovereign.  Morgenthau 
modified Carr’s pre-conditions for the existence of international law, stating that it is 
only, ‘where there is neither a community of interest nor balance of power there is no 
international law’ (1978, p. 282).  Morgenthau’s modification was necessitated by his 
observation that, ‘… during the four hundred years of its existence international law has 
in the most instances been scrupulously observed’ (1978, p. 281). Nevertheless, the 
realist focus on state survival and anarchy in the absence of a global sovereign leads 
realists to dismiss the prospect of state submission to the decisions of international 
tribunals in instances where perceived ‘vital’ interests are at stake.  As Schwarzenberger 
points out: 
In a system ultimately based on the rule of force, the Leviathans [states] cannot be 
expected to act with humility and moderation in matters of vital importance.  As 
was emphasized in the Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Eastern Carelia case, ‘it is well established in international law that 
no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other 
States either to mediation or to arbitration or to any other kind of pacific settlement 
(1941, p. 141).  
 
Despite an historic record of state compliance with international law, realists contest that 
international law enforcement remains largely dependent upon ad hoc enforcement 
measures taken by powerful states.  Morgenthau ominously warns that when international 
laws are violated, they are not always enforced, and when attempts are made at 
enforcement, they are not always effective (1978, pp. 281-282).  Evidence of the 
precarious and arbitrary nature of law enforcement within the international realm offered 
by realists includes the numerous violations of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and Kellogg-Briand pact, both of which attempted to place legal restrictions on the use of 
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force (Morgenthau 1978, pp. 286-287).  Thus, while realists recognize the existence of 
some form of international law, albeit under certain preconditions such as a community 
of interests or balance of power, compliance, non-compliance and international law 
enforcement are all dictated by relative power distributions.  In describing a realist 
perspective of international law enforcement, Morgenthau notes: 
There can be no more primitive and no weaker system of law enforcement…for it 
delivers the enforcement of the law to the vicissitudes of the distribution of power 
between the violator of the law and the victim of the violation.  It makes it easy for 
the strong to both violate the law and to enforce it, and consequently puts the rights 
of the weak in jeopardy (1978, p. 298). 
 
International law enforcement’s dependency on the asymmetries of state power makes 
issues such as the question of legal rhetoric largely epiphenomenal and instead realists 
would suggest that we look toward the underlying distribution of state power to 
understand contemporary and past developments in international criminal justice.22 
 
Neorealists, both offensive and defensive, also view international law as reflection of 
state power.  Kenneth Waltz points to the distribution of material capabilities within the 
international system of states as shaping international order (1979, pp. 97-99), and 
identifies power, not international law, as the ordering principle in the international 
system (Waltz 1979, p. 97).  Not surprisingly international criminal tribunals were not 
even mentioned in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979), nor did international 
judicial bodies warrant a mention in Waltz’s reassessment of neo-realism after the cold 
war (2000, pp. 5-41).  Mearsheimer also fails to directly engage with international 
criminal tribunals; however, it is evident Mearsheimer would be highly skeptical of the 
ability of international criminal tribunals to constrain state action.  Mearsheimer posits 
international institutions ‘have minimal influence on state behavior’ (1994-95, p. 7).  
Grieco supports Mearsheimer’s assertion by noting, ‘international institutions affect the 
prospects for cooperation only marginally’ (1988, p. 488).  Moreover, international 
institutions are argued to reflect the preferences of powerful states (Mearsheimer 1994-
95, p. 13; Waltz 2000, pp. 20-21).  Therefore, a realist explanatory hypothesis of 
                                                 
22 Realists argue the resort to legal rhetoric serves as a ‘pretext’ or ‘disguise’ for acts motivated by the 
pursuit of power (Goldsmith & Posner 2005, pp. 170-171).   
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compliance would identify relative power distributions as the explanatory phenomena 
that explains compliance or non-compliance acts.  Compliance on the part of a weaker 
state would reflect the successful projection of coercive power on the part of a more 
powerful state, while non-compliance would be symptomatic of a failure or an inability 
of a powerful state to project its power over large distances. 
 
Realism’s silence on international criminal tribunals is perhaps surprising given the 
realist emphasis on coercion can find affirmation in the observation that third party state 
coercion has often been attributed with having facilitated the Tribunal’s ability to secure 
custody of indicted persons from the states of the former Yugoslavia.  Realists can point 
to the direct linkage between international financial assistance and the handing over of 
indicted persons to the ICTY as the causal phenomena that explains why relatively weak 
states within the former Yugoslavia elect to cooperate with the Tribunal.  Anecdotal 
evidence does seem to support the assertion that norms of international justice or the 
legally binding nature of the UN Charter are irrelevant to any discussion of compliance 
causality.  Even former president of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, highlighted the 
dependency of the Tribunal upon state cooperation in his 1997 report to the UN Security 
Council: 
If States… refuse to implement [the Tribunal’s] orders or to execute [the 
Tribunal’s] warrants, the Tribunal will turn out to be utterly impotent.  Thus if 
greater respect is accorded to the authority of States than the need to deter gross 
abuses of human rights, this will place severe limitations on what the Tribunal can 
achieve’ (Report of the International Tribunal 1997, p. 44). 
 
Goldsmith and Posner argued the Tribunal’s subsequent lack of impotence was a mere 
reflection of the support of a single state, namely the United States (2005, p. 116).  As 
will be highlighted in Chapter Two, coercion or inducements deployed by third party 
states can offer a power compliance narrative.  Moreover, Chapter Three will note 
Serbia’s failure to meet a Washington imposed deadline for the transfer of Slobodan 
Milošević to The Hague, resulted in the United States not only suspending US$40 million 
in direct aid, but also casting negative votes in international lending institutions which 
effectively severed Belgrade’s access to reconstruction assistance.  Shortly after this 
decisive and expensive ‘message’ was transmitted to Belgrade, Milošević was 
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surrendered to the ICTY ('U.S. Pressure on Serbia to Transfer ICTY Indictees' 2002, p. 
739).  However, while the preceding example provides support for a power-based 
approach to analyzing state cooperation with the ICTY, there are also examples of 
financial incentives and/or penalties failing to coerce cooperation such as the European 
Union’s attempts to link cooperation with the ICTY to Serbia’s EU accession process. 
 
Within the field of IL, realists have found common ground with positivist IL scholars 
who share Carr’s Hobbsian view of law as being part of a coercive order.  IL positivists 
are largely dismissive of prospects for the entrenchment of international law in absence of 
a global sovereign.  Interestingly, Bassiouni cites Hobbes’, non veritas sed autoritas facit 
legem, it is not rightness but authority that makes law, as part of the philosophical 
underpinnings of legal positivism (1992, p. 57).  Scholars who concur with the preceding 
description of the relationship between power and law, such as John Austin, view law to 
be part of a coercive order and argue that it is only ‘…made effective through the threat 
of state sanction’ (Kerr 2004, p. 7).  While IR realists and IL positivists who mitigate 
international law’s ability to constrain state action can point to the historic failures of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand pact, and the failure of the 
International Law Commission to establish a permanent international criminal tribunal 
during the cold war, they cannot easily account for subsequent developments in the field 
of international criminal justice since 1993.  After all, the establishment of the ICTY was 
followed by the creation of both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.  Additionally, the coming into effect of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court was actively opposed by the United States and 
therefore the ICC cannot be dismissed as a tribunal dependent upon American power.23 
 
An additional complicating factor for realist interpretations of international criminal 
tribunals is that realism’s unit of analysis is the state.  Thus, Chapters Five and Six defy 
realism’s assumptions regarding the state being the subject of international legal 
                                                 
23 Goldsmith and Posner argue the ICTY’s ‘modest success in trying war criminals’ was the result of 
‘NATO’s (and primarily American) military, diplomatic, and financial might’ (2005, p. 116), which is 
consistent with Waltz’s claim that the strength of an international institution reflects the strength and 
support of powerful states (2000, pp. 20-21). 
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obligations.  Moreover, two underlying assumptions of the Nuremberg principles pose a 
direct challenge to realism’s core underlying assumptions.  The first is that war crimes are 
committed by individuals who deploy the apparatus of states in the commission of 
‘criminal’ enterprises.  The second is that there exist jus cogens law and erga omnes 
obligations, which states are unable to abrogate.  With regard to the existence of jus 
cogens law, realism simply does not provide a framework for exploring ideational 
constraints upon state action.  Mearsheimer’s observation, ‘a state might destroy a 
defeated rival by killing most of its people’ (2001, p. 151), provides a reminder of the 
extent to which realists are hesitant to criminalize statecraft.   
 
The perceived realist denial of prospects for international legal structures to coalesce into 
a global judiciary and established precedents that constrain the international behavior of 
states has led realists to be derided by proponents of a more robust system of international 
criminal tribunals as advocates of an ideology of impunity disguised as realpolitik.  
Bassiouni, an international legal scholar and former head of the UN Commission of 
Experts that called for the creation of the ICTY, defines realpolitik as ‘the pursuit of 
political settlements unencumbered by moral and ethical limitations’ (2003b, p. 190).  
Realpolitik according to Bassiouni ‘…may settle the more immediate problems of 
conflict, but, as history reveals, its achievements are … at the expense of long-term 
peace, stability, and reconciliation (Bassiouni 2003b, p. 190).  However, Bassiouni fails 
to take note of the fact that Morgenthau does recognize certain international standards 
that serve to limit state behavior.  Morgenthau writes, ‘[i]f there was to be at least a 
certain measure of peace and order in the relations among such entities endowed with 
supreme authority within their territories and having continuous contact with each other, 
it was inevitable that certain rules of law should govern these relations’ (1978, p. 280).  
Accountability per se is not incompatible with realist approaches to IR, after all the 
victor’s justice of Nuremberg and Tokyo were not inconsistent with realist approaches to 
IR, but rather, the enforcement of IHL is limited by the asymmetries of state power.  
Thus, what realists hope to impart is that for a weak state to attempt law enforcement 
action against a more powerful foe would bring catastrophic consequences upon the 
former.  Moreover, for realists there is no erga omnes obligation upon states to enforce 
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IHL or even obey international law, the only erga omnes obligation that states assume is 
that of survival. 
 
3.2 Liberalism: Tribunal Justice and Democratic Peace? 
 
Liberalist accounts of international criminal justice suggest that democratic states are 
more likely to support the creation of international criminal tribunals, but offer little 
insight into compliance with arrest and surrender orders.  Bass observes, ‘Liberal states 
have taken a legalistic approach to the punishment of war criminals, even when so doing 
has greatly complicated international diplomacy… legalism seems to arise exclusively in 
liberal states…’ (2002, p. 280).  Although Bass recognizes securing custody of citizens of 
recalcitrant states has proven an obstacle that was in many instances insurmountable, 
Bass avoids attempts at explaining compliance or non-compliance acts.  When the 
question of compliance is addressed by liberal theorists, it is assumed that compliance 
regimes are most effective among a community of liberal democratic states.24  For 
example, Moravcsik notes, ‘[t]he most important preconditions for the creation of and 
compliance with the sort of highly refined regime norms found in Europe are strong pre-
existing norms, practices and institutions of liberal democracy,…’ (1995, p. 184).  
Donnelly also credited, ‘a relatively homogenous and close sociocultural community’ 
with sustaining a robust western European human rights regime’ (1986, p. 623).  Outside 
a community of liberal democratic states, Moravcsik suggests that we must fall back 
upon material incentives and disincentives to bring about illiberal state compliance with 
human rights regimes (1995). 
 
There is also a significant body of IL literature which identifies domestic regime type as 
explaining compliance with international legal obligations (Burley 1992, pp. 1907-1996; 
R. Fisher 1981; Henkin 1979).  However, when it comes to explaining compliance with 
arrest and surrender orders, the liberalist focus on regime type sheds little light on 
compelling compliance on the part of illiberal regimes.  Moreover, there is disagreement 
                                                 
24 Burley defines liberal states as states with ‘…juridical equality, constitutional protections of individual 
rights, republican governments, and market economies based on private property rights.’  ‘Nonliberal 
states,’ according to Burley, are states that lack the above (1992, p. 1909). 
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within literature that links domestic regime type to compliance outcomes.  In some cases 
all that is observed is that the less ‘rules’ are respected domestically within a state, the 
less likely a state will respect international legal obligations (R. Fisher 1961, p. 1139).  
Note that this is a significant departure from Moravscik and Burley’s identification of 
liberal democracy as an antecedent condition necessary to generate non-coerced 
compliance with international human rights regimes.  Instead, according to Fisher all that 
is necessary is a state in which ‘rules’ – authoritarian or democratic – are respected: 
The situation in Congo vividly attests the weakness of governments whose officials 
do not respect law.  In sharp contrast, the government of the Soviet Union is highly 
organized and rule-respecting.  It is a mistake to think of that government as 
lawless, and commanding obedience from its officials only at the point of a pistol.  
No one is holding a pistol to the head of the man who holds the pistol; that man is 
complying with rules (1961, p. 1139). 
 
As the subsequent case studies cover multiple states with multiple regime types, we could 
expect compliance records to reflect regime type.  However, as will be noted in Chapter 
Two, Croatian cooperation with the ICTY actually deteriorated following the election of 
pro-western democratic elites in January 2000.  Moreover, the collapse of the Milošević 
regime in Serbia initially brought about a hardening of Serbian non-cooperation with the 
ICTY that was only effectively reversed following coercion on the part of the United 
States. 
 
3.3 Neoliberal Institutionalism and an Atrocities Regime 
 
Neoliberal institutionalist IR scholars emphasize the role of regimes in facilitating 
cooperation between state actors (Axelrod & Keohane 1985; Keohane 1984, 1986, 1988; 
Keohane & Martin 1995; Keohane & Nye 2001; Krasner 1983) and regard the emerging 
international tribunal system as an attempt to facilitate cooperation in a given issue area 
through the construction of an atrocities regime (Abbott 1999; Rudolph 2001, pp. 655-
691).25  The neoliberal conceptualization of the state as a unitary rational actor provides 
theoretical common ground with neorealists; however neoliberals and neorealists diverge 
in their analysis of the extent to which state behavior can or cannot be constrained by 
                                                 
25 Rudolph attempts to explain regime emergence and not compliance. 
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institutions or regimes.  Krasner defines regimes as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations’ (Krasner 1983, p. 2).  With regards to 
the issue area of atrocities and war crimes, IHL and international criminal tribunals can 
be viewed as both rules and procedures embedded within an emerging atrocities regime 
(Rudolph 2001, pp. 655-691).  However, this focus on facilitating inter-state cooperation 
led Reus-Smit to describe regimes as almost purely functional (2004, p. 18). 
 
For scholars of IL, neoliberal institutionalism’s focus on regimes and compliance 
provides for a powerful response to an existential crisis within a discipline that emerged 
from a perceived inability to theorize compliance.  Guzman, an IL scholar, pointed out in 
the California Law Review, ‘…the absence of an explanation for why states obey 
international law in some instances but not in others threatens to undermine the very 
foundations of the discipline’ (2002, p. 1826).  Guzman went on to import the neoliberal 
institutionalist image of international law as a regulatory mechanism maintained by 
rational egoistic states through reciprocity and sanctions in an attempt to establish a 
framework for IL compliance theory.26 
 
Although the debate regarding why states comply with regime rules is relevant to 
explaining state compliance with ICTY orders, it must be noted that there exist four 
significant obstacles to applying neoliberal institutionalism to the subsequent study of 
compliance with ICTY orders.  These obstacles include neoliberal institutionalist 
assumptions regarding regime consent, creation, reciprocity and obligation.  With regard 
to the first two obstacles, it is assumed that states that are the subjects of legal obligations 
consented to abide by the rules of a given regime and participated in regime creation.27  
Therefore, state preferences are assumed to be reflected within the regime itself.  Neither 
was the case with regard to the states of the former Yugoslavia.  Compliance with ICTY 
orders was a legal obligation imposed by UNSC fiat upon the states of the former 
                                                 
26 The tendency to import theories of IR into IL led Sriram to describe the interaction between IR and IL as 
a ‘unidirectional application’ rather than a ‘serious dialogue’ (2006, pp. 467-478) 
27 It should be noted that the extent to which regime rules reflect state preferences is said to reflect the 
relative power of a given state at the time of regime emergence. 
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Yugoslavia and the states of the former Yugoslavia played no role in the drafting of the 
Tribunal Statute.  With regard to reciprocity, neoliberal institutionalism assumes non-
compliance decisions on the part of a single state inflict material costs upon other states.  
Although non-compliance with ICTY orders inflicts significant costs upon the ICTY 
itself, third party states are not materially harmed by a non-compliance act.  The absence 
of cost is significant because rational games of coordination are left unable to explain 
third party state enforcement of the ICTY Statute upon the states of the former 
Yugoslavia.  The logic of reciprocity assumes defection by one state would inflict direct 
costs upon other states (Keohane 1986, pp. 1-27), and the severity of retaliation inflicted 
upon the defecting state is assumed to reflect the level of harm inflicted upon states that 
remained compliant with regime rules (Keohane 1986, p. 12).  With regard to obligation, 
neoliberal institutionalists and rational choice theorists do not assume the existence of an 
overriding obligation to comply with regime rules (Guzman 2008, pp. 16-17; Keohane 
1986, pp. 19-20).  Defection or non-compliance acts can be a rational choice for 
policymakers and are not dictated by moral imperatives.  As a result the compliance 
method identified by neoliberal institutionalists to transform non-compliant behavior on 
the part of a recalcitrant state is identical to that of neorealism.  Voluntary compliance, on 
the other ahand, would be assumed to reflect rational self-interest. 
 
3.4 The Two Logics 
 
If we are to employ the dichotomy established by March and Olsen between the ‘logic of 
consequences’ (LoC) and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (LoA), neo-liberal 
institutionalism falls within the former along with neorealism (March & Olsen 1998; 
Risse 2001, p. 3).  March and Olsen define the logic of consequence as presenting, 
‘…political order as arising from negotiation among rational actors pursuing personal 
preferences or interests in circumstances in which there may be gains to coordinated 
action’ (March & Olsen 1998, p. 949).  The logic of appropriateness is characterized as 
being rule-based.  March and Olsen note, ‘[h]uman actors are imagined to follow rules 
that associate particular identities to particular situations, …’ (1998, p. 951).  The focus 
on perceived identities and rules will be discussed in more detail in the coming pages. 
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A LoC-based approach to international criminal tribunals would envision tribunals as 
acting an agent of states.  International legal scholars Posner and Yoo support the LoC-
based approach and suggest that the effectiveness of international criminal tribunals relies 
on prosecutors and judges remaining dependent upon the states responsible for their 
creation (2005, pp. 1-74).  Posner and Yoo posit: 
…international tribunals can help states resolve disputes by providing information 
on the facts and rules of conduct.  But they must act consistently with the interests 
of the states that create them’ (2005, p. 72).28 
 
Posner and Yoo’s conceptualization of the relationship between international tribunals 
and state interests is at odds with IL scholars such as Helfer and Slaughter who argue that 
international tribunals are more effective when advancing principle over power (1997, p. 
314), or in other words norms over interests.29   
 
Posner and Yoo argue that tribunals which are not closely controlled by states such as the 
ICC actually pose a threat to international cooperation because of the risk that an 
independent prosecutor or judges may infuse moral values, ideologies, or the interests of  
a clique of states into the work of the court (2005, pp. 7,73).  This argument, however, is 
grounded on the assumption that moral or ideological imperatives hinder attempts at 
bringing an end to hostilities and raise costs imposed upon third party states.30  If we are 
to accept the assumption that a global international criminal judicial infrastructure would 
actually increase costs upon states by prolonging conflict, then state support for 
international criminal justice defies rationalist explanation.  Take for example the ICC’s 
indictment of the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony along 
with four senior LRA commanders.  The ICC’s indictments removed a powerful 
incentive for the LRA to enter into a peace settlement, amnesty.  Catholic Archbishop 
John Baptist Odama illustrates the difficulties that have resulted from the ICC’s 
                                                 
28 Emphasis added by author. 
29 Helfer and Slaughter along with Williams and Taft argue that prosecutorial independence from state 
actors is necessary for international criminal tribunals to carry out their judicial functions (Helfer & 
Slaughter 1997; Williams & Taft 2003). 
30 For example, Williams and Taft claim that is was precisely the absence of moral or ideological 
imperatives that prevented the ICTY from serving as a peace-building institution in the former Yugoslavia 
(2003, pp. 225-233).   
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indictments in posing the question, ‘[h]ow can we tell the LRA soldiers to come out of 
the bush and receive amnesty when at the same time the threat of arrest by the ICC hangs 
over their heads?’ (Pelser 2005).31  The cost of amnesty is significantly lower than that of 
prosecution, yet nonetheless, the ICC enjoys the support of Statute of Rome signatory 
states. 
 
3.5 Norms, Rules and Legitimacy 
 
The constructivist focus on normative, ideational or social structures in IR (Kocs 1994; 
Kratochwil 1984, 1989; Shannon 2000; Wendt 1992, 1995, 1999) provides an alternative 
theoretical lens through which compliance with international criminal tribunal arrest and 
surrender orders can be viewed.  The compliance method identified by constructivists 
focuses on intersubjective processes of persuasion and shaming.  Moreover, compliance 
with international law is a function of norm internationalization rather than the outcome 
of a rational weighing of material compliance costs.  Table 1.1 outlines theories of IR 
and compliance methods explored up to this point. 
Table 1.1: Compliance and IR Theory 
 
 DECISION-
MAKING 
PROCESS 
COMPLIANCE 
METHOD 
EXPLANATIONS 
FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE 
IR THEORIES 
AND 
APPROACHES 
Logic of 
Consequences 
Rational cost-
benefit analysis 
Coercion, 
inducements, use 
of force 
Benefits of non-
compliance > 
compliance costs 
Realism, neo-
realism, neo-
liberal 
institutionalism 
Logic of 
Appropriateness 
Ideational, 
norm following 
Persuasion, 
shaming 
Competing norms, 
lack of norm 
internalization 
Cognitive-
sociological 
approaches, 
liberalism 
 
While LoC and LoA compliance methods have been juxtaposed in Table 1.1, they should 
not be construed as being entirely mutually exclusive.  Table 1.1 is an organizational tool 
that has been provided to help provide clarity to multiple approaches to compliance 
                                                 
31 At the time of writing LRA interlocutors traveled to The Hague to enquire about the process of 
withdrawal of an ICC indictment.  The LRA argues that an agreement with the Ugandan government to try 
war criminals domestically makes ICC prosecutions ‘redundant’(Glassborow & Eichstaedt 2008). 
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established in existing scholarship. However, constructivist legal scholars do tend to 
imagine international norm-development as directly in conflict with state interest-based 
decision-making.  Bassiouni notes that the history of IHL: 
…reveals the tension between norm-development which reflects the commonly 
shared values and aspirations of peoples irrespective of their diversity, and the 
political interests of states (2003a, p. 29). 
 
On the other hand, Finnemore and Sikkink point out: 
…the current tendency to oppose norms against rationality or rational choice is not 
helpful in explaining many of the most politically salient processes we see in 
empirical research – processes we call “strategic social construction, in which 
actors strategize rationality to reconfigure preferences, identities or social context.  
Rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant episode of 
normative influence or normative change, just as the normative context conditions 
any episode of rational choice’ (1998, p. 888). 
 
LoC and LoA explanations for compliance might be better represented by a continuum 
which would place purely LoC compliance or non-compliance acts at one extreme while 
purely LoA compliance or non-compliance acts would fall along the opposite extreme.  
Figure 1.1 is provided to illustrate a proposed compliance continuum. 
Figure 1.1: Compliance Method Continuum 
 
3.5.1 Norm Life Cycles, the Boomerang Pattern and Spiral Model 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink provide a useful model of what is described as a norm’s life cycle 
that has significant implications for the study of compliance.   The life cycle of a norm is 
said to consist of three-stages, norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalization 
(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, pp. 887-917).  The first stage, norm emergence, is 
characterized by norm entrepreneurs attempting to convince a critical mass of states to 
adopt a given norm.  The second stage, norm cascade, describes a process by which 
certain states, norm leaders, attempt to convince other states, norm followers, to accept 
LoC LoA 
use of force, 
coercion, 
inducements 
persuasion, 
shaming 
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the new norm.  The final stage, internalization, is marked by a new norm being ‘taken-
for-granted’ and no longer being the subject of debate (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 
895).  Thus, we can assume that weakly internalized norms, Stage I and II norms, would 
require substantial external persuasion to bring about compliance and non-compliance 
acts should be relatively common.32  With regard to Stage III norms, we should find non-
compliance acts as hardly occurring at all. 
 
Yet, contradictory normative behavior by states defies Sikkink and Wallings linear 
progression of norm entrenchment.  For example, while Croatia resisted cooperation with 
the ICTY, it was identified as being part of the group of ‘like-minded’ states that pushed 
for the creation of the ICC (Bassiouni 2003a, p. 457).  Also, although Finnemore and 
Sikkink concede new norms ‘never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a 
highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and 
perceptions of interest’ (1998, p. 897), the outcome of contests involving ‘new’ norms 
coming into to conflict with preexisting norms requires further examination.  After all, 
Kivimäki observes states that rationalize non-compliance with human rights regimes 
often do so with appeals to the norm of state sovereignty (1994, p. 417). 
 
Nevertheless, two complementary compliance models have emerged from Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s exploration of norm life cycles.  The first model, the ‘boomerang pattern’ was 
developed by Keck and Sikkink and isolates domestic civil society as a causal mechanism 
which serves to mobilize external shaming processes through engagement with 
transnational advocacy networks (1998, pp. 12-38).  The second model, the ‘spiral 
model,’ builds on the boomerang pattern by tracing state responses to domestic and 
transnational civil society mobilization (Risse & Sikkink 1999, pp. 1-38).  Both models 
identify domestic and transnational civil society networks as acting to alter state behavior 
and necessitate an exploration of domestic and transnational civil society in the 
subsequent case studies so as to assess the explanatory power of the above models. 
 
                                                 
32 Sikkink and Walling point an increasing number of domestic, hybrid and international human rights trials 
as evidence of a ‘justice cascade’ (2005) or Stage II of the above mentioned life cycle. 
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3.5.2 Compliance and Legitimacy 
 
Because the ICTY’s enforcement of IHL is restricted to the former Yugoslavia and is not 
erga omnes, and not applicable to the UNSC states which created the ICTY, the activities 
of the Tribunal are perhaps better described as imposed rather than norm-generating.33  
The ICTY was after all established by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
and was imposed by legal fiat upon the former Yugoslavia.  The ICTY was not a regime 
created by or directly consented to by the states under its prosecutorial jurisdiction.34  
Kratochwil argues that a perception of legitimacy with regards to all parties involved is a 
precondition for interactions to be considered rules in the following analogy, ‘[i]t is the 
lack of legitimacy of such demands that makes the acceptance of “being robbed” as part 
of the normative discourse implausible, even if it is based on stable expectations’ (1989, 
p. 53). 
 
It is the question of legitimacy raised by Kratochwil, which is almost completely ignored 
in rationalist IR scholarship.35  To the extent that rationalist scholarship engages with the 
question of regime legitimacy, neorealists suggest rules and laws are legitimate if they 
reflect the underlying distribution of power, while neoliberal institutionalists assume 
legitimacy to be a reflection of function benefits provided to states by adherence to a 
given rule or law.  Revealingly, despite the similarities between neoliberal regime theory 
and international law that were identified by Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood (1998, pp. 
367-397), substantial differences remain regarding conceptions of regime legitimacy.  
Within IL scholarship, the legitimacy of international regimes rests on the repeated equal 
enforcement of international law (Rudolph 2001, p. 686).  Moreover, it is assumed that 
for the legitimacy of a given law to be maintained there can be little or no flexibility in its 
enforcement, while among neoliberal institutionalists the flexibility of regime rules is 
deemed to be essential for long-term regime survival (Rudolph 2001, p. 686).   
                                                 
33 Kratochwil makes a distinction between norm-based rules and commands, noting that norm-based rules 
are said to be ‘…valid erga omnes, and are thereby quite different from commands’ (1989, p. 53).   
34 It is of interest to note Sweden expressed concern regarding the ICTY’s method of establishment through 
the UNSC and instead argued that the ICTY should have been established through a multilateral treaty and 
thus expressly consented to by the states of the former Yugoslavia (Scharf 1997, pp. 54-55). 
35 Pareto improving regimes are assumed by neoliberals to be legitimate. 
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Vinjamuri and Snyder refer to the body of literature that emphasizes cognitive legitimacy 
as the ‘emotional and psychology approach’ to international justice and note that authors 
who utilize such an approach tend to argue that in order to prevent future atrocities an 
‘emotional catharsis’ among victims and an acceptance of responsibility by perpetrators 
must first be achieved (2004, p. 357).  Despite the fact state compliance per se is not the 
central focus of literature on catharsis-based approaches to international criminal 
tribunals, there is an implicit assumption that tribunals, acting as the agent of victims, will 
enjoy significant support within post-conflict societies.  Tribunals are also assumed to 
generate a justice constituency within post-conflict societies which will in turn pressure 
domestic elites into cooperating with international criminal tribunals.  Although initial 
attempts at securing compliance may require third party norm enforcement, trial 
processes themselves are assumed to feedback to the recalcitrant state generating future 
voluntary compliance acts.36 
 
Figure 1.2: Compliance Feedback 
 
In the early 1990s, proponents of the ICTY argued that cathartic feedback from 
international war crimes trials would heal ‘open wounds’ that would otherwise remain a 
source of future conflict.37  Neier suggested that it was the lack of justice in the former 
Yugoslavia following World War II that fed resentments which manifested in the early 
1990s: 
The resentments that Serbs harbored against Croats for the unpunished 
crimes of the Ustasha state during World War II was a major factor in the 
catastrophic developments in the ex-Yugoslavia more than four decades 
later.  Justice provides closure; its absence not only leaves wounds open, 
                                                 
36 Sikkink and Risse’s ‘spiral model’ serves to illustrate how strategic acquiescence to human rights 
regimes can lead to norm internalization (1999, pp. 17-35). 
37 Of course the term ‘cathartic feedback’ was not used within tribunal scholarship which emphasized the 
cathartic effect of international war crimes trials. 
Transfer accused 
Cathartic feed back 
Recalcitrant 
State 
International 
Criminal Tribunal 
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but its very denial rubs salt in them.  Accordingly, partisans of 
prosecutions argue, peace without justice is a recipe for further conflict 
(1998, p. 213). 
 
Williams and Taft also made a parallel argument when claiming that trials before an 
international court could have the effect of, ‘…laying bare to the Yugoslav people how 
they were manipulated through propaganda and coercion to commit savage acts on a 
massive scale’ (2003, p. 238).  This historical record is assumed to demystify destructive 
ideologies such as national chauvinism that serve to legitimize war crimes and 
reconstitute domestic norms.   
 
IL scholars, such as Akhavan, have also argued that the much of the power of 
international criminal tribunals derives from cathartic feedback.  Indictments issued by 
international tribunals are said to have a stigmatizing effect on indicted individuals and 
upon the states that fail to transfer them (Akhavan 2001).  Thus, the stigmatizing effect of 
norm-breaking alone is assumed to facilitate state compliance.38  It will, however, be 
noted in subsequent chapters that there is little evidence of individuals indicted by the 
ICTY being stigmatized within their local communities.39  Instead, Ante Gotovina, 
Ramush Haradinaj, and Slobodan Milošević, to name just a few examples, have all seen 
their popularity increase following their transfer to the ICTY.40  Tihomir Blaškić was 
even enthusiastically greeted by Croatia’s prime minister after completing a nine year 
sentence for the murder of over a hundred Bosnian Muslim civilians in southern Bosnia-
Herzegovina.41  While the above examples are merely anecdotal, polling data from 
                                                 
38 Finnemore and Sikkink argue, ‘[w]e recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval 
or stigma and norm conforming behavior either because it produces praise, or, in the case of a highly 
internalized norm, because it is so taken for granted that it provokes no reaction whatsoever (1998, p. 892). 
39 In fact, although there is no wider comparative study that empirically tests whether or not the phenomena 
of cathartic feed back existed previously, it is of interest to note indictments issued by the Tokyo tribunal 
also seemed to lack a domestic stigmatizing effect, which Akhavan attributes to the subjects of international 
prosecutions.  For example, the convicted Class-A war criminal and rightwing politician, Shigemitsu 
Mamoru, emerged from prison to become Japan’s foreign minister from 1954 – 1956, while another war 
criminal convicted by the same tribunal, Kishi Nobusuke, was elected prime minister of Japan in 1957 
(Dower 1999, p. 474). 
40 Haradinaj was elected prime minister of Kosovo following confirmation that he was under investigation 
for war crimes, and Milošević, according to polling data published in the Serbian daily Glas Javnosti (10 
September 2005, p.3), has become one of Serbia’ most popular political figures only after his transfer to the 
ICTY. 
41 Večernj List, August 4, 2004, p. 1. 
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Croatia and Serbia appears to affirm a breakdown in Akhavan’s stigmatization process.  
Despite the prosecution and conviction of Croats responsible for serious violations of 
IHL during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, a large majority of Croats continue to 
believe that Croats did not perpetrate war crimes (Lalić 2002, p. 20; Lamont 2004, p. 61).  
More disturbingly, the percentage of Serbs who believe Serb forces were involved in war 
crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo has decreased substantially since the 
beginning of the Milošević trial.  For example, the percentage of Serbs who believe large 
numbers of prisoners were held by Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina decreased from 
36 percent in 2001, to 26 percent in 2004.  Also, the percentage of Serbs who believe 
Serb forces besieged Sarajevo for over 1,000 days decreased from 53 percent in 2001 to 
40 percent in 2004.42 
 
The assumption that international criminal tribunals can provide cathartic feedback relies 
heavily on the ability of international criminal tribunals to establish a historic record 
accessible to post-conflict societies.  However, the practices of ICTY itself illustrates that 
the legal process may in fact serve as an impediment to the establishment of a historic 
record.  First, the use of secret testimony in a courtroom setting means that any attempt at 
divulging the ‘truth’ of a given event may result in criminal prosecution on charges of 
contempt of court.  Second, the prosecutorial framework of the ICTY allows prosecutors 
to argue multiple narratives of a single event.  Third, the excruciatingly slow pace of 
international criminal investigations allowed a number of defendants to die natural deaths 
before they were ever brought to trial.  It has even been argued that the failure of the 
ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) to bring charges against the Croatian leadership 
in a timely fashion has meant that a historic record of Tuđman’s role in the 1991-1995 
conflict may never be established.  William and Taft write: 
… the failure of the Office of the Prosecutor to act in a timely fashion on the 
indictment of Tudjman led to the loss of a significant historical record both for the 
international community, and the Croatian community.  Undoubtedly the continued 
idolization of Tudjman among Croats regarding their role in the early Yugoslav 
conflict, arose not only from a strong sense of nationalism but also from a dearth of 
information regarding the specific aspirations and actions of Franjo Tudjman (2003, 
p. 219). 
                                                 
42 See Appendix V. 
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In addition to Tuđman, Croatia’s wartime minister of defense Gojko Šušak died before 
and indictment could be brought against him for his role in the conflict, and Janko 
Bobetko, was only indicted in 2002 for crimes committed a decade earlier.  Yet, Bobetko 
too died a natural death before his trial could begin.  As a result of the inability of the 
OTP to bring charges in a timely fashion, Croatia’s civilian political elite escaped 
prosecution, and the highest-ranking Croats to be tried were military officers or Bosnian 
Croat quislings of the Croatian state.  An additional factor that raises concerns regarding 
the ability of international criminal tribunals to establish an impartial historical record is 
the practice of sealing the records of cases of defendants who die before the court has 
reached a judgment.  Williams and Taft lament, ‘… the failure of the Tribunal to make 
information accessible to the public greatly hampered its ability to serve one of the 
primary functions of justice – the establishment of an accurate historical record and the 
release of relevant information to the public’ (2003, p. 219).43 
 
If the focus of the debate is shifted from IHL enforcement to explaining demands for the 
creation of the ICTY then changing perceptions of what is and is not acceptable behavior 
on the part of states perhaps has more explanatory power than a narrow focus on state 
interests.  International criminal tribunals can be interpreted as not being the product of a 
hegemonic power harnessing international justice as just another tool for power 
amplification, but rather as emerging from a growing social awareness of the horrors 
perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia that violated all pre-existing norms of appropriate 
behavior.  This is consistent with a growing trend in IL scholarship which describes 
sovereignty as an evolving concept that is inclusive of obligations imposed upon states in 
return for recognition as part of the international community (Broomhall 2003, p. 59).  
 
 
 
                                                 
43It is of interest to note that the Nuremberg Tribunal made a conscious effort to publicize its proceedings 
and even issued a forty-two volume bilingual publication documenting the tribunal’s work, while the 
failure of the Tokyo tribunal to transform Japanese opinion of Japan’s role in the Second World War has 
been partly explained by the fact that the Tribunal never produced a comprehensive official record (Dower 
1999, pp. 453-454). 
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4. Sovereignty Compromised? 
 
There is an emerging consensus in both IL and constructivist IR literature that 
sovereignty ‘…is constituted by the recognition of the international community, which 
makes its recognition conditional on certain standards…’ (Broomhall 2003, p. 43).  These 
standards are said to be codified in the form of international criminal law and represent 
the limits of state sovereignty (Broomhall 2003, p. 43).  An interpretation of state 
sovereignty as constantly evolving and renegotiated permits the entrenchment of 
international criminal tribunals without mounting a zero-sum challenge to the 
Westphalian model of state sovereignty.  While some scholars see sovereignty as not 
necessarily in conflict with an emerging criminal tribunal system either because 
sovereignty is the product of inter-subjective understandings between states or because 
there is a perceived convergence between state interests and IHL enforcement, Cassese, 
drawing on practical experience as a former president of the ICTY, argues that the legal 
sovereignty afforded to states represents a continuing obstacle to IHL entrenchment.  This 
leads Cassese to argue that international criminal law cannot be effective as long as states 
retain certain aspects sovereignty that prevent tribunals from direct enforcement of their 
orders:   
So long as states retain some essential aspects of sovereignty and fail to set up an 
effective mechanism to enforce arrest warrants and to execute judgments, 
international criminal tribunals may have little more than normative impact (1998, 
p. 17). 
 
Cassese presents international law entrenchment and the recognition of state sovereignty 
as almost mutually exclusive concepts.  In other words, effective international law 
enforcement mechanisms cannot exist in a world of states that value ‘sovereignty’ over 
human rights.44  Bassiouni provides a concrete example of a direct enforcement system 
for international criminal law: 
… a regime applicable to international judicial institutions which have the power of 
enforcing their orders and judgments without going through states or any other 
legal authority (2003a, p. 18). 
 
                                                 
44 Cassese also presents this dichotomy between sovereignty and human rights in his 1997 ICTY annual 
report to the United Nations Security Council (Report of the International Tribunal 1997). 
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The only historical examples of such a regime, according to Bassiouni, are the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals (Bassiouni 2003a, p. 18); however, these tribunals were 
only possible following the complete military defeat of the Germany and Japan which 
otherwise never would have voluntarily submitted to such a regime. 
 
4.1 The Tribunal Regime and State Sovereignty 
 
Table 1.2 presents an illustration of the evolution of international criminal tribunals.  It 
can be observed that throughout the 20th century the scope of territorial and temporal 
jurisdiction for international criminal tribunals has been constantly expanding; however, 
there remains no example of a permanent international criminal tribunal, which exercises 
universal jurisdiction absent the consent of states. 
Table 1.2: International Criminal Tribunals
45 
Territorial/Individual 
Jurisdiction 
Temporal 
Jurisdiction 
Prosecutorial 
Jurisdiction 
Empirical 
Examples 
Conquered territory, 
vanquished individuals 
Ad hoc Selective, victor 
imposed 
Nuremberg and 
Tokyo 
Territorially limited, 
all individuals 
Ad hoc Selective, UNSC 
imposed 
ICTY and ICTR 
Consenting States, 
UNSC imposed 
Permanent Established through 
multilateral 
agreement or 
UNSC imposed 
ICC 
Unlimited Permanent Universal None 
 
Because international criminal tribunals depend on states for their creation, the prospect 
for the emergence of a global direct enforcement tribunal system is neither expected nor 
seriously contemplated by policymakers.  With regard to the existing permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the Statute of Rome represents a deepening 
institutionalization of a limited international criminal tribunal system that depends on 
state cooperation.  Furthermore, because the ICTY was an ad hoc tribunal with limited 
territorial and temporal jurisdiction and the creation of the UNSC, it was invested with 
                                                 
45 Table modified from a report authored by the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Statement Delivered by the Croatian Delegation 1998). 
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significantly more authority in relation to the states over which it exercised jurisdiction 
than the ICC.  For example, the ICC was not granted primacy over national courts, while 
Article 9(2) of the ICTY’s Statute states: 
‘[t]he International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts.  At any stage 
of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request national courts to 
defer to the competence of the International Tribunal…’ ('International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Amended Statute of the International Tribunal' 
2005).  
 
The primacy clause has been the subject of much controversy as it presents a direct 
challenge to the sovereign jurisdiction of domestic courts.  The tension between the 
primacy clause and domestic judiciaries has become more apparent following the death 
of Tuđman in Croatia and the fall of Milošević in Serbia as local prosecutors showed an 
increased willingness to launch proceedings against individuals indicted by the ICTY.  In 
fact, the relationship between the ICTY and new the post-authoritarian regimes has 
proved in some cases more problematic as new democratic elites are forced to legitimize 
themselves through relatively free and fair elections.  In states where persons indicted for 
crimes against humanity are more popular than political elites, or in some cases are the 
political elites,46 cooperation with an international tribunal poses a serious threat to the 
domestic political order. 
 
4.2 Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
In addition to a perceived challenge to state sovereignty, the ICTY has interacted with 
multiple non-traditional actors.  As two of the case studies to be explored are in fact 
under international administration, it will also be noted that international organizations in 
both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have been criticized for non-cooperation with the 
Tribunal.  Difficulties have arisen as a result of conflicting interests between the ICTY, 
NATO and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  With regards to the later 
two, the maintenance of stability has been prioritized over the investigation and 
prosecution of war crimes.  However, when attempting to explore the causes of non-
                                                 
46 For example, Slobodan Milošević was president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Ramush 
Haradinaj was prime minister of Kosovo at the time of their indictments by the ICTY. 
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compliance outcomes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, it is important to recall that 
existing rationalist approaches to IR and even constructivist approaches, which Krasner 
labels sociological perspectives, offer little guidance on how to explain the behavior of 
entities that lack either legal sovereignty or the ability to act autonomously.  Krasner 
points out: 
…[neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and sociological perspectives] cannot 
analyze questions involving political entities that are not fully autonomous, much 
less those where territory and authority structures are not coterminous.  Such 
entities, even if they are called states, are constrained not just by the power of other 
states but also by externally imposed domestic conditions (1995-1996, p. 147). 
 
While neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism’s inability to explore research questions 
involving ‘not fully autonomous’ entities is self-evident, Krasner argues that the 
sociological assumption that the sovereign state is produced and reinforced by shared 
understandings and authority structure cannot account for states engaging in activities 
that undermine Westphalian understandings of sovereignty (1995-1996, pp. 145-146).  
With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, assumptions regarding state compliance 
with international law in IR scholarship cannot be applied to entities whose governance 
structures are to varying degrees controlled by external actors.  Chapter Five will 
illustrate the extent to which the international community maintains direct control over 
domestic governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Office of the High 
Representative and the Peace Implementation Council despite the fact Bosnia-
Herzegovina maintained its legal identity as a sovereign state.  Moreover, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Six, Kosovo’s local institutions of self-government are 
prohibited from interactions with the ICTY, as cooperation with the Tribunal has been 
deemed a ‘reserved competency’ for UNMIK alone.47 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 This point was emphasized in a personal interview with UNMIK spokesperson Alexandar Ivanko, 8 
November 2007. 
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5. Conclusions: Introducing the Case Studies 
 
The post-cold war proliferation of international criminal tribunals has brought about a 
diverse and growing body of tribunal scholarship; however, existing scholarship on 
international criminal tribunals largely neglects questions of compliance with tribunal 
orders for the arrest and surrender of persons accused of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and instead focuses on the historic-legal 
underpinnings of the emerging tribunal system or consists largely of normative appeals 
for international justice which tend to emphasize the presumed therapeutic effect of war 
crimes trials on post-conflict societies (Akhavan 1998, 2001; Bassiouni 1992, 2003a, 
2003b; Cassese 1994, 1998; Meron 1998; Neier 1998; Simpson 2007).  The lacuna of 
literature on state compliance with tribunal orders represents a significant void in IR and 
IL literature given tribunal dependency upon state compliance can be found in the statutes 
of post-Nuremburg international criminal courts such as the ICTY, the ICTR and the 
ICC, which all place legally binding obligations upon either UN member states, or in the 
case of the ICC, signatories of the Statute of Rome, to facilitate processes which lead to 
the apprehension and trial of accused persons.  With regard to the ICTY, Article 29 of the 
Tribunal Statute assigns to states a number of pre-trial tasks extending from assistance 
with Tribunal investigations to the enforcement of arrest and surrender orders.48 
 
In order to test existing theoretical interpretations of compliance in IR and IL literature 
this thesis will explore both the domestic and international politics of compliance with 
arrest and surrender orders.  Although Article 29 encompasses a broad range of 
obligations which includes providing access to witnesses and documentation, Tribunal 
orders for provision of evidence are often confidential.  In fact, even in the event of state 
non-compliance, the non-compliance act itself in some cases is never made public.49  
Arrest and surrender orders on the other hand offer a greater degree of transparency.  
Despite the fact the ICTY began issuing sealed indictments in 1997 against a number of 
accused who were considered a flight risk or resided in a state that did not recognize the 
                                                 
48 See Appendix I. 
49 This point was emphasized in a confidential interview with an ICTY legal officer, 4 December 2007. 
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jurisdiction of the Tribunal, once a transfer to Tribunal custody has taken place, the seal 
of confidentiality was then lifted as trials could not be conducted in secret.  Therefore, 
non-compliance and compliance acts are more easily identifiable when it comes to arrest 
and surrender orders. 
 
The subsequent five case studies, while representing a diverse range of actors were all 
subject to the same legal regime, the Statute of the Tribunal.  However, actor diversity 
does require this thesis to be divided into two constituent parts.  Because three case 
studies more closely resemble the post-Westphalian model of a sovereign state, one case 
study encompasses a state that operates under externally imposed domestic governance 
structures, and the final case studies encompasses an externally imposed legal entity 
which lacks recognition of as a state, the three ‘states’ will be studied together, while the 
latter two case studies will be discussed separately.  Part I will thus explore the states, 
Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, while Part II will explore the shared sovereign entity 
that is Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, which was transformed into a protectorate under 
UN administration through UNSC Resolution 1244. 
 
Throughout the five case studies there will be an attempt to disentangle the domestic and 
international politics of compliance, while also exploring the extent to which compliance 
and non-compliance outcomes were dictated by utilitarian cost benefit calculus or 
normative obligation.  Although all five case studies will include a discussion of the 
domestic and international politics of compliance, the first three case studies will also 
include an exploration of state legitimization and identity in order to assess the extent to 
which ideational structures effect compliance choices.  In both Part I and Part II, there 
will also be a discussion of the construction of international justice which will explore 
whether or not domestic civil society or transnational advocacy networks proved 
consequential to effecting compliance outcomes.  Each chapter will then conclude with a 
discussion of the international politics of compliance. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
Croatia: A Coercive Model for Compliance 
 
 
 
We take [Norac] this evening as a symbol of all those young Croats, all Croatian men, who 
believing in their nation, in the right to resistance, to freedom, to their state, said ‘no’ to the 
aggressor and demonstrated that we could … defend and free this country. 
 
Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (2003-      ) praising Mirko Norac at a Croatian 
Democratic Union pre-election rally in February 2001
1
 
 
[The crime of persecution was perpetrated through] … the mutilation and desecration of the body 
of Boja PJEVAC; the public killing of Boja VUJNOVIC by burning her alive whilst mocking her; 
expressing an intention to kill all civilians; placing racist graffiti on buildings; and leaving 
sinister and menacing messages on a destroyed building, all of which resulted in the civilian 
population being forced to abandon their homes and property and to leave the area permanently. 
 
Excerpt from the Prosecutor vs. Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac, Consolidated Indictment 
30 July 2004 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Tracing Causal Pathways to Compliance Outcomes 
 
As we turn to what IR neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists consider a traditional 
unitary state actor, the Republic of Croatia, we will take into account a case study in 
which the ICTY has been confronted with the complex task of securing cooperation from 
a state that gained international recognition only a year before the UNSC’s May 1993 
adoption of Resolution 827.2  Although Croatia supported the creation of an international 
criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, voluntary cooperation on the part of the 
Croatian state proved not forthcoming once the ICTY launched investigations into IHL 
violations committed by Croatian armed forces.  Absent an in-country NATO security 
presence, the OTP’s investigations, and later prosecutions, were reliant on the assistance 
                                                 
1 Quoted in (Sanader 2001, p. 121). 
2 Austria, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Sweden and Switzerland recognized Croatia in January 1992.  The 
United States established diplomatic relations with Croatia in August 1992. 
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of the Croatian state for tasks such as the exhumation of mass graves, the collection of 
documentary evidence and the arrest of war crimes suspects.  Moreover, absent an 
international civilian administration, such as the Office of the High Representative in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina or the United Nations Missions in Kosovo, external actors lacked 
the ability to directly remove non-compliant state officials from office or impose 
domestic governance structures.3  Nonetheless, by December 2005, the ICTY secured the 
transfer of all Croatian citizens indicted by the Tribunal with the exception of Janko 
Bobetko, who died shortly after ICTY doctors confirmed the defendant’s ill health in 
2003.4  In fact, as of 2007, the ICTY’s successes in gaining custody of persons indicted 
for war crimes in Croatia surpassed even Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state under international 
military and civilian administration. 
 
Chapter One outlined multiple causal pathways within IR literature that could explain 
state compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders that ranged from rationalist 
strategic cost-benefit calculi to norm-centric approaches.5  In order to asses the former we 
must explore the domestic and international politics of compliance with special attention 
to internal incentive structures along with external coercion and inducements deployed by 
third party states to reward compliance and penalize non-compliance acts.  The latter 
causal pathway requires us to examine the domestic politics of compliance with special 
attention to international criminal justice norm penetration of elites and civil society.  So 
as to test rationalist and norm-centric explanatory hypotheses, this Chapter will begin 
with a discussion of the domestic political context in which the ICTY attempted to secure 
state compliance.  Interestingly, while regimes and elites changed during the first decade 
of interaction between the Croatian state and the Tribunal, episodes of compliance and 
non-compliance transcended Croatia’s transition from presidential authoritarianism to 
                                                 
3 One notable exception relevant to the period of time under examination was the UNTAES mission in 
Eastern Slavonia, which administered Eastern Slavonia from 15 January 1995 to 15 January 1998.  
Established under UNSC Resolution 1037, UNTAES governed Eastern Slavonia for a transitional period of 
two years until the region was returned to the Croatian state.  One Croatian Serb accused, Slavko 
Dokmanović, was transferred by UNTAES to ICTY custody in 1997. 
4 It should be noted that the ICTY has only indicted five Croatian citizens for war crimes committed within 
Croatia while 27 Bosnian Croats have been indicted for war crimes committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
5 Literature which identifies norm internalization as a causal phenomenon emphasizes the transmission of 
international norms into domestic politics through exogenous transnational advocacy networks and 
endogenous civil society NGOs (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998).   
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parliamentary democracy in January 2000.  Moreover, throughout the period of time 
covered in this case study Croatian elites engaged in norm affirming rhetoric by both 
recognizing the jurisdiction of the ICTY6 and supporting the establishment of a 
permanent international criminal court.7  Next, there will be an exploration of the 
domestic penetration of norms of international criminal justice.  Because domestic civil 
society is identified in constructivist IR literature as a transmission belt for international 
norms (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Sikkink & Walling 2005), 
special attention will be paid to Croatia’s NGO community.8  It will be emphasized that 
although an embryonic human rights NGO community emerged during the 1990s, 
powerful veterans’ organizations were more effective in pressuring elites to maintain 
non-compliance strategies.9  Thus, social protest-based explanations for compliance with 
ICTY arrest and surrender orders, such as the ‘boomerang pattern’ or the ‘spiral model,’ 
cannot explain the ICTY’s tremendous achievements in Croatia.  Instead, this Chapter 
will demonstrate that there does appear to be a correlation between external coercion 
applied upon the Croatian state by third party states, primarily the United States (1996-
1999) and European Union member states (2002-2006), and compliance outcomes.  By 
dividing the international politics of compliance into three phases, we can observe that 
rather than reflecting a change in domestic regime type or local elites, compliance acts 
reflected external incentives for compliance rather than exclusively endogenous 
preferences.  However, before discussing the international politics of compliance, let us 
first establish the domestic political context in which compliance and non-compliance 
decisions took place. 
 
                                                 
6 Illustrative of Croatian norm affirmation of the ICTY are comments made by Ivan Šimonović before the 
UN General Assemby in 1998: 
Let me reiterate Croatia’s support for the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia to bring to justice all those responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  Croatia reiterates its view that cooperation with the Tribunal must be unconditional… 
(Šimonović 1998, p. 8). 
7 See for example, Croatia’s statement delivered to the UN General Assembly in 1998 in which Croatia 
expressed strong support for the creation of a permanent international criminal court (Statement Delivered 
by the Croatian Delegation 1998). 
8 Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang pattern’ takes appeals by domestic NGO’s within the norm violating 
state as a starting point for the mobilization of external shaming processes (1998, pp. 12-14). 
9 This is especially significant given the importance Sikkink and Walling attach to domestic NGOs in 
constructing the ideational context for war crimes trial processes (2005). 
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2. Domestic Politics and Compliance 
 
When the Socialist Republic of Croatia held its post-communist founding elections in 
1990, multi-party elections were held within the context of a collapsing federal state and 
intensifying intra-Yugoslav republican conflict.  Internally, Croatia’s ruling communist 
party, the League of Communists of Croatia (Savez komunista Hrvatske, SKH), was 
challenged by Franjo Tuđman’s Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica, HDZ), a party which Zakošek described as having a strong centralized 
leadership, internal cohesion and a clear ethno-nationalist programmatic identity (2002, p. 
30).  The HDZ’s centralized leadership structures allowed the party to quickly 
consolidate power around Tuđman following electoral victory in 1990 through the 
ratification of the December 1990 Christmas Constitution.  Furthermore, the party’s hold 
on power was amplified by the fact Croatian electoral law translated the HDZ’s narrow 
electoral victory over the SKH into an absolute parliamentary majority in the Social 
Political Council, the dominant republican parliamentary decision-making institution 
(Lamont 2008, p. 62). 
 
In the aftermath of Croatia’s June 1991 declaration of independence and the outbreak of 
war, Croatia’s regime type acquired an increasingly authoritarian hue as the Office of the 
Presidency, created in 1990, came to dominate all other institutions of government, 
including both parliament and the judiciary (Lamont 2008, p. 70).  With regard to the 
parliament, the institution’s role was almost entirely usurped by presidential advisory 
councils, in which policy decisions were made and presented to the parliament as fait 
accompli (Zakošek 2002, pp. 113-114).10  While neither the causes of the consolidation 
of authoritarianism nor the outbreak of war in 1991 are the focus of this study, violent 
conflict and presidential authoritarianism embedded legacies that shaped the domestic 
political context of interaction between the ICTY and the Croatian state.  For example, 
the centralization of powers around Tuđman and a small clique of advisors meant that 
there was little debate regarding the ratification of the 1996 Constitutional Law on 
                                                 
10 Sikkink and Lutz argue centralized decision-making structures can be conducive to compliance (2000, p. 
639). 
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Cooperation with the ICTY.  Additionally, with regard to the war, the ejection of 
150,000-200,000 Croatian Serbs in August 199511 meant that for the most part Serb 
victims of war crimes were no longer members of the domestic political community and 
could not organize domestic NGOs to publicize state human rights abuses. 
 
2.1 State Legitimization 
 
After Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991, the Tuđman-led government 
immediately sought international recognition of Croatian independence in order to affirm 
Croatia’s status as a sovereign state and legitimize the new government.  As a newly 
independent state, Croatia’s ratification of human rights covenants was part of a larger 
effort to affirm Croatia’s status as an independent state through membership in 
international institutions.12  International legitimization was directly linked to domestic 
legitimization of the governing HDZ as Croatian membership in institutions such as the 
United Nations (UN) was perceived as a reaffirmation of state sovereignty and was 
enthusiastically received by domestic public opinion.  In fact, the HDZ directly benefited 
from Croatia’s admittance into the UN preceding parliamentary and presidential elections 
held in August 1992.13  Furthermore, although Tuđman’s authoritarianism meant that 
Croatia could not formally seek entry into either the EU or NATO, the perceived support 
of EU member states such as Germany was important in maintaining the legitimacy of 
the regime (Boduszynski 2001, p. 21).  In addition, despite an inability of Croatia to 
formally negotiate membership into the EU or NATO, the extent to which Zagreb sought 
legitimization from European institutions can be illustrated by the fact that even in the 
absence of a formal EU accession process during the 1990s, in 1998 the Croatian 
government began to ‘voluntarily’ harmonize new legislation with existing EU law 
(Government of the Republic of Croatia Action Plan 1999, p. 14). 
                                                 
11 Although 150,000-200,000 is a broad range, this is the figure quoted in the ICTY’s initial indictment of 
Ante Gotovina (The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina 2001). 
12 For example, as Croatia sought membership in the Council of Europe, Croatia signed the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Framework Convention on the Protection for National Minorities, and 
the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture among others.  Croatia became a full member of the 
Council of Europe in 1996. 
13 Zakošek attributes the scale of the HDZ’s electoral victory in August 1992 to the fact that elections were 
held shortly after Croatia won recognition as a member state of the UN (2002, p. 35). 
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While the HDZ’s attempted to legitimize the new state through embedding Croatia in 
existing international covenants and treaties, the HDZ was also confronted with the task 
of de-legitimizing the Yugoslav ancien regime.  It was through the linkage of the 
Yugoslav project to war crimes perpetrated by the Yugoslav National Army 
(Jugoslovenska narodna armija, JNA) on Croatian territory in 1991 that what Kasapović 
later described as the ‘moral de-legitimization’ of the Yugoslav project was achieved 
(2002, p. 293).  For example, Croatian state television’s labelling of JNA forces as, 
‘Yugo-military greater Serbian aggressors’ inextricably linked ‘Yugoslavia’ to the Greater 
Serbian project.14  Also, the historic memory of war crimes committed by Josip Broz 
Tito’s partisan forces in May 1945 was resurrected as a means of de-legitimizing the pan-
Yugoslav partisan movement.  Moreover, just as the Jasenovac memorial center, built on 
the site of a notorious concentration camp, was utilized by the Yugoslav regime to de-
legitimize the World War II-era fascist Independent State of Croatia, (Nezavisna država 
Hrvatska, NDH), the resurrection of the memory of members of the NDH armed forces 
who were massacred by partisans at Bleiburg in Austria during May 1945 served to de-
legitimize the Yugoslav state as it cast the state as having been the creation of a criminal 
enterprise (D.B. MacDonald 2002, pp. 170-172).15  In fact, during the 1990s, Bleiburg 
became a pilgrimage site, not just for neo-fascists, but also for officials of the Croatian 
state.16  It is because of the nexus between regime illegitimacy and war crimes promoted 
in the 1990s that the initiation of ICTY investigations into major Croatian military 
operations was perceived not just as a threat to regime elites directly implicated in the 
investigations themselves, but as a threat to the legitimacy of the Croatian state, as well.17 
 
                                                 
14 Emphasis added by author.  For example, see (Dan Hrvatskog Sabora 2006). 
15 Numerous publications detailing war crimes committed against surrendering Croatian fascist forces in 
1945 were produced during the 1990s.  For example, Darko Sagrak’s Zagreb 1941-1945 (1995).  
Furthermore, as the fascist NDH was the only independent Croatian state in modern history, attempts were 
made at rehabilitating the legacy of the Ustaša party’s fascist regime.  For example, Trpimir Macan, in the 
introduction to Tko je Tko u NDH [Who is Who in the NDH], edited by Marko Grčić, concluded ‘the 
Ustaša regime…was not criminal’ (Grčić 1997, p. IX) 
16 Media coverage of the commemoration of the Bleiburg massacre has in fact become an almost annual 
ritual following Croatia’s declaration of independence.  For example see ‘Kostović: Nitko se još nije 
isprićao za zločin na Bleiburgu’ Jutarnji list, 15 May 2002, p. 2. 
17 This linkage between state legitimacy and war crimes would become increasingly emphasized following 
the indictment of Ante Gotovina in 2001.  See for example Lukić 2001. 
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2.2 The Domestic Politics of Compliance 1996-1999 
   
The subversion of the rule of law through presidential control over judicial appointments 
and dismissals meant that a domestic legal regime underpinning ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders and state provision of complementary prosecutions and investigations 
was not a viable prospect during the 1990s.  Domestic legal objections to swift 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders were overcome through extra-
constitutional means rather than through a legal codification of the arrest and surrender 
process.  The Office of the Presidency’s interference in the judicial process meant the 
Croatian judiciary exercised little independence as judges waited for clear signals from 
the presidency before reaching judgments in sensitive cases (Zakošek 2002, p. 30), and in 
particular cases involving war crimes or regime associates.  Furthermore, the domestic 
legal foundation of the 1996 Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY was even 
subject to legal challenge.  Although the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia directly 
introduced international law into domestic legislation through Article 134, which states, 
‘[i]nternational agreements concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution… 
shall be part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia…,’18 Croatia’s adoption 
of the Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY satisfied, ‘neither the procedure 
for amending the Constitution nor the procedure for enacting laws’ (Josipović 2005, p. 
188) rendering the domestic legal foundation for the surrender of an accused to the 
Tribunal questionable at best.  As a result, despite having demonstrated a willingness to 
comply with ICTY surrender orders and establishing, ‘…a better record of cooperation 
and compliance with the Tribunal than the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (Report of 
the International Tribunal 1999, p. 27), the arbitrary means by which individuals were 
transferred to The Hague meant that there was no standardized process for the transfer of 
an accused to ICTY custody and instead ICTY indictments were responded to only on an 
ad hoc basis.  Thus, Tuđman’s transfer of 17 Bosnian Croats to ICTY custody from 1996-
1999 did not constitute an internalization of a domestic compliance regime.  In fact, 
rather than ensuring the universal application of arrest and surrender orders, the Croatian 
government proved more willing to transfer those who lacked close political connections 
                                                 
18 Emphasis added by author. 
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with the governing party or president.  For example, while Tihomir Blaškić and Vinko 
Martinović19 were voluntarily surrendered to The Hague, others such as Ivica Rajić were 
issued false identities and sent into hiding or as in the case of Mladen Natelilić20 and 
Janko Bobetko, arrest and surrender orders were denied upon the Croatian state’s 
determination that the defendants were too ill to stand trial.21 
 
With regard to domestic war crimes proceedings during and in the immediate aftermath 
of the 1991-1995 conflict, prosecutions almost exclusively targeted Croatian Serbs.  The 
OSCE reported that since 1991, the domestic courts issued over 1700 war crimes 
indictments and secured over 800 convictions, a vast majority against members of 
Croatia’s Serbian minority (Supplementary Report 2004, p. 1).  Yet, rather than 
representing an entrenchment of norms of IHL, many convictions were not consistent 
with internationally recognized IHL standards and many Serbs were tried in absentia.  
Furthermore, perhaps the most egregious example of the Croatian judiciary’s ethno-
centric interpretation of IHL occurred after Tuđman’s death in December 1999 when 
Svetozar Karan, a Croatian Serb, was found criminally responsible for what the court 
referred to as the 500 year history of war crimes perpetrated by Serbs against Croats by 
the Gospić County Court (Supplementary Report 2004, p. 13).22  Karan’s conviction was 
symptomatic of the challenges that the Croatian judiciary faced in overcoming the legacy 
of Tuđman-era politically motivated judicial appointments and proceedings.  Tuđman’s 
subversion of the rule of law combined with a legacy of constitutional or legal 
nationalism, which Hayden defines as ‘…a constitutional or legal structure that privileges 
the members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state’ 
(2002, p. 655), illustrates just a couple obstacles to referring cases from the ICTY to the 
                                                 
19 It should be pointed out that at the time of Martinović’s indictment in December 1998, Martinović was 
already serving a prison sentence for a post-war murder unrelated to the ICTY indictment; however his 
transfer was considered voluntary as he instructed his attorneys not to challenge the extradition order issued 
by the Croatian Supreme Court. 
20 Natelilić was also already imprisoned by Croatian authorities and was awaiting trial for unrelated 
criminal activities at the time of his December 1998 indictment by the ICTY for war crimes committed in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina; however, the Croatian government argued that as domestic proceedings had been 
delayed for reasons of ill health, Natelilić could not be transferred to The Hague. 
21 After initial protests by the Croatian government, both Natelilić and Bobetko were examined by ICTY 
doctors in Croatia, rather than in The Hague. 
22 This conviction was later overturned by the Croatian Supreme Court, which ordered Karan’s re-trail in 
Karlovac.  Karan was again convicted on other charges and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. 
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Croatian judiciary under Rule 11bis.23  In the short term, ad hoc and extra-legal 
mechanisms through which Tuđman governed permitted both compliance and non-
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders that facilated a pareto improving 
bargaining process which allowed the Croatian state to extract material rewards for 
compliance acts; however, the long term effect of Croatia’s ad hoc response to ICTY 
indictments was that following regime transition, the transfer of individuals indicted by 
the ICTY had become increasingly perceived as a political rather than judicial process.24  
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that from 1993 to 1999, Croatia never challenged the 
legality of the Tribunal itself and instead relied upon legal challenges to individual 
indictments and investigations or claims of a functional inability to comply with ICTY 
orders. 
 
2.3 The Domestic Politics of Compliance 2000-2006 
 
The electoral defeat of the governing HDZ in parliamentary elections held in January 
2000 resulted in a six party coalition, led by Ivica Račan’s communist successor Social 
Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP).  Combined with the 
defeat of the HDZ’s presidential candidate in the first round of presidential elections also 
held in January 2000 this created the perception that the 2000 change in government 
represented a decisive break from Croatia’s nationalist authoritarian past and the 
beginning of the end of what Kasapović described as ‘…the long-term political and moral 
de-legitimization of the [Croatian] Left, which had been the main promoter of the 
Yugoslav idea in Croatian history’ (Kasapović 2002, p. 293).  The change in government 
was followed by constitutional reforms aimed at stripping the Croatian presidency of 
powers accumulated under Tuđman (Lamont 2008, p. 74).  The transition to 
parliamentary government meant that cooperation with the ICTY could no longer be the 
outcome of ad hoc presidential decision-making processes, which previously 
                                                 
23 Rule 11bis of the Tribunal Statute permits the ICTY to refer cases back to state courts for prosecution 
(Rules, Procedures and Evidence 2007). 
24 Personal interview, Social Democratic Party official, 23 March 2006, Personal interview, ICTY Outreach 
Office Zagreb, 23 March 2006.  Personal interview with former Croatian foreign ministry official 24 March 
2006.  Also see Lamont 2004, pp. 60-61. 
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monopolized compliance decisions, but rather would be reliant on parliamentary 
consensus. 
 
As Croatia transitioned from presidential authoritarianism to parliamentary democracy, 
the HDZ’s electoral defeat signaled an opportunity to improve cooperation between the 
ICTY and the Croatian state.  After all, although Tuđman was willing to surrender 
individuals indicted by the Tribunal, Tuđman’s government also obstructed ICTY 
investigations of war crimes perpetrated by Croat forces (Report of the International 
Tribunal 1999, p. 27).  Representative of this initial optimism regarding the extent to 
which the reformist government in Zagreb would be willing to confront war crimes 
committed by the previous regime was the fact that the ICTY, for the first time, referred a 
case to the Croatian judiciary for prosecution under Rule 11bis.  Also, Račan’s 
government adopted a parliamentary resolution affirming the government’s commitment 
to cooperation with the ICTY (Declaration on Cooperation 2000). Yet, although Račan’s 
government proved to be forthcoming with regards to ICTY requests for information 
(RFIs) and in providing assistance with regard to the exhumations of mass graves (Report 
of the International Tribunal 2003, p. 53), the indictments of Rahim Ademi and Ante 
Gotovina, which were made public in July 2001, plunged the SDP-led coalition 
government into crisis over the question of their transfer to Tribunal custody and the 
contents of the indictments themselves.  A minor coalition partner, the Croatian Social 
Liberal Party (Hrvatska socijalna libralna stranka, HSLS) demanded non-compliance 
with the arrest and surrender request and a renegotiation of the Tuđman-era 
Constitutional Law on Cooperation with ICTY.  Dražen Budiša, the HSLS party leader, 
even accused the ICTY of having indicted Croatian nation for genocide in its indictments 
of Ademi and Gotovina (Lukić 2001).  When Račan instead reaffirmed a commitment on 
the part of the Croatian government to continue to cooperate with the ICTY, despite not 
having acted to arrest Gotovina before the indictment was made public on July 25, 
2001,25 the HSLS left the governing coalition. 
                                                 
25 The Gotovina indictment was initially confirmed on 8 June 2001 and shortly thereafter disclosed in 
confidentiality to relevant Croatian government ministers in an attempt to secure Gotovina’s arrest before 
the indictment’s publication.  An arrest warrant for Ante Gotovina was issued by the Croatian Ministry of 
Justice on 9 July, three weeks before the ICTY’s indictment was made public.  It was during the period of 
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In addition to the depature of the HSLS from the governing coalition, Račan’s 
government was also put under significant pressure by Croatia’s large war veterans’ 
organizations which organized large rallies to protest the prosecution of members of the 
Croatian armed forces for violations of IHL before either domestic or international courts.  
A February 2001 gathering in Croatia’s second largest city of Split attracted over 100,000 
protesters, while similar demonstrations were organized around the country throughout 
2001-2002 (Lamont 2004, pp. 60-61).  The mobilization of veterans’ organizations post-
regime transition singled to the Račan government the high domestic costs associated 
with compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders and guided Zagreb away from the 
norm-affirming rhetoric found in the April 2000 Declaration on Cooperation with the 
ICTY.26 
 
2.3.1 Challenging Article 29 – The Bobetko Crisis 
 
Although a direct confrontation with both domestic public opinion and the ICTY was 
avoided in 2001 by the fact that Ademi voluntarily surrendered to the Tribunal and 
Gotovina went into hiding after being issued with false travel documents by the Ministry 
of the Interior, the July 2001 crisis exposed the vulnerability of Račan’s parliamentary 
government to populist opposition to compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  
However, it was only when a former head of the Croatian armed forces, Janko Bobetko, 
was indicted in September 2002 that Račan directly challenged the legality of an arrest 
and surrender order and indirectly sought to renegotiate the relationship between the 
states of the former Yugoslavia and the ICTY.  Račan’s rejection of the Bobetko 
indictment on the grounds that domestic courts deemed the indictment to be ‘illegal’27 
                                                                                                                                                 
time after 8 June and before 21 July 2001 that Gotovina went into hiding.  It was also between 8 June and 
the 21 July that Gotovina acquired a false passport under the name ‘Kristijan Horvat.’  More on events that 
followed the ICTY’s confirmation of the Gotovina indictment can be found in the ‘Prosecution’s Response 
Opposing Gotovina’s Request for Provisional Release’ 22 August 2007. 
26 It should be emphasized that Croatia would not deny its legal obligation to cooperate with the ICTY, but 
rather denied the legality of an individual indictment. 
27 Questions raised by the Croatian government in its appeal of the Bobetko indictment included: ‘a) Does 
the [ICTY] Statute or the Rules provide for a right to appeal or to seek a review of a decision of a 
confirming Judge? b) If so, does Croatia have locus standi to make such an application? c) Was the 
prosecution under an obligation prior to issuing an arrest warrant to interview the proposed accused person? 
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was perceived by the Tribunal as an attempt to alter the relationship between states and 
the ICTY established in the Tribunal Statute.  In fact, the OTP reminded Croatia that 
compliance with Tribunal arrest and surrender orders was not ‘an optional regime’ for 
states.  Furthermore, if the states of the former Yugoslavia were to be the arbiters of the 
legality of indictments issued by the ICTY, then the effectively the Tribunal could no 
longer compel transfers (Decision on Challenge by Croatia 2002).  Thus, in a strongly 
worded dismissal of Croatia’s appeal of the Bobetko indictment, the Appeals Chamber 
found: 
Croatia’s role in complying with [an arrest] request or order is the purely 
ministerial one of executing the warrants and carrying out such arrest and detention 
as ordered by the Tribunal. A State which is ordered to arrest or detain an 
individual pursuant to Article 29(d) has no standing to challenge the merits of that 
order (Decision on Challenge by Croatia 2002). 
 
The failure of Croatia’s appeal of the Bobetko indictment on procedural grounds led the 
Croatian government argue against Bobetko’s transfer on grounds the defendant’s health 
had substantially deteriorated.  However, this objection was also dismissed by the OTP, 
which argued that it should be the ICTY which determines whether a defendant was too 
ill to appear before the Tribunal, not the state in question.  The OTP also demanded that 
the defendant should be first surrendered to the ICTY and only then would the health of 
the defendant be assessed in The Hague by Tribunal doctors.  Significantly, even after the 
failure of Croatia’s legal appeals, Croatia never rejected the ICTY legal regime itself, but 
instead focused on efforts to reinterpret regime rules. 
 
In October 2002, the president of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, reported Croatia’s non-
compliance to the UNSC; however, as Cassese chose to report Croatia as not being in 
compliance its obligations under international law, rather than refer Croatia to the 
Council, no punitive action was taken (Status Report No. 11 2002, p. 11).  Following 
Cassese’s report to the UNSC a compromise was negotiated between the Tribunal and 
Croatia which permitted Tribunal doctors to examine Bobetko’s health in a Zagreb 
                                                                                                                                                 
d) Should the confirming Judge have requested the prosecution to submit evidence which would 
demonstrate the necessity to arrest the accused? e) Should the confirming Judge have adopted a procedure 
less constraining than the issue of an arrest warrant if that other procedure could have served the same 
objective? In particular, if the accused satisfies the conditions for provisional release, does he nevertheless 
still need to be arrested?’ (Decision on Challenge by Croatia 2002). 
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hospital.  As Tribunal doctor’s confirmed Bobetko’s health had in fact deteriorated, the 
ICTY agreed not to pursue Bobetko’s transfer unless there was a significant improvement 
in the accused’s health (Hartmann 2003).  Then, following Bobetko’s death in April 
2003, the ICTY withdrew its indictment.  Although Bobetko’s death brought the 
immediate crisis in the relationship between the Tribunal and the Croatian state to an end, 
the fact that the Račan government rejected the ICTY’s demand Bobetko be served with 
the indictment28 was interpreted as a successful challenge to the ICTY within Croatia.29   
 
2.3.2 From Non-Compliance to Compliance 
 
The return of the HDZ to government, following parliamentary elections in November 
2003, marked the beginning of a process of reconciliation between the Croatian state and 
the ICTY.  Despite the fact the HDZ had aggressively opposed the transfer of Croatian 
officers under ICTY indictment to The Hague while in opposition (Lamont 2004, p. 60), 
once the party returned to power in 2003, the HDZ immediately engaged in norm 
affirming rhetoric that emphasized Croatia’s legal obligation to cooperate with the ICTY.  
The HDZ’s post-Tuđman party leader, Ivo Sanader, favored the aggressive pursuit of 
rapid EU and NATO membership (Lamont 2008, p. 77) and saw cooperation with the 
ICTY, as a means by which Croatia could accelerate membership negotiations with Euro-
Atlantic institutions (Sanader za ORF 2005).  The priority which Sanader attached to 
improving relations with the ICTY can be illustrated by the fact that, along with other 
heads of government, Sanader contacted ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
immediately after taking office in order to discuss ways Croatia could improve 
cooperation with the Tribunal.  Sanader’s government also enlisted the assistance of 
foreign intelligence agencies in the search for fugitive general Ante Gotovina,30 while 
                                                 
28 Although Bobetko’s lawyers were eventually presented with the indictment in March 2003, Bobetko’s 
illness had progressed to a point that Račan had avoided the prospect of having Bobetko served in person 
with the indictment. 
29 Vladimir Šeks, an opposition HDZ member of parliament argued that Račan successfully transformed 
himself into ‘a leader of the Croatian Right’ (Lamont 2004, pp. 60-61).  Yet, this transformation would not 
prevent the SDP-led government from suffering electoral defeat to the HDZ in November 2003. 
30 BBC correspondent Nick Thorpe provides a description of the role of UK intelligence in the search for 
Ante Gotovina (2005). 
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also facilitating the voluntary surrenders of Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač, who were 
indicted and surrendered to Tribunal custody in 2004. 
 
3. Constructing International Justice: International Norms and Domestic Politics 
 
The preceding overview of Croatia’s interaction with the ICTY highlighted domestic 
politics of compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders; however, it did not provide 
insight into explanations for compliance which rely on norm internalization.  The 
constructivist causal mechanisms of normative social protest or elite socialization could 
serve as non-material mechanisms to alter elite preferences.  After all, Finnemore and 
Sikkink argued that domestic civil society could utilize international norms of appropriate 
behavior to transform the preferences of domestic elites (1998, p. 893), and in the event 
access to local elites was blocked, Keck and Sikkink suggest NGOs could take their 
campaigns abroad to mobilize external shaming of elites (1998, pp. 12-14).  In Croatia 
civil society served to harden non-compliance preferences, and the ‘boomerang pattern’ 
described by Keck and Sikkink failed to manifest itself.  While Croatian political elites 
consistently engaged in norm-affirming rhetoric, even when challenging Tribunal 
jurisdiction over specific investigations, it was within civil society that more aggressive 
demands for a complete rejection of the ICTY regime emerged.  Croatian civil society’s 
mobilization against the ICTY was representative of widespread public distrust of the 
Tribunal and the belief that war crimes were not committed by Croatian armed forces 
during the 1991-1995 conflict (Lamont 2004, pp. 60-62).  While a prolific body of 
literature focusing on case studies of successful international norm internalization has 
emerged in recent years (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Gurowitz 1999; 
Keck & Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Lutz & Sikkink 2000; Sikkink 1993; Sikkink & 
Walling 2005), examinations of breakdowns in causal mechanisms identified in the 
literature remain lacking.  In an attempt to explain the failure of international norms of 
international criminal justice to penetrate the domestic realm, there will be an exploration 
of civil society and domestic institutional constraints to norm mobilization.  However, 
first there will be a discussion of attempts by external normative actors to engage with 
domestic civil society and public opinion. 
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3.1 The ICTY and Transnational Advocacy Networks 
 
Throughout the period of time under exploration in this case study external normative 
pressure was exerted by both the ICTY itself and transnational international human rights 
organizations.  Unfortunately, the ICTY only belatedly engaged in a dialogue with 
domestic NGOs and public opinion through its failure to establish a regional Outreach 
Office until 2000.31  Moreover, it was also only in 2000 that the Tribunal began to 
translate press releases into Serbo-Croatian (Power 2000, p. 22).  The ICTY recognized 
its own image problem in its 1999 annual report delivered to the UNSC, which conceded, 
‘The Tribunal is viewed negatively by large segments of the population of the former 
Yugoslavia’ (Report of the International Tribunal 1999, p. 38).  Because ICTY trials 
were not broadcast directly within Croatia32 information regarding trials was filtered 
through first domestic correspondents reporting from The Hague and second through 
domestic media outlets.  Direct access to information regarding war crimes trials has also 
been made more difficult for those in the former Yugoslavia as comprehensive access to 
Tribunal documents was available in only English and French on the Tribunal’s website, 
while only more limited information is provided in the languages of the former 
Yugoslavia.33  With regard to ICTY trial transcripts, these are only available in the two 
official languages of the Tribunal, English and French, despite testimony often being 
translated from the languages of the former Yugoslavia. 
 
In the absence of ICTY outreach activities during the 1990s, the state controlled media, 
which almost entirely monopolized television news coverage and also influenced 
                                                 
31 Even after the establishment of the ICTY’s Outreach Offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade, these 
offices were only staffed with two full time professional outreach personnel. Pesonal interview with 
Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY Field Office in Belgrade, 23 January 2007. 
32 This is referring to television broadcast coverage such as Serbia’s B92’s broadcast of the Milošević trial.  
It should be noted that ICTY trials in open session are broadcast over the Internet on the ICTY’s webpage 
[www.un.org/icty].  It must be pointed out that on 11 March 2008, after the period of time covered in this 
case study, opening statements in the Gotovina et al. trial were carried live by Croatian state television. 
33 For example, as of May 2006, only four indictments were translated into Albanian, which did not include 
indictments of a number of prominent Serbs indicted for war crimes in Kosovo itself.  See the ICTY 
webpage’s Albanian language site [http://www.un.org/icty/index-a.html] last accessed 26 May 2006. 
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coverage of events in the print media (Zakošek 2002, pp. 29-30), was able to frame the 
Tribunal’s activities in a manner that reflected non-compliance preferences of state elites.  
State involvement in undermining the legitimacy of international war crimes trials 
involving Croats was facilitated through both state and private media, which launched 
aggressive attacks against the ICTY that went effectively unchallenged by the Tribunal.  
Overall media coverage of the ICTY led an official of the ICTY Outreach Office in 
Zagreb to note that it was impossible for the Office to even attempt to counter campaigns 
of misinformation in the Croatian press.34 
  
Although direct state control over the media was substantially weakened by legislation 
adopted in 2001 which prevented political parties from influencing the selection of 
Croatian Radio Television directors (Zakošek 2002, p. 131), intimidation of independent 
journalists proved an effective extra-legal means of influencing war crimes coverage 
post-regime transition.  For example, Freedom House found that independent media 
coverage of the ICTY has been obstructed by a systemic campaign of intimidation against 
journalists.  Freedom House’s 2005 report on freedom of the press in Croatia noted: 
Government cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)… and other sensitive political issues are still difficult to cover 
for state-run and local media outlets. Several reporters were physically attacked this 
year, and one reporter claimed to have received death threats. There were no arrests 
for the 2003 shooting of a broadcaster owner and the car bombing of an influential 
publisher. Two separate incidents involving the harassment of journalists by the 
Counterintelligence Agency (POA) shocked media organizations. In November, a 
journalist came forward and stated that she was held against her will, threatened, 
blackmailed, and interrogated about the president's activities. Earlier in the year, 
four journalists filed complaints claiming that the POA had conducted surveillance 
against them and accused them of espionage because the journalists had reported on 
the whereabouts of an indicted war criminal. After each instance, the POA director 
was replaced ('Freedom of the Press – Croatia 2005' 2005).   
 
Even at times when the Croatian state expressed a compliance preference, state elites 
would find themselves the targets of intimidation by veterans’ organizations.  For 
example, after Račan reaffirmed Croatia’s commitment to cooperating with the ICTY, 
Dražen Pavlović of the Croatian Military Invalids of the Homeland War (Hrvatski vojnih 
invalida iz domovinkog rata, HVIDR-a), a prominent veterans’ organization, issued a 
                                                 
34 Personal interview with a member of staff of the ICTY Outreach Office in Zagreb, 23 March 2006. 
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veiled threat warning that both Mesić and Račan would soon be ‘eating breakfast’ with 
the recently assassinated Serbian prime minister Zoran Đinđić ('Prijetnje Mesiću i 
Račanu: ‘Što prije doručkujte s drugom Đinđićem'' 2003).  Pavlović’s threat illustrated 
the extent to which segments of civil society had mobilized against cooperation and acted 
as a mechanism that could force the involuntary defection of state elites expressing a 
compliance preference.35 
 
The ICTY was not alone in failing to engage in normative persuasion within Croatia.  
Transnational international justice NGOs also invested minimal effort in engaging with 
domestic civil society during the 1990s and instead groups such as Human Rights Watch 
published detailed reports of human rights violations only to recommend third party 
states sanction the Croatian state.36  Meanwhile although No Peace without Justice has 
undertaken outreach activities in Africa to promote the ICC, NPWJ’s activities in the 
former Yugoslavia were primarily limited to documentation of war crimes (Colitti 2005).  
The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, while primarily aimed at promoting 
the ICC also engages in promoting broader norms of international criminal 
accountability, based its Regional Office for southeastern Europe in Brussels, Belgium.  
Absent a sustained presence of transnational international justice advocacy networks 
within Croatia, only relatively small Croatian branches of larger transnational NGOs 
emerged during the 1990s such as the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, 
which engaged in documenting human rights violations.37 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Although the term involuntary defection was used by Putnam to describe domestic non-state actors 
blocking adherence or ratification of an agreement on the part of a state (Putnam 1988, p. 438), the term 
involuntary defection is used here to describe elements of civil society acting to block, impede or attempt to 
dissuade compliance acts on the part of a state. 
36 Human Rights Watch advocated third party coercion to bring about war crimes trials and an improvement 
in human rights in Croatia.  See for example the following Human Rights Watch publications: ‘Croatia: EU 
Must Address Domestic War Crimes Trials’ 20 December 2004; ‘Croatia: A Decade of Dissappointment’ 5 
September 2006; ‘Human Rights Watch Concerns on the Western Balkans’ 7 March 2006. 
37 See Appendix II. 
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3.2 Civil Society: Veterans, Victims and Human Rights NGOs  
 
Peskin and Boduszysńki point out that there was effectively no domestic pressure from 
civil society to investigate war crimes committed by the Croatian government during the 
1991-1995 conflict, and instead the impetus for the investigation of war crimes was 
almost completely external (2003, p. 1123).  The absence of a robust human rights NGO 
community may serve to explain the significant obstacles to conducting war crimes trials 
of prominent Croats suspected of serious violations of IHL whether domestic or 
international.  Sikkink and Walling note that human rights NGOs can play a vital role 
acting as norm entrepreneurs bringing about domestic human rights trials and establishing 
the ‘ideational context’ for international criminal tribunals (2005, pp. 22-24).  However, 
as many Latin American human rights NGOs to which Sikkink refers were initially 
composed of the direct relatives of victims of state human rights abuses, such as the 
Mothers of the Plazo de Mayo and Grandmothers of the Plazo de Mayo in Argentina 
(Sikkink 1993, p. 425), the ejection of the Krajina Serb community in 1995 may explain 
the relative absence of local NGO pressure groups demanding the prosecution of Croats 
responsible for war crimes as the victims of state human rights abuses are no longer 
members of the domestic political community. 
 
With regard to the extent that civil society did engage in the war crimes debate, major 
segments of civil society were intensely hostile to ICTY investigations committed by 
Croatian forces.  The early mobilization of civil society against the ICTY had a 
significant long-term impact on the subsequent development of the Croatian NGO 
community as the public war crimes debate was monopolized by advocacy groups with 
close links to the HDZ.  In fact, an official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Zagreb 
recalled that despite an attempt in 2005 to engage veterans’ organizations in a conference 
on war crimes organized by the Outreach Office, veterans’ organizations declined to 
participate out of lingering distrust of the Tribunal.38   
 
                                                 
38 Personal interview with member of staff of the ICTY Outreach Office in Zagreb, 23 March 2006. 
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As with the impetus for the prosecution of war criminals, NGO campaigns demanding 
investigations of war crimes committed during the 1991-1995 war were initially the 
outcome of external rather than internal stimuli.  In fact, Croatian Serb victims of human 
rights abuses directed their campaigns toward public opinion in western Europe and 
North America rather than attempt to engage public opinion within Croatia.39  Although a 
domestic human rights NGO community began to emerge in the 1990s, it remained 
highly dependent upon foreign sources of funding from donors such as the US and UK 
Embassies in Zagreb, the US Agency for International Development, the European 
Commission and the Open Society Institute.40  Furthermore, foreign-funded NGOs 
encountered substantial obstacles to operating in-country.  One such obstacle was the fact 
that Croatian civil society was dominated by organizations that were not consistent with 
traditional concepts of NGOs and instead were often organizations of a distinct ethno-
nationalist hue (S. Fisher 2003, pp. 74-92).41  The relative strength of anti-ICTY NGOs, 
primarily Croatian war veterans’ and war victims’ organizations, was the result of a 
decade of almost exclusive access to state funding and the recent memory or effects of 
armed conflict.  Because many anti-ICTY NGOs are of a distinctly illiberal orientation, 
there should be a clear distinction made between domestically funded war veterans’ 
organizations and more traditional conceptions of NGOs.42  Moreover, because 
compliance models which rely upon domestic civil society as part of a causal chain such 
as the ‘boomerang pattern’ and the ‘spiral model’ isolate human rights NGOs, non-
compliance pulls exerted by other elements of civil society remains to be explored. 
 
Although much smaller in terms of membership when compared with victims’ and 
veterans’ organizations, externally funded NGOs with a Zagreb presence have attempted 
to engage domestic opinion with regard to war crimes issues; however, they have been 
unable to alter compliance preferences.  The difficulties encountered by human rights 
NGOs in operating in Croatia were exacerbated by negative media framing of human 
                                                 
39 For example, Amnesty International initiated an international campaign in December 2004 demanding 
justice for Croatian Serbs murdered in 1991. 
40 Data regarding funding of human rights NGOs accumulated by author. 
41 Fisher notes that a number of ethno-nationalist NGOs even participated in a 1998 joint United Nations’ 
and Croatian government sponsored NGO fair in Zagreb, which attracted the suspected war criminal 
Tomislav Merčep and his entourage of armed bodyguards (2003, p. 80).   
42 See Appendix II. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 67
rights NGO activities.  The Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights (Hrvatski 
helsinški odbor za ljudska prava, HHO) noted even after Tuđman’s death in December 
1999, media defamation of NGOs continued in the local press (Unprofessionalism, 
Misinformation and Intolerance 2004).  Furthermore, the HHO also noted evidence of 
state involvement in media campaigns against NGOs: 
Attacks against non-governmental organisations at the end of [19]99 … were part 
of the special intelligence service action known as “Chameleon”.  The activities 
were undertaken in order to defame NGO[s] and the … opposition as well as some 
international organisations such as NED (Unprofessionalism, Misinformation and 
Intolerance 2004). 
 
The same report also described how the newsweekly Fokus framed the motives of foreign 
funded NGOs: 
The bearers of the red star always disguise their violence under the mask of culture, 
under which, as a terrible stench carried by the wind, they spread their pseudo-
culture or the so-called alternative culture.  How much noise they made … during 
HDZ rule in order to infiltrate their morbid, drunkenly and homosexual intoxicated 
programs.  Large quantities of money of UN-(known) origin was spent on spreading 
of all kinds of human perversities through their performances, concerts, films and 
media (Unprofessionalism, Misinformation and Intolerance 2004).43 
 
While internationally funded human rights NGOs found themselves subjects of media 
campaigns of disinformation, such as those described above, in the 1990s Croatian war 
veterans’ and war victims’ associations were transformed into financial clients of the 
governing HDZ (Zakošek 2002, p. 128).  Thus, despite complying with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders during the 1990s and engaging in norm affirming rhetoric, the Croatian 
government was not confronted with the emergence of domestic actors linked to 
transnational networks that could challenge non-compliance acts or preferences. 
 
4. The International Politics of State Compliance 
 
Absent domestic pressure to either investigate war crimes committed by Croatian forces 
or comply with ICTY arrest and surrender orders, the extent to which the ICTY would be 
able to compel cooperation was dictated by the level of coercion which the US and EU 
member states were prepared to apply upon Croatia.  As a result, the domestic politics of 
                                                 
43 Emphasis added by author. 
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ICTY indictments and transfer processes only served to delay, not prevent, transfers.  
There are in fact three distinct phases of Croatian interaction with the ICTY that are 
identifiable by the leading role of either the US and later EU member states in coercing 
compliance.  The first phase, which lasted from 1996 until 2000, begins with Croatia’s 
ratification of the Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY and was marked by 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender requests as occurring as a result of a linkage 
of US bilateral military and financial assistance to the transfer of individuals under ICTY 
indictment.  The second phase began with the election of Croatia’s first post-Tuđman 
government in January 2000 and lasted until March 2005 when the European Council 
froze Croatia’s EU accession process as a result of ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte’s negative assessment of Croatian cooperation with the Tribunal.  During this 
phase ambiguous signals from the US and internal divisions among EU member states 
resulted in an almost complete breakdown in relations between Croatia and the ICTY as 
Croatian elites adopted a more intransigent position toward the transfer of individuals to 
The Hague.  The third and final phase begins with the suspension of Croatia’ EU 
accession process in March 2005 and concludes in December 2005 following the arrest 
and transfer of the last Croatian citizen sought by the Tribunal.  It was during this period 
that the progression of membership negotiations was linked to compliance with ICTY 
arrest and surrender requests.  Significantly, the three phases described above illustrated 
varying state reactions to an evolving international political environment, and as result 
each arrest and surrender was the result of ad hoc decision-making processes.  Therefore, 
the ad hoc processes through which transfers occurred suggests that the transfer of 
individual suspects to the ICTY cannot be interpreted as the outcome of an internally 
negotiated policy consensus in favor of cooperation as following each ICTY indictment 
the Croatian state waited for signals from the US and EU member states before acting. 
 
4.1 Phase I: Tuđman, the US and the ICTY 
 
Despite the fact ICTY investigations, albeit at this point not indictments, targeted 
individuals within Tuđman’s government, Peskin and Boduszysńki accurately point out 
that, ‘Tuđman would be more forthcoming in handing over indicted war crimes suspects 
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than would his democratic successors who pledged increased cooperation’ (2003, p. 
1124).44  While Croatian compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders during the 
1990s can be interpreted as a reflection of the absence of ICTY indictments targeting 
regime elites, it should be noted that the ICTY also failed to indict Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia regime elites until May 1999, yet Belgrade’s non-compliance preference 
proved significantly less malleable.  Moreover, even though the ICTY’s 19 indictments 
transmitted to the Croatian judiciary between 1995 and 1999 targeted members of the 
Bosnian Croat armed forces (Hrvatska vijeće obrane, HVO), during the 1992-1995 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina there was little distinction between the HVO and the 
regular Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska, HV).  In fact, not only did Zagreb exercise 
effective command and control over the HVO, HVO officers at times were promoted into 
the ranks of the HV itself.  Given the absence of domestic mobilization in support of the 
prosecution of members of the Croatian armed forces for serious violations of IHL, the 
extent to which Croatia’s non-compliance preference could be transformed was largely 
dictated by exogenous coercion. 
 
4.1.1 The United States and the Coercive Model 
 
Compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders which antagonized Tuđman’s own 
core regime elites can be explained by the dependency of the Tuđman regime upon US 
military, intelligence and financial support both during and after the war in Croatia.  
Absent US pressure to transfer Bosnian Croat officers indicted by the ICTY during the 
1990s, the Tribunal’s arrest and surrender orders would have remained un-enforced by 
the Croatian state.  During the 1990s, the US exercised significant leverage over Croatia 
as Zagreb became increasingly dependent upon Washington for military and financial 
assistance both during and immediately after the 1991-1995 conflict.  In fact, as Croatia 
found itself isolated in Europe in the aftermath of military operations that terminated the 
existence of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the close personal relationship Tuđman 
enjoyed with the US became increasingly important to a regime fearing international 
isolation. 
                                                 
44 This observation was made prior to the return of the HDZ to government in November 2003. 
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Because the US viewed the Croatian Army as a means by which the US could exert 
pressure on Serb forces without direct US military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(The Road to Dayton 1995; Holbrooke 1999, p. 73), the US was prepared to provide 
substantial material support to Croatia both during and after the 1991-1995 war.  
Moreover, Camp Pleso, a military hospital, was established at Zagreb’s international 
airport and quickly transformed into a hub for US logistical support activities in the 
region, and Franjo Tuđman’s son and former head of Croatia’s intelligence services, 
Miroslav Tuđman, even described the relationship between Croatian and US intelligence 
services as a ‘partnership’ in which the US provided Croatia with intelligence on Serb 
activities (Gutman & Barry 2001, p. 30). 
 
As the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified, the US began assume a direct role in 
training and preparing the Croatian Army for offensive military operations that would 
eventually end the war in Croatia and in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina (Gutman & 
Barry 2001, p. 30).  US assistance was vital in altering the balance of power on the 
ground between Croatian and Serb forces in the months immediately preceding the 
Dayton Peace Agreement.  When the Croatian Army began to undertake aggressive 
offensive military operations in 1995, US Foreign Service Officer Robert Frasure 
reminded Richard Holbrooke: 
We “hired” these guys [Croatia] to be our junkyard dogs because we were 
desperate.  We need to try to “control” them.  But this is not time to get squeamish 
about things.  This is the first time the Serb wave has been reversed.  That is 
essential for us to get stability, so we can get out (Holbrooke 1999, p. 73). 
  
The extent to which US assistance described by Frasure proved effective was highlighted 
in a 2001 US Department of Defense commissioned report: 
In the space of 1 year, with the help of a U.S. consulting firm, Military Professional 
Resources, Inc. (MPRI), with unusually strong political support from the top, and 
with adequate funding, the Croatians built a force that drove the Serbs out of their 
territory.  They surprised not only their enemies but the rest of the world as well 
(Braddock & Chatham 2001, p. 21). 
 
Furthermore, this same report suggests that the Croatian Army which ‘drove the Serbs 
out’ was almost entirely the creation of MPRI: ‘Croatia’s success was the result of 
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exceptional circumstances including not having an existing military to resist changes that 
made for effective training’ (Braddock & Chatham 2001, p. 21).45  Although the extent to 
which the US involvement went beyond training to the actual planning of Croatian 
military operations is disputed, it is evident that the US was cognizant of the fact ICTY 
investigations had been initiated against senior Croatian civilian and military officials.  
Therefore, where possible the US attempted to warn Zagreb of impending ICTY 
investigations and indictments.  Andrija Hebrang, a former minister of defense, recalled 
that US General Wesley Clark personally transmitted a warning to the Croatian 
government in 1998 that the ICTY had initiated investigations and intended to issue 
indictments regarding war crimes committed by Croatian forces in 1995 (Hebrang 2005, 
p. 20).   
 
Despite US sensitivity to ICTY investigations targeting Croatian elites, a ‘coercive 
model’ for cooperation emerged as the modus operandi for Croatian state interaction with 
the Tribunal in February 1996 when US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights 
John Shattuck informed the Croatian government full cooperation with the ICTY was a 
pre-condition for future US military and political assistance and US support for Croatian 
talks with the IMF, World Bank and NATO’s Partnership for Peace program (Granić 
2005, p. 140).46  Within two months of Shattuck’s visit to Zagreb the Constitutional Law 
on Cooperation with the ICTY was adopted by the Croatian parliament.47  While the 
coercive threat of a freezing of relations had the desired effect of Croatian ratification of 
the Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY, it would require further coercion 
to bring about the actual transfer of Bosnian Croats indicted by the Tribunal.  The 
                                                 
45 Emphasis added by author. 
46 US compliance demands upon Croatia reflected the fact that the ICTY exercised an important function in 
US foreign policy toward to the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s partly through the Tribunal’s 
ability to marginalize recalcitrant nationalist politicians and military elites (Hazan 2004, p. 52)   It was in 
1994 that the US seconded twenty-two intelligence analysts and legal professionals to the ICTY, an act 
which was credited with giving the Tribunal a capability to begin investigations that could lead to 
indictments.  With regard to the Tribunal’s creation, the US actively began planning for an international 
criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1992 when State Department officials from the Legal 
Advisors office, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and the Bureau for European and 
Canadian Affairs were tasked with planning for the creation of an international court to prosecute war 
criminals in the former Yugoslavia (Western 2004, p. 228).  
47 The Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY was ratified by the Croatian parliament on the 19 
April 1996. 
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transfers of accused persons required additional pressure by the US in the form of a 
renewed threat to ‘block’ US-Croatian bilateral relations in the event the ICTY’s most 
wanted Bosnian Croat fugitive, Dario Kordić, was not transferred to the ICTY.48  After 
the US informed the Croatian government of the costs of non-compliance, Dario Kordić 
was transferred to The Hague (Granić 2005, p. 160).  It was during Kordić’s transfer to 
ICTY custody what former Croatian foreign minister Mate Granić described as a 
‘coercive model’ of cooperation with the ICTY crystallized as only external pressure was 
believed to be effective in bringing about Croatian state cooperation with the ICTY 
(2005, p. 160). 
 
Yet, while the US was prepared to exercise significant coercion to secure the transfers of 
Bosnian Croats to ICTY custody in 1996 and 1997, by 1998 the US proved significantly 
less willing to coerce Croatian compliance.  Given Zagreb’s icy reaction to ICTY 
indictments against lower ranking Bosnian Croats, the US had reason to fear that any 
subsequent indictments targeting senior officials within Tuđman’s government could 
threaten US military access to Croatia, which was vital to the maintenance of a military 
presence in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina.49  Although the extent to which 
Washington acted to shield Zagreb from non-compliance costs during 1998 and 1999 
remains unclear, it is of interest to note that following Croatia’s refusal to transfer 
Natelilić in 1999 the US was portrayed by Vjesnik, a pro-government daily, as having 
behaved like ‘an ally’ at the UNSC in assisting Croatia avoid international sanction for 
non-compliance with an ICTY arrest and surrender order ('Hrvatska treba ubrzati i 
okončati postupak protiv Tute?' 1999).50 
                                                 
48 Robert Gelbard informed Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić that the United States would freeze 
relations with Croatia if Dario Kordić along with other Bosnian Croats were not surrendered to the ICTY.  
Gelbard noted that should Tuđman comply, the US would remain a ‘reliable ally’ of Croatia (Granić 2005, 
p. 160). 
49 The US military not only maintained a ‘national support element’ in Croatia but also utilized Croatian 
ports on the Adriatic and maintained supply routes across northern and central Croatia.  For Croatia’s 
supporting role in Operation Joint Endeavor see (Fontaine 1997-98).  Furthermore to facilitate transit from 
Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina the US Army Corps of Engineers constructed a bridge across the Sava 
River, which forms a border between Croatia and Bosnia, in December 1995. 
50 Before Croatian non-compliance was to be reported to the UN, US ambassador to Croatia, William 
Montgomery, held a consultative meeting with Mate Granić, Croatia’s foreign minister ('Hrvatska treba 
ubrzati i okončati postupak protiv Tute?' 1999).  The subject of discussion at this meeting has not been 
disclosed. 
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4.1.2 European Union Member States and the ICTY 
 
Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s, EU member states proved less able to influence 
Croatia’s strategic behavior during and immediately after the 1991-1995 war.  Although 
the EU attempted to engage the newly independent Croatian state through an initiation of 
negotiations for a ‘Co-Operation Agreement’ in 1994, Croatia’s August 1995 offensive 
known as ‘Operation Storm’ resulted in the EU freezing further negotiations on the 
agreement (Government of the Republic of Croatia Action Plan 1999, p. 40).51  The 
termination of negotiations for a Co-Operation Agreement effectively ensured Croatia’s 
exclusion from the EU accession processes until January 2000.  Also, following 
Operation Storm, Croatia found itself excluded from the EU’s PHARE program, but 
Croatia’s Autonomous Trade Agreement with the EU, which was subject to annual 
renewal was not terminated.  Significantly for Zagreb, renewal of the Autonomous Trade 
Agreement was not linked to cooperation with the ICTY, while on the other hand 
economic assistance from the United States was in 1996 and 1997 linked to Croatia’s 
fulfillment of ICTY arrest and surrender orders. 
 
With regard to compelling transfers of Croatian accused to ICTY custody, it is important 
to point out that while the US took an early interest in supporting the ICTY and was thus 
prepared to periodically exert considerable coercive pressure upon the Croatian 
government to comply with arrest and surrender orders, particularly from 1996-1997, EU 
member states were highly skeptical of the Tribunal.  European skepticism was 
exacerbated in June 1994, when the US seconded twenty-two specialists to the Tribunal 
which included Defense Department and CIA analysts along with legal professionals.  
Although the seconded personnel provided the ICTY with the capability to conduct 
investigations and produce indictments, the response among EU member states to this 
overt act of US support for the Tribunal was considerably hostile.  Former ICTY 
spokesperson Christian Chartier was warned by an unnamed western European diplomat, 
                                                 
51 The EU-Croatian Co-operation Agreement was modeled on the 1993 EU-Slovene Co-operation 
Agreement, which marked the first step toward Slovenia’s EU accession. 
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‘This is unacceptable.  Your Tribunal is infiltrated by the CIA!,’ while former ICTY 
president Judge Antonio Cassese recalled European governments asking, ‘Why are you 
accepting all these Americans?’ (Hazan 2004, p. 53).  Skepticism of the Tribunal in 
western European capitals reflected the priority of European diplomacy being the 
restoration and maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia.  Premature indictments 
emanating from the ICTY were feared to be a threat to both of the above objectives.52 
 
4.2 Phase II: Challenging the Tribunal 
 
As previously mentioned, Tuđman’s death in December 1999 and the subsequent triumph 
of opposition parties in both parliamentary and presidential elections held in January 
2000 was initially welcomed by the international community and international human 
rights groups as an opportunity for Croatia to intensify cooperation with the ICTY.  The 
end of single party HDZ governance and the election of a six-party coalition led by the 
SDP resulted in a dramatic reorientation of Croatian foreign policy, which for the first 
time since independence prioritized rapid accession to the EU (On the Accession of the 
Republic of Croatia 2002).  Zagreb’s formal pursuit of EU membership meant that the 
EU could exert newfound leverage in the form of conditionality, which was unavailable 
to the EU during Tuđman’s authoritarian presidency.  However, Račan’s government’s 
expectation of rapid integration into the EU, similar to that of Slovakia following the 
electoral defeat of the authoritarian Mečiar in parliamentary elections in 1998 and again 
in 2002, was quickly diminished as EU member state ratification of the Stability and 
Association Agreement (SAA), which was signed in May 2001, proved to be a much 
slower process than Zagreb initially expected.53  Moreover, the EU initially transmitted 
ambiguous signals regarding the costs of non-compliance with arrest and surrender orders 
from July 2001 to March 2005 because of significant internal divisions among member 
states regarding the extent to which Croatian membership negotiations should be effected 
                                                 
52 For more on European efforts to end the war in the former Yugoslavia see Chapter 3. 
53 Although the SAA was ratified by Croatia in October 2001, the ratification process was not completed by 
EU member states until February 2005. 
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by non-compliance with the orders of a non-EU institution.54  The UK government 
proved most critical of Croatian non-compliance and stated, ‘Croatia has failed to respect 
and honour its regional and international commitments to co-operate fully with the ICTY’ 
(Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Human Rights Report 2003, p. 167).  Croatian 
non-compliance even resulted in the UK unilaterally suspending parliamentary 
ratification of Croatia’s SAA.  Meanwhile, following the UK decision to suspend SAA 
ratification, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, offered strong support for Croatia’s 
membership bid into the EU without even mentioning the Bobetko crisis (Germany 
Supports Croatia’s Candidacy for Admission to the EU 2003). 
 
4.2.1 Enforcement Ambiguity and Non-Compliance 
 
The ambiguous signals transmitted from EU member states regarding the costs of non-
compliance (Massari 2005, pp. 268-269) were followed by an almost complete 
breakdown in relations between Croatia and the Tribunal as a result of Croatia’s rejection 
of the Bobetko indictment, which the Račan government described as ‘… legally and 
politically unacceptable to the Republic of Croatia…’ (Background Report 2002).  
Absent the clear threat of sanction, which compelled Croatian cooperation with the ICTY 
in 1996 and 1997, Croatian elites began to rhetorically defend Croats indicted for war 
crimes for domestic political gain.  Although it had been clearly articulated Croatia’s 
invitation to join the NATO alliance was contingent upon full cooperation with the 
ICTY,55  the US too proved unable and unwilling to effectively coerce Croatia’s post-
Tuđman elites into compliance, especially as US political and military assistance was no 
longer perceived in Zagreb as vital for state survival.  Furthermore, because US 
legislation exclusively applied financial sanctions for non-cooperation with the ICTY to 
                                                 
54 For example, states which argued for EU membership to be linked with cooperation with the ICTY 
included the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, which refused to ratify the SAA 
following Croatia’s refusal to extradite Janko Bobetko, whereas Central European states such as Austria 
and later the new Eastern European member states argued that compliance with ICTY orders should not be 
linked to Croatia’s pursuit of EU membership.  Personal interview former foreign ministry official 24 
March 2006. 
55 In 2002, a report issued by a NATO parliamentary assembly meeting in Istanbul condemned Croatia’s 
failure to transfer Bobetko to the ICTY (Salihbegović & Trkanjec 2002), and at the 2004 NATO summit in 
Istanbul, Croatia’s invitation to join the NATO alliance was linked to full cooperation with the ICTY 
(Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004). 
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Serbia and Montenegro and was not applicable to any of the other states of the former 
Yugoslavia, the US focus on Serbia was interpreted in Zagreb as a message that Croatian 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender requests was no longer a priority for US 
diplomacy in the region.  In fact, whereas Serbia and Montenegro were subject to an 
annual certification by the US Secretary of State of being in cooperation with the ICTY in 
order to be eligible for direct financial assistance from the US,56 no such formal 
certification process was put in place for Croatia. 
 
Although Bobetko’s death in April 2003 brought an end to the immediate crisis, Croatia’s 
continuing failure to cooperate with the Tribunal led the UK to adopt a stance that would 
eventually be accepted by other EU member states.  This was the clear linkage between 
EU membership and cooperation with the Tribunal at the December 2004 European 
Council.57  The UK argued, ‘[I]f Croatia wishes to show full respect for the rule of 
international law and highlight its commitment to European values and standards …, the 
government must resume full cooperation [with the Tribunal] as soon as possible’ 
(Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Human Rights Report 2003, p. 168).  In fact, 
in March 2003, it was the growing threat of EU sanction that led the Račan government 
to present Bobetko’s lawyers with the ICTY indictment, an act the government had 
previously rejected.  Yet, what explains this dramatic shift in policy toward the ICTY by 
the Croatian state?  After all, Tuđman never directly challenged the legitimacy of the 
ICTY itself, but instead insisted that transfers could not be carried out for practical 
reasons such as being unable to locate suspects.  Račan’s direct challenge to the ICTY led 
one western diplomat to lament, ‘It is not even necessary to extradite Bobetko to The 
Hague, but it is important that [Račan] accepts the competency of the tribunal and 
receives the indictment.’58  In other words, it was more important that Croatia continue to 
engage in norm affirming rhetoric than actually carry out its legal obligations toward the 
Tribunal.  Here, it is argued that while EU internal divisions encouraged non-compliance 
with the Bobetko arrest and surrender order, it was also the undermining of the normative 
                                                 
56 See the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act 2006, Section 
563. 
57 At the December 2004 European Council the onset of Croatia’s accession negotiations were direcly 
linked to ‘full cooperation’ with the ICTY (Presidency Conclusions 2004). 
58 Quoted in (Hedl 2002). 
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underpinning of international justice by the US through its aggressive pursuit of an 
Article 98 agreement that transmitted a signal to Croatian elites that cooperation with 
international criminal tribunals was after all an optional regime. 
 
4.2.2 Article 98: Contradictory Norms? 
 
The opposition of the US to the ICC in the early 2000s created uncertainty amongst 
Croatian policymakers as to whether the US would continue to support the work of the 
ICTY.59  In fact, as a result of the American Servicemember’s Protection Act, Croatia for 
the first time found itself subject to the loss of military assistance from the US because of 
its failure to conclude an Article 98 agreement with the US irregardless of cooperation 
with the ICTY.  During Phase II, Croatia found itself caught between two contradictory 
demands, the EU warning that entering into an Article 98 agreement would violate the 
Rome Statute and the US warning that failing to do so would subject Croatia to financial 
sanction.  Although not directly related to the issue of cooperation with the ICTY, the two 
questions were viewed as intrinsically linked as they both related to state obligations to 
cooperate with international judicial bodies.  Furthermore, the US appeared to undermine 
the legitimacy of international war crimes trials when US Ambassador to Croatia, Ralph 
Frank, declared before an audience of Zagreb University students, ‘[w]e believe that war 
crimes cases should be tried by the affected countries themselves, when possible, not by a 
new international court’ (Frank 2004).  Although Frank pointed out that because the 
ICTY was a Chapter VII creation of the UNSC and not established through a multilateral 
treaty, Croatia remained obligated to cooperate with the Tribunal, statements such as 
‘[t]he United States is not a signatory to that treaty [the Rome Statute]. And I point out 
that neither Russia nor China is a signatory either, if you think we are alone on that’ 
introduced contradictory norms into the compliance debate.  As the Bobetko crisis 
erupted concurrent to US demands Croatia acquiesce to an Article 98 agreement, 
compliance with arrest and surrender orders from an international tribunal was 
                                                 
59 Personal interview former Croatian foreign ministry official Zagreb 24 March 2006.  Moreover, in an 
interview with the Croatian daily Vjesnik, US Ambassador to Croatia, Ralph Frank publicly denied 
speculation that in return for Croatia’s signing of an Article 98 agreement with Washington, the US would 
‘forget’ Croatia’s outstanding obligations toward the ICTY (Lopandić 2004). 
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increasingly perceived as voluntary response to material incentives rather than a binding 
obligation under international law. 
 
4.3 Phase III: Compliance 
 
In November 2003 the return to power of Tuđman’s HDZ under the leadership of Ivo 
Sanader marked the beginning of a period of rapprochement between the Tribunal and the 
Croatian state.  Despite Sanader’s robust rhetorical support for individuals indicted by the 
ICTY (Sanader 2001, p. 121), Croatia’s pursuit of rapid EU accession was increasingly 
threatened by the linkage of cooperation with the ICTY to the beginning of membership 
negotiations.  Although the new HDZ government signaled an increased willingness to 
cooperate with the ICTY after the European Council conditioned the start of Croatian 
accession negotiations on ‘full cooperation’ with the ICTY in December 2004, it was not 
until March 2005 that attempts to locate Gotovina acquired the urgency necessary to 
effect an arrest.  March 2005 was significant because it was at this time EU membership 
negotiations were scheduled to begin; however, negotiations were indefinitely postponed 
until Croatia was certified as being in full cooperation with the ICTY.60 
 
It must be pointed out that it is impossible to overstate the impact of EU conditionality on 
transforming the relationship between the Tribunal and the Croatian state.  After the EU’s 
cancellation of membership negotiations, Croatian intelligence services began to closely 
monitor Gotovina’s relatives in Croatia in an attempt to locate the fugitive general,61 and 
on 3 October 2005 ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte informed the EU General 
Affairs and External Relations Council that Croatia was in full cooperation with the 
Tribunal, which permitted the Council to approve the onset of Croatia’s accession 
negotiations (GAERC Conclusions 2005).  However, it should be noted that Croatia’s 
                                                 
60 At the December 2004 meeting of the European Council, the Council agreed on opening accession 
negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005 ‘provided that there is full cooperation with the ICTY.’  On 16 
March 2005 the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) determined that EU accession 
negotiations with Croatia should be postponed until Croatia was deemed as being in full cooperation with 
the ICTY (Croatia: 2005 Progress Report 2005, p. 3). 
61 Gotovina’s location was revealed through electronic surveillance of communication between the accused 
and his wife, who remained in Croatia (Kočić 2007). 
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pursuit of EU membership and cooperation with the ICTY were contingent upon a pre-
existing elite consensus that favored rapid integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
 
6. Conclusions: Explaining Compliance 
 
Although at first glance Croatia’s transfer of individuals indicted by the ICTY suggests a 
simple narrative of coerced compliance, a closer examination of Croatia’s interaction 
with the Tribunal raises questions as to why Croatian elites engaged in norm affirming 
rhetoric in the absence of domestic mobilization in support of international war crimes 
trials during the 1990s.  Even though the gap between norm affirmation and rule 
compliance was only closed by third party coercion, Zagreb sought to negotiate 
membership into a wide range of international organizations following its 1991 
declaration of independence and was prepared to accept a wide range of human rights 
commitments.  Moreover, Zagreb provided diplomatic support for the creation of a 
permanent international court throughout the late 1990s, concurrent to its legal challenge 
of Natelilić and Martinović’s transfer to ICTY custody.  Despite a strong correlation 
between compliance and coercion, rationalist approaches to IR cannot adequately explain 
why the Croatian state was prepared to engage in international criminal justice norm 
affirmation despite a preference for non-compliance with Tribunal orders.   
 
The liberal focus on explaining compliance outcomes through an exploration of 
endogenous constraints suggests Croatia would have maintained a policy preference for 
non-compliance unless external incentives or disincentives altered the domestic cost-
benefit equilibrium facing domestic elites.  In fact, while domestic incentive structures 
serve to explain the time lag between the certification of Tribunal indictments and the 
actual transfer of war crimes suspects, transfers were brought about by external coercion.  
The absence of a robust human rights NGO community and the ejection of the Croatian 
Serb population in 1995 left a vacuum when it came to domestic social protest 
demanding the prosecution of members of Croatian armed forces responsible for 
violations of IHL.  Instead, because veterans’ and victims’ organizations served to 
reinforce elite preferences for non-compliance, compliance with ICTY arrest and 
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surrender orders only occurred when the perceived consequences of non-compliance 
threatened strategic state foreign policy objectives. 
 
In 2004-2005, an elite consensus in Croatia that favored rapid integration into Euro-
Atlantic institutions allowed the EU, on the principle of conditionality, to secure Croatian 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders only after internal divisions between 
member states were overcome, and the EU clearly articulated the linkage between 
cooperation with the ICTY and EU membership.  Within months of the EU freezing 
Croatia’s accession process, Ante Gotovina was transferred to ICTY custody following 
the accused’s arrest in Spain.  In the case of Janko Bobetko, Croatia’s rejection of the 
ICTY arrest and surrender order was a response to ambiguous signals regarding the costs 
of non-compliance from the EU and a perception that US foreign policy no longer 
prioritized cooperation with international criminal tribunals. 
 
Croatia demonstrates that when confronted with non-compliance on the part of a state 
seeking entry into international organizations and the maintenance of strategic 
relationships with third party states prepared to take enforcement action in support of an 
international criminal court, rationalist enforcement mechanisms can prove effective in 
altering non-compliant behavior.  However, the antecedent conditions necessary for 
coercion to produce compliance outcomes are both ideational and material.  Ideational 
antecedent conditions include an acceptance of a legal obligation to enforce tribunal 
orders, while material antecedent conditions can include military and financial 
dependence on third party states. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Serbia: State Compliance and the Limits of Coercion 
 
The arrival in The Hague of Mladic, Karadzic and the other fugitives are not only required by the 
international community as essential for the dispensation of justice; they are equally essential for 
the advancement of the interests of Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
President of the ICTY Judge Theodor Meron in a statement following a meeting with Serbian Prime 
Minister Vojislav Koštunica in November 2005 
 
 
[The security services] searched for Mladic everywhere, except for where he was hiding. 
 
Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Miroslav Labus in May 2006 
 
  
 
1. Introduction: The Power of Human Rights? 
 
On the 26th of February 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found Serbia1 
‘…failed in its duty to co-operate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia…,’ and emphasized, ‘[t]his failure constitutes a violation by [Serbia] 
of its duties as part of the Dayton agreement, and as a Member of the United Nations, and 
                                                 
1 Before exploring Serbia’s interaction with the ICTY, it must be noted that the former Yugoslav republic 
of Serbia, has undergone substantial transformation during its first fifteen years following the 1991 collapse 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Socijalistička federativna republika Jugoslavjia, SFRJ) 
and did not acquire an international legal identity as an independent state until 2006.  Between 1991 until 
2006 Serbia transitioned from being a constituent republic within the SFRJ to a constituent republic within 
the SRJ and then to a constituent republic within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Državna 
zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora, SiCG) before becoming an independent state, the Republic of Serbia.  Yet, 
despite Serbia’s status as a constituent republic within the SRJ and later the SiCG, the focus of this study 
will be on the Republic of Serbia itself.  This is because the Republic of Serbia dominated the SRJ, in 
which Montenegro functioned as Serbia’s junior partner within the federation, until Montenegrin president 
Milo Đukanović broke with the Milošević regime in 1997. After Đukanović’s break with Milošević, 
Montenegro became a de facto independent state and adopted an independent foreign and economic policy.  
In fact, ICTY reports to the UNSC issued separate assessments of compliance for Montenegro and Serbia 
while both were member republics of the SRJ and later the SiCG.  For the purpose of clarity Serbian 
foreign policy will be referenced by Belgrade’s international legal identity during the period of time in 
question.  Thus, when exploring Serbian foreign policy from 1992 until 2002, the actor referenced will be 
the SRJ, while from 2002 until 2006 the actor will be referenced as SiCG. 
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accordingly a violation of its obligations under Article VI of the Genocide Convention’ 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro 2007, p. 161).2  The ICJ’s judgment in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro highlighted what has become a decade 
and a half long record of non-compliance with Article 29(d) and (e) obligations, arrest 
and surrender orders, on the part of various Belgrade governments.  Moreover, the ICJ 
judgment, which found Serbia’s failure to cooperate with the ICTY not only to be a 
breach of the Dayton agreement and multiple UNSC resolutions but also a breach of the 
Genocide Convention, failed to bring about an immediate improvement in Serbian 
cooperation with the Tribunal.  Rather, according to Olga Kavran, spokesperson for the 
ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, as of March 2007 Serbian cooperation remained ‘non-
existent’ (2007). 
 
Given Serbia’s record of non-cooperation with the Tribunal, this Chapter will explore 
both the domestic and international politics of Serbian state cooperation with the ICTY as 
a narrow focus on international politics offers only a partial picture of Serbia’s troubled 
relationship with the Tribunal.  This Chapter will begin with a discussion of the politics 
of state legitimization from 1990 until 2006, which will highlight Serbia’s foreign policy 
divergence from other successor states of the former Yugoslavia, as Belgrade neither 
secured international recognition for the newly established Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Savezna republika Jugoslavija, SRJ),3 nor demonstrated an aversion to 
international sanction.4  Second, there will be an exploration of the domestic politics of 
compliance, which will be followed by an examination of the role of civil society and 
transnational advocacy networks in order to assess the impact of non-state societal actors 
                                                 
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina filed suit against Serbia and Montenegro for violating the Genocide Convention in 
1993.  After hearing oral arguments from representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and 
Montenegro, the International Court of Justice found that Serbia violated its obligations under the Genocide 
Convention to prevent genocide in Srebrenica and by failing to cooperate with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro 2007). 
3 Dušan Lazić noted that as of 1999 the SRJ was not a full member of any major political, economic or 
financial organization including, but not limited to, the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF, the 
World Bank, the WTO or Interpol (1999).  In fact, the SRJ only gained admittance to the United Nations as 
a member state in November 2000 (United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/12, 2000).   
4 The inability of a series of UNSC resolutions (UNSC Resolutions 757, 787 and 820) which imposed a 
trade embargo upon the SRJ to have a discernable impact on Belgrade’s war in Bosnia is just one example 
of a lack of aversion to international sanction.  Pevehouse and Goldstein provide additional support for this 
observation in a time series study which revealed ‘…Serbian actions toward Kosovo were not affected by 
international actions toward Serbia’ (1999, pp. 538-546). 
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on compliance decisions.  Next, there will be a discussion of the international dimension 
of Serbia’s troubled relationship with the ICTY.  Here, it will be noted attempts at 
conflict resolution on the part of the Contact Group, which brought about the 1995 
Dayton agreement and the 1999 Rambouillet agreement, led to an abandonment of 
attempts to coerce Serbian compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders so as not to 
antagonize the Milošević regime (Williams & Scharf 2002, p. 202).  Coercion was, 
however, utilized by the United States and European Union member states against post-
Milošević Serbian governments from 2000 until 2007 with limited success.  Finally, this 
Chapter will seek to explain why coercion, coupled with incentives that proved effective 
in bringing about Croatian compliance with ICTY Article 29 (d) and (e) obligations, 
failed to produce a similar outcome in Serbia.  After all, it was the linkage of EU 
accession to cooperation with the Tribunal that brought about the arrest of Croatian 
general Ante Gotovina in December 2005, yet this linkage failed to compel Serbia to 
surrender Ratko Mladić or any other of the remaining ICTY fugitives harbored in Serbia. 
 
2. Domestic Politics and Compliance 
 
Unlike Croatia, which saw new elites assume power preceding the collapse of the 
Yugoslav federal state, Serbia experienced regime continuity from 1987, when Slobodan 
Milošević assumed control of the League of Communists of Serbia (Savez komunista 
Srbije, SKS), until 5 October 2000.  The ability of the Milošević regime to survive the 
crisis in legitimacy, which proved lethal to the League of Communists’ hold on power in 
neighboring Yugoslav republics, has been attributed to Serbian nationalist grievances 
being incorporated into SKS ideology through a campaign that de-legitimized the Titoist 
ethno-federal division of the Yugoslav state creating an illusion of regime change despite 
continued SKS rule (Malešević 2002, pp. 188-189; Vladisavljević 2002).  Milošević’s 
transformation of the SKS into the Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije, 
SPS), an ethno-nationalist populist political party, effectively destabilized nascent 
opposition political movements and secured regime survival during multi-party elections 
in 1990.  Although the subsequent outbreak of war and deepening ethnification of 
Serbian politics and society have been well documented elsewhere (Cohen 2002, pp. 102-
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133; Gordy 1999; Ramet & Pavlaković 2005), the rejection of the emerging post-cold 
war regional consensus which favored economic and political integration into Euro-
Atlantic and international organizations requires further discussion. 
 
2.1 State Legitimization 
 
Domestic regime continuity was reflected in SRJ foreign policy as Belgrade claimed 
inheritance of the international legal identity of the SFRJ (Aćimović 1994, pp. 413-424; 
Kreća 1994, pp. 399-412; Libal 1997, pp. 138-139) and maintained ties with ‘non-aligned 
bloc’ countries in the UN General Assembly (Granić 2005).5  Belgrade’s claim to SFRJ 
continuity meant that Belgrade was absent from campaigns led by Croatia and Slovenia, 
which were often described during 1991 as ‘rebel republics,’6 to gain international 
recognition and membership in international organizations.7  Although Badinter 
Commission explicitly rejected Belgrade’s claim to SFRJ continuity and deemed the SRJ 
to be ‘new state’ (Libal 1997, pp. 138-139), the SRJ remained unwilling concede the 
question of continuity.  The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry continued to claim legal 
continuity with the SFRJ post-1991 because international recognition of continuity was 
perceived to strengthen Belgrade’s claim that the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina constituted civil wars as opposed to international conflicts (Aćimović 1994, 
p. 415; Libal 1997, p. 139).  Moreover, Michael Libal, former head of the Southeast 
European Department in the German Foreign Ministry, suggested Belgrade hoped an 
acceptance of SFRJ continuity would ‘retroactively invalidate’ the Badinter Commission, 
thus removing the legal basis for the recognition of Yugoslavia’s successor states (1997, 
                                                 
5 The SFRJ was one of the founding members of the non-aligned bloc of countries, and Belgrade hosted the 
first Non-Aligned Movement summit in 1961.  Moreover, Petković noted Belgrade enjoyed strong support 
amongst Non-Aligned Movement member states at a ministerial summit held in 1991; however, due to a 
diplomatic focus on European mediation in the Yugoslav conflict, Belgrade failed to ask the movement for 
support.  Once the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted, divisions emerged within the Non-Aligned 
Movement as predominately Muslim states advocated a harsher line against Belgrade.  At the movement’s 
Jakarta summit, Belgrade was described to have been in the ‘doghouse.’  Nonetheless, at Jakarta, the Non-
Aligned Movement did not debate the Yugoslav crisis fearing such a debate would divide the Movement 
between Muslim and non-Muslim states (Petković 1992, pp. 7-8). 
6 Take for example, the title of an article that appeared in The New York Times by John Tagliabue, ‘Conflict 
in Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia’s Army Issues Ultimatum to Rebel Republic,’ on 30 June, 1991, p.1. 
7 For more on Croatian efforts to secure international recognition and membership in international 
organizations see Granić 2005. 
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p. 139).  Nevertheless, the prospect for the actual recognition of SRJ-SFRJ continuity was 
virtually non-existent as UNSC Resolution 757 rejected Belgrade’s claim to SFRJ 
continuity and UN General Assembly Resolution 47/1 rejected the SRJ’s claim to inherit 
the membership status of the SFRJ and went on to state the SRJ must apply for 
membership as a new UN member state (Kreća 1994, pp. 399-412).8 
 
2.1.1 The Domestic Politics of International Institutions 
 
Although Croatia and Slovenia’s campaigns for recognition met with significant 
resistance from the European Community, Germany’s declaration of an intention to 
unilaterally recognize the two republics despite opposition from Paris and London 
(Crawford 1995, pp. 1-34) meant that during 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and 
Slovenia would secure international recognition and eventual acceptance into the UN as 
member states.9  While all three republics sought integration into international 
organizations, Croatia in particular perceived membership in international organizations 
as both a reaffirmation of independence and a means of securing state survival (Granić 
2005, pp. 11-46, 153).10  The SRJ, on the other hand, prioritized the establishment of ad 
hoc bilateral relations outside the context of international organizations (Lazić 1999).  
Moreover, rather than attempt to negotiate membership into international organizations,11 
the SRJ embarked on a campaign to de-legitimize existing institutions, from which 
Belgrade found itself excluded, through claims international organizations represented a 
threat to SRJ state sovereignty.  International organizations, according to the SPS’ 1992 
party program, ‘openly engage in the internal affairs of sovereign states in opposition to 
the general principal of sovereign state [UN] member non-interference...’ (Program of 
the Socialist Party of Serbia 1992).  More sinisterly, international organizations were 
                                                 
8 Belgrade chose not to apply for United Nations membership as a new member state until after the collapse 
of Milošević’s regime in October 2000. 
9 Macedonia faced significantly greater difficulty gaining international recognition as a result of a Greek 
diplomatic campaign against the use of the geographic term ‘Macedonia’ in the official name of the new 
state. 
10 Libal argued that during 1991, when Croatian armed forces were suffering losses at the hands of the 
Yugoslav National Army, Zagreb sought to secure an internationalization of the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia (1997, p. 38) Belgrade sought to characterize the conflict as an internal matter. 
11 See footnote 1. 
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characterized as being part of a ‘New World Order’ of ‘imperialist character’ that sought 
to secure the ‘…domination of the West over the East and South’ (Program of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia 1992).  The SPS’ challenging of the emerging post-cold war 
neo-liberal economic consensus was even utilized as a means of contextualizing the intra-
Yugoslav conflict unfolding in the early 1990s.  Take for example Milošević’s closing 
statement at the first party congress of the SPS: 
The crisis facing Yugoslavia, which is exposed to the pressure of conservative and 
disintegrative forces, as well as the presence of such forces in Serbia herself, have 
made it necessary and justified to bring together socialist, i.e. left-wing forces, ideas 
and people in order to preserve peace and secure progress and social development. 
Peace and economic and cultural progress, the fruits of which will be equally 
enjoyed by all citizens, are the essence of our new party’s commitment at this 
moment. Our longer-term commitment is to create a society without economic 
exploitation and without political hierarchy (1990). 
 
Examined in the context of SPS party ideology, it is perhaps not surprising to note that 
Serbia and Montenegro were the only former Yugoslav republics to oppose the very 
establishment of the ICTY in 1993.  The SRJ rejected UNSC Resolution 827, which 
established the ICTY, on the basis that the UNSC’s actions violated the principle of state 
sovereignty (Kerr 2004, p. 37).  Interestingly, in a letter transmitted to the United Nations 
Secretary General and the President of the UNSC, the SRJ sounded a conciliatory note by 
expressing a willingness to prosecute its own citizens responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law before national courts (Vukasović 1994, p. 12).  Once the 
ICTY was established, it is worth noting the SRJ’s rejection of legally binding 
commitments to comply with UNSC Resolution 827 violated Article 16 of the 
Constitution of the SRJ, which automatically incorporated international law into domestic 
legislation (Fatić 2002, p. 67).  This contradiction, needless to say, did not have an impact 
on SRJ policy toward the Tribunal as the domestic judiciary functioned as an appendage 
of the Milošević regime. 
 
From 1996 to 1997, there was a brief rapprochement between the SRJ and the European 
Union during which time the SRJ was granted autonomous trade preferences by EU 
member states (Janjević 1999, p. 5).  In fact, during this period of time, SRJ deputy 
foreign minister Radoslav Bulajić argued for the SRJ’s reintegration into the global 
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economy and Yugoslav membership into the World Trade Organization and the 
International Monetary Fund (1997, p. 7).  However, the intensification of violence in 
Kosovo in 1998 resulted in the EU revoking its trade agreement and imposing a robust 
trade sanctions regime upon the SRJ which included the freezing of SRJ assets in EU 
member states (Janjević 1999, p. 5).  In response, Belgrade negotiated an alternative 
preferential trade agreement with Moscow and sought integration into an undefined 
Russian led union with Belarus (Jovanović 1999-2000, pp. 26-31). 
 
2.1.2 State Legitimization and Identity 
  
Even after the collapse of Milošević’s authoritarian regime in October 2000, and EU 
efforts to integrate Belgrade into its Stability and Association Pact for Southeastern 
Europe, many Serbian elites continued to view international institutions with hostility and 
presented building closer ties with Russia as an alternative to EU integration.  Vojislav 
Šešelj, the head of the Serbian Radical Party, which as of 2007 was Serbia’s largest 
parliamentary political party, perceived Serbia to be a ‘defender’ of Russian interests in 
southeastern Europe.  Take for example Šešelj’s description of Serbia’s relationship with 
the Russian Federation, ‘Serbia tirelessly defends the fatherland.  And Russia sleeps.  We 
also defend Russia and at the same time try to awaken her’ (Šešelj 2006).  The SRS party 
program also presented an alternative foreign policy orientation which envisages Serbia 
building closer ties with Russia, China, Japan, India along with ‘Arab states’ and the 
‘states of South America’ (Program of the Serbian Radical Party 2001).  As the SRS 
remained the largest single parliamentary political party from 2000 to 2007, there would 
be no political consensus in support of integration into the European Union along the 
lines of the broad cross party consensus for rapid integration into Euro-Atlantic 
institutions that emerged in post-Tuđman Croatia. 
 
2.1.3 State Legitimization and Ethnicity 
 
An exploration of domestic legitimization processes must also note that throughout the 
1990s a single ethnic community, namely ethnic Serbs, monopolized control over all state 
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organs at the expense of sizable domestic ethnic minorities.  The exclusion of domestic 
minorities from political life during the 1990s resulted in the construction of national or 
state interests along exclusively ethnic lines, hence the campaign to establish an 
ethnically defined ‘Greater Serbia.’12  An illuminating example of this process of 
ethnification can be found in a comparison of the 1990 SPS party program, which 
committed to party to acting to secure continuity of the socialist system and acting to 
block Serbia’s integration into the international economy, to the Second Congress of the 
SPS, which framed the conflict in Yugoslavia as an inter-ethnic conflict.  The SPS party 
program adopted at the Second Congress did not disguise a commitment to create a 
‘Greater Serbia’ and promised to take into consideration the concerns of Serbs in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina and secure their ‘right’ to be territorially integrated into the SRJ 
(Program of the Socialist Party of Serbia 1992).  
 
The ethnification of politics also undermined the norm of international criminal justice.  
It is of interest to note that six years after the collapse of the Milošević regime, ICTY 
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte argued that the very concept of the rule of law 
remained alien to Serbian political culture (Del Ponte: Serbia's Painful Inability 2006).  
Del Ponte’s observation is reinforced by Obradović who noted in 1994: 
However, outside the circle of specialists in this field, in the broader public opinion, 
these obligations of the state, their scope and the reasons for their establishment, are 
not always completely clear.  This is particularly the case within the better part of 
public opinion in the FR Yugoslavia, where, … the prevailing understanding is that 
since Serbs have been attacked by Croats and Muslims and are “biologically 
endangered” as they say – all means for their defense are permitted, and 
therefore,…it is superfluous to discuss responsibility for war crimes.  And it is 
particularly superfluous and unjust for this responsibility to be discussed by the 
International Tribunal  (1994, p. 24). 
 
 Slobodan Milošević’s ethno-nationalist mobilization not only bounded morality to the 
‘biologically endangered’ Serbs, and his consolidation of power in the 1990s completely 
                                                 
12 Trust in the ICTY is much higher amongst Serbia’s ethnic minorities than amongst ethnic Serbs (Stavovi 
građana o međunarodnoj zajednici 2005, p. 12).  This was potentially significant as according to the last 
pre-war census conducted in 1991 ethnic Serbs only comprised 66 percent of the total population of the 
Republic of Serbia.  Ethnic Albanians comprised Serbia’s largest ethnic minority at 17 percent of the 
population, followed by ethnic Hungarians representing 3.5 percent of the population (Republic of Serbia 
Census 1991). 
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undermined even the appearance of constitutionalism in Serbia and the SRJ.  When 
exploring the foreign policy of the SRJ, it is important to note that Milošević dominated 
the foreign policymaking process while occupying the office of president of Serbia, 
despite the constitutional division of powers, which delegated control over foreign policy 
to the federal structures of the SRJ.13 
 
2.2 The Domestic Politics of Compliance 1993-2000 
 
The SRJ robustly opposed the very establishment of the ICTY in 1993 on the grounds the 
Tribunal Statute violated SRJ state sovereignty (Kerr 2004, p. 37).  Although as a 
signatory to the 1995 Dayton agreement Milošević accepted a legal obligation to 
cooperate with the Tribunal, the SRJ failed to comply with ICTY arrest and surrender 
orders throughout the 1990s.14  Despite this failure to cooperate with the Tribunal, 
Milošević was rewarded for acting as a peace-broker at Dayton through the removal of 
UN economic sanctions imposed during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 164-167).  Absent any demand for cooperation with the 
Tribunal, Milošević was able to effectively ignore the existence of ICTY indictments 
against SRJ citizens.15  The result was not a single ICTY annual report from 1996 until 
the collapse of the Milošević regime in 2000 found SRJ cooperation with the Tribunal to 
be satisfactory.  The Tribunal was unable to challenge Serbian non-compliance and in the 
words of the 1999 ICTY annual report to the UNSC, ‘[f]or a considerable period of time, 
the international community failed to respond adequately to the challenges to its authority 
                                                 
13 Although Milošević held the position of president of Serbia from 1990 until 1997 and president of 
Yugoslavia from 1997 until 2000, Milošević’s power did not derive from any constitutional division of 
powers between the two offices but rather from extra-institutional bases of support that crystallized around 
the regime in the 1990s.  Thus, from 1990-1997 the Yugoslav presidency was a largely ceremonial office, 
while actual power was exercised by the Serbian president; however, from 1997 to 2000, this arrangement 
was reversed.  Significantly, this ad hoc and extralegal foreign policymaking process would return to haunt 
Milošević as it would be the Republic of Serbia which would transfer him to the ICTY in contravention of 
SRJ law which explicitly reserved questions of extradition to the federal and not republican governments 
(Fatić 2002, p. 69). 
14 An exception to this would be the transfers of Dražen Erdemović and Radoslav Kremonović to ICTY 
custody in 1996.  However, as Erdemović and Kremonović had not (yet) been indicted at the time of their 
transfers to The Hague, Milošević was able to claim this act did not constitute a precedent for future 
cooperation (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 256). 
15 The first three SRJ citizens indicted by the ICTY were Mile Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić and Veselin 
Šljivančanin, who were indicted for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity on 26 October 1995. 
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by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ (Report of the International Tribunal 1999, p. 
26).  Although the international politics of compliance will be discussed in detail shortly, 
at this point it should be noted that SRJ non-compliance with Article 29 obligations 
resulted in the Tribunal referring Belgrade to the UNSC.  In response the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 1207 in November 1998, which demanded the SRJ’s ‘immediate and 
unconditional execution’ of ICTY arrest orders, but did not include any form of punitive 
measures in the event Belgrade ignored the Security Council’s demands.  Despite an 
intensive campaign by the OTP to highlight SRJ non-cooperation, the ICTY reported: 
None of these demands brought any concrete improvement in the attitude or 
behaviour of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and none was supported by 
effective action to compel such change until the situation in Kosovo had 
deteriorated dramatically (Report of the International Tribunal 1999, p. 27). 
 
The ICTY would have to wait until a change in regime was brought about in the SRJ 
before any realistic attempt at securing the transfer of ICTY indictees could be made. 
 
Nevertheless, during 1996 there were two transfers from the SRJ to Tribunal custody. 
Because the SRJ’s rejection the ICTY’s claim to exercise jurisdiction over the territory of 
the SRJ was reinforced by the position of the judiciary, which considered the transfer of 
an SRJ citizen to the ICTY would be an unconstitutional act, Belgrade faced significant 
difficulties in rationalizing the transfers of Dražen Erdemović and Radoslav 
Kremenović.16  Therefore, when compliance acts occurred they were characterized as sui 
generis events.  For example, when Erdemović and Kremenović were transferred to 
ICTY custody by Belgrade in 1996, their lack of SRJ citizenship was said to provide the 
legal basis for the transfer.17  The Erdemović and Kremenović transfers illustrate the 
extent to which non-compliant behavior had been internalized as legitimate action within 
the SRJ.  The internalization of the norm of state sovereignty, as articulated in the foreign 
                                                 
16 Dražen Erdemović and Radoslav Kremonović were former members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces 
who contacted western media, Le Figaro and ABC News, during 1996 with details of the Srebrenica 
massacre.  Both expressed a preference to voluntarily surrender themselves to ICTY custody.  After 
contacting western media Erdemović and Kremonović were arrested by SRJ police so as to prevent their 
voluntary surrender to ICTY custody. 
17 One of the more interesting rationalizations offered for Erdemović’s transfer to the ICTY was that he was 
‘on lend’ from the SRJ to the ICTY and thus his presence in The Hague was not tantamount to an 
extradition (Čičić 1996).  And, as previously mentioned, the fact the Erdemović and Kremenović transfers 
preceded their indictments by the ICTY, Belgrade was able to argue the transfers were not precedent 
setting. 
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ministry’s legal challenge to the ICTY, restricted the scope for compliance on the part of 
Serbia’s post-Milošević elites in the aftermath of the collapse of the Milošević regime in 
October 2000.18 
 
While the events surrounding the Kosovo conflict will be discussed in greater detail in an 
exploration of the international politics of compliance, here it will be noted the escalation 
of violence in Kosovo during 1998 once again made Milošević the focus of international 
efforts to contain violent conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the Tribunal’s efforts to 
secure cooperation from the SRJ were largely ignored by Contact Group member states.  
Concurrent to efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the Kosovo crisis, the United 
States and the United Kingdom worked to build a consensus within NATO for the use of 
force against the SRJ should efforts to secure a negotiated settlement over Kosovo fail 
(Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 183-184).  The subsequent indictment of Milošević by the 
Tribunal during NATO’s Operation Allied Force brought an abrupt end to Tribunal 
access to the SRJ.  In the aftermath of NATO’s air campaign, the ICTY was referred to 
by the SRJ’s foreign minister as a ‘NATO Tribunal’ and was characterized as being an 
instrument of US foreign policy (Jovanović 1999-2000, p. 29).  Interestingly, while 
Belgrade attempted to de-legitimize the ICTY, the SRJ filed suit against NATO member 
states at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), charging alliance members with having 
committed ‘genocide’ (Jovanović 1999-2000, p. 29).  Before the ICJ dismissed 
Belgrade’s suit on a technicality, the SRJ suggested that unlike the ICTY, which was 
characterized as a ‘political’ court, the ICJ was a legitimate forum in which a state could 
seek ‘justice’ (Jovanović 1999-2000, p. 29). 
 
2.3 Domestic Politics of Compliance 2000-2006 
 
Despite initial optimism that surrounded the collapse of Milošević’s government in 
October 2000, as in Croatia, a change in domestic regime did not bring about a change in 
                                                 
18 Polling data from the Belgrade Center for Human Rights indicated that from 2003-2005 an average of 
just 15.6 percent of the population supported cooperation with the ICTY because cooperation would be 
‘just.’ 
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state policy toward the Tribunal.19  The dimming prospects for a change in state policy 
vis à vis The Hague were highlighted in March 2001 during testimony before the US 
Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs.  Morton Abramowitz testified: 
Belgrade has yet to detain and transfer a single indictee to the Hague Tribunal.  It 
has plagued the work of the Tribunal’s Belgrade office with bureaucratic obstacles.  
And President Koštunica’s hostile public statements have left no doubt about his 
attitude toward cooperation with the Tribunal in general, and the effort to have 
Milošević face charges in the Hague in particular.  Earlier this week, one indictee 
did go the Hague - a Bosnian Serb of dual nationality - and Mr. Koštunica’s 
government was eager to emphasize that his surrender was “voluntary” and entailed 
no change in policy.  I think we should take them at their word (US Assistance to 
Serbia: Benchmarks for Certification 2001, p. 13). 
 
Although Milošević was surrendered to the ICTY within weeks of Abramowitz’s 
testimony, overall cooperation between the Tribunal and the SRJ was deemed to be 
identical to pre-1998 levels (US Assistance to Serbia: Benchmarks for Certification 2001, 
p. 23).  In fact, Milošević’s 2001 transfer to the ICTY was the outcome of external 
coercion which produced a domestic political contest between the Yugoslav president 
Vojislav Koštunica and Serbian prime minister, Zoran Đinđić.  No political consensus in 
favor of cooperation with the ICTY emerged from the Milošević transfer as illustrated by 
the fact that Milošević’s surrender to the Tribunal was not immediately followed by the 
transfer of other senior SRJ citizens under ICTY indictment.20  Moreover, a legal 
framework for the transfer of accused persons to ICTY was not established because 
Milošević’s transfer was effected by the Republic of Serbia as oppose to the SRJ (Fatić 
2002, p. 69). 
 
2.3.1 Serbia’s Domestic Non-Compliance Pull 
 
Although post-authoritarian elites in both Serbia and Croatia confronted substantial 
populist opposition to compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders, the domestic 
                                                 
19 The Milošević-era president of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinović, remained in office as president 
of Serbia after the collapse of the Milošević regime creating a situation whereby the new reformist 
government was tasked with bringing about cooperation with the ICTY while Milutonović, also under 
ICTY indictment, occupied the Serbian presidency. 
20 It will be noted in an exploration of the international politics of compliance that the domestic power 
contest between the Yugoslav president and Serbian prime minister was itself precipitated by intense 
United States coercive pressure to surrender Milošević to the ICTY. 
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political environment in Croatia proved more favorable toward compliance for four 
reasons.  First, with regard to Croatia, Sanader’s reform of the post-authoritarian Croatian 
Democratic Union meant that the radical right was left without an anti-system 
parliamentary political party that could electorally benefit from populist appeals for non-
compliance with Article 29 obligations or attempt to utilize parliamentary procedure to 
obstruct compliance.  As a result, a clear parliamentary consensus in favor of cooperation 
with the ICTY was more easily constructed in Croatia given the fact that as of November 
2003 not one major political party actively opposed Croatian state compliance, whereas 
in Serbia there remained a significant anti-ICTY parliamentary bloc21.  In Croatia there 
also existed a clear parliamentary consensus in parliament in support of EU accession.  
Therefore, once compliance with Article 29 obligations and EU accession were explicitly 
linked by the European Council in December 2004, residual parliamentary opposition to 
cooperation with the Tribunal evaporated. 
 
Second, in the Croatian context, ICTY indictments were much fewer in number and never 
targeted civilian political elites, i.e. the leaders of major political parties, former 
presidents or government ministers.  Therefore, Croatian elites such as Ivo Sanader and 
Stjepan Mesić could dismiss any link between the indictments against Croatian military 
personal and the overall legitimacy of military campaigns undertaken by the ancien 
regime.  In Serbia, however, indictments were certified not only against former 
presidents, ministers and military elites, but also the leader of an opposition political 
party, Vojislav Šešelj of the Serbian Radical Party, making any attempt to ‘individualize’ 
guilt much more difficult than in Croatia.  Also, by targeting civilian and military elites of 
the SRJ and not just regime surrogates, ICTY indictments threatened not only indicted 
individuals, but the entire SRJ ruling elite.  As a result in post-Milošević Serbia, 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders have proven to be highly polarizing 
within the Serbian parliament, as delegates from the SRS and the SPS questioned Serbian 
obligations vis à vis the Tribunal.  Furthermore, parties which supported state cooperation 
with the ICTY, such as Zoran Đinđić’s Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS), 
                                                 
21 See Appendix III. 
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only did so for pragmatic reasons such as gaining international financial assistance or 
normalizing Serbia’s relationship with the European Union and the United States.22 
 
In the aftermath of October 2000 entrenched elite interests, which sought to maintain a 
policy of non-compliance with Tribunal arrest and surrender orders, stretched from 
Milošević-era appointees such as Nebojša Pavković, who remained head of the Yugoslav 
Army until 2002, to the SRJ’s first post-Milošević president, Vojislav Koštunica.  
Against this backdrop, Serbia’s republican government led by Đinđić sought to fulfill 
outstanding obligations to the Tribunal as a means of bringing the SRJ into the European 
Union.  However, because Koštunica occupied the SRJ presidency, Đinđić was forced to 
secure Milošević’s transfer from a Belgrade prison to The Hague extra-judicially (Fatić 
2002, p. 69).  From the office of the Yugoslav presidency, Koštunica was able to obstruct 
cooperation with the ICTY through his power base amongst recalcitrant conservative 
nationalists in the Yugoslav Army, while Đinđić attempted to construct a support base 
within the Republic of Serbia’s Ministry of the Interior (Edmunds 2003, p. 29).  Although 
Đinđić supported Serbian fulfillment of ICTY obligations and the transfer of all 
individuals under ICTY indictment to The Hague, the continued presence of Milošević-
era regime associates within Serbia’s security services ultimately brought about Đinđić’s 
assassination on the 12 March 2002 in an operation known as ‘Stop The Hague’ (Vujačić 
2003, p. 12). 
 
Third, during the Milošević-era, legislation enabling cooperation with the ICTY, such as 
Croatia’s 1996 Constitutional Law on Cooperation with the ICTY, was not ratified 
leaving the very question of state obligations to comply with Article 29 obligations the 
subject of domestic political debate.  Because Croatia established a legal regime for 
compliance in 1996, Croatia’s post-Tuđman elites inherited a domestic legal regime that 
favored compliance.23  The Serbian parliament’s 2002 adoption legislation establishing a 
domestic legal framework for cooperation with the ICTY, which included a clause 
                                                 
22 Andrej Nosov of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights noted that the only exception was the Liberal 
Democratic Party, which entered parliament in January 2007, and advocated cooperation with the Tribunal 
in order to ‘change Serbia’s image.’ Personal interview with Andrej Nosov in Belgrade, 23 January 2007. 
23 Although a legal regime for compliance was created, in practice ICTY indictments were responded to by 
the Croatian state on an ad hoc basis. 
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denying the ICTY jurisdiction over indictments issued by the Tribunal after the entry into 
force of the Law on Cooperation with the ICTY, illustrate the difficulties faced by post-
Milošević Serbian governments in building a legislative consensus on the question of 
cooperation with the Tribunal.24 
 
Fourth, organized crime’s penetration of state security services amplified the ability of 
recalcitrant civil servants to obstruct compliance attempts.  After all, during the 1990s 
Serbian elites did not rely on formal institutional structures, buttressed by an independent 
judiciary, but rather on informal personal relationships with the state security apparatus 
and organized crime.  The latter moved overtly into the political process during the 
second half of the 1990s as underworld figures formed political parties and contested 
elections.  One of these figures included Milošević’s wife, Mirjana Marković, who 
established her own political party, the Yugoslav United Left (Jugoslovenska udružena 
levica, JUL), which was essentially nothing more than a vehicle for the facilitation of 
criminal activities that ranged from embezzlement to  murder (Palariat 2001, pp. 911-
912; Sekelj 2000, p. 62).  Furthermore, the notorious paramilitary figure Željko 
Ražnjatović established a political party known as the Party of Serbian Unity.  The nexus 
between politics and organized crime resulted in the Serbian political environment 
becoming an increasingly violent forum as the assassinations of former Serbian president, 
Ivan Stambolić, Serbia’s first post-Milošević prime minister, Zoran Đinđić, and multiple 
assassination attempts against prominent opposition politician Vuk Drašković serve to 
illustrate.  In addition, a minister of defense and interior, numerous police officials, 
members of the Serbian nouveau riche along with regime affiliated criminals are among 
others murdered by regime affiliates (Branković 2002, pp. 211-212). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Article 39 of the Yugoslav Law on Cooperation with the ICTY stated that any individual indicted by the 
Tribunal subsequent to the entry into force of the Law on Cooperation with the ICTY would be tried by the 
domestic courts violated the primacy clause of the ICTY Statute (Jorda 2002).  In April 2003, the Law was 
subsequently amended to confirm ICTY jurisdiction over all war crimes cases. 
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2.3.2 Pragmatic Compliance 
 
Rather than symbolize a recognition of Serbia’s legally binding obligations to cooperate 
with the Tribunal, arrests and transfers of ICTY suspects occurred in the context of a 
domestic power contests between elements of the new regime loyal to Zoran Đinđić and 
elements of the ancien regime who retained influence and control over state security 
services.  The assassination of Zoran Đinđić occurred in the context of this power 
struggle and was followed by the arrest and transfer of individuals to ICTY custody on 
the part of the Serbian government.  It was during this period of time that the Serbian 
government requested the ICTY bring forward the indictments of Franko Simatović and 
Jovica Stanišić because Serbian authorities lacked evidence to justify their continued 
imprisonment (Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in Serbia 2003, p. 3).  
However, rather than interpreting the Simatović and Stanišić’s transfers as a compliance 
act, it is important to point out that Belgrade merely took advantage of an opportunity to 
do away with the two former Milošević era intelligence chiefs.  The manipulation of the 
ICTY for domestic political purposes led Bang-Jensen to observe, ‘…no pattern of 
cooperation with the Tribunal ever emerged’ even after war crimes suspects began to 
arrive from Serbia in The Hague’ (Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in Serbia 
2003, p. 6).  Eric Witte of the Coalition for International Justice also pointed out, as of 
2003, there was almost no attempt to conceal non-compliance on the part of Belgrade, 
and even Ljubiša Beara, who was publicly indicted by the ICTY in 2002, maintained his 
entry in the local telephone directory (Democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 
Serbia 2003, p. 14). 
 
Although non-compliance with obligations to arrest fugitives indicted by the ICTY did 
not end with the Milošević regime, there has been an effort on the part of post-Milošević 
governments to encourage voluntary surrenders following the marginalization of 
Koštunica in 2002.  After the establishment of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
the federal presidency was substantially weakened leading Koštunica to focus his 
attention on securing the late Zoran Đinđić’s office of Serbian prime minister.  With 
Koštunica temporarily out of office and Pavković removed as head of the armed forces in 
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2002, ICTY suspects began to ‘voluntarily surrender’ to ICTY custody at the 
encouragement of the Serbian government.  However, it must be noted the focus of this 
study is on compliance with arrest and surrender orders, and because arrests are only 
necessary in the event of the failure of an accused to surrender to the court, voluntary 
surrenders are outside the scope of this study.  While the Croatian government proved 
willing to arrest ICTY fugitives on its territory such as Ivica Rajić, the Serbian 
government sought to encourage voluntary surrenders and, with the exception of 
Slobodan Milošević, Franko Simatović and Jovica Stanšić, sought to avoid transferring 
high ranking suspects to Tribunal custody against their will, or at least absent the 
appearance the accused’s transfer was voluntary.  In fact, Koštunica’s party emphatically 
declared, ‘arrests were not an option for the Democratic Party of Serbia’ (Holliday 2005, 
p. 2).  The necessity for transfers to the Tribunal to appear to be ‘voluntary’ stems from 
the ICTY’s lack of legitimacy within Serbia, which will be explored in greater detail 
below.  This absence of legitimacy limits the effectiveness of external coercion as 
successive Belgrade governments argue the domestic costs of compliance prevent the 
state from carrying out Article 29(d) and (e) obligations (Holliday 2005, pp. 1-5).  
 
3.  Constructing International Justice – International Norms and Domestic Politics 
 
As in Croatia, the impetus for the prosecution of domestic elites and the members the 
local armed forces was almost completely external.  Despite episodes of anti-Milošević 
social protest in 1991, 1996 and 2000, Serbian civil society largely failed to mobilize 
public opinion in support of the prosecution of individuals suspected of serious violations 
of IHL.  It must also be emphasized there were significant barriers to advocacy groups 
either domestic or international from directly engaging with Serbian public opinion 
because the domestic media reinforced the perception of Serb victimhood during the wars 
that occurred across the former Yugoslavia.25  In fact, when asked to compare Serb 
victimization to that of other ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia, 81 percent of 
respondents believed Serbs had been the most victimized ethnic group during the conflict 
                                                 
25 Polling data collected by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights affirms this observation (2005).  See 
Appendix V. 
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in the former Yugoslavia (Belgrade Center for Human Rights 2005).  While the media’s 
role in reinforcing the perception of Serb victimization during the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia has been well documented elsewhere (D.B. MacDonald 2002), it should be 
noted that many of the same journalists who engaged in spreading hate speech through 
the media under Milošević have been rehabilitated in post-Milošević Serbia.26  
 
Moreover, in post-Milošević Serbia, Serbia’s largest parliamentary political party, the 
SRS, utilized both the traditional media and the Internet to remind the electorate of 
atrocities perpetrated against ethnic Serbs.  In fact, on the SRS website a link was 
provided to video footage of atrocities committed by Croats and Bosnian Muslims against 
Serb populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.27  In addition, while access to 
information regarding war crimes involving non-Serb victims remains difficult to access, 
as of August 2006, the official website of the Serbian Government included a highly 
detailed study of ‘Albanian Terrorism and Organized Crime in Kosovo-Metohija,’ which 
not only chronicled human rights abuses, but attempted to link the Kosovo Liberation 
Army to international Islamist movements such as Al Qaeda (Albanian Terrorism and 
Organized Crime in Kosovo 2003, p. 27).  Rather than confront the legacy of Serbian 
involvement in the conflicts that followed the collapse of the Yugoslav state, successive 
governments have been engaged in a campaign to gather evidence of war crimes 
committed by other warring parties in order to de-legitimize proceedings against indicted 
Serbs before the ICTY.  For example, in 2005, Serbian prime minister Vojslav Koštunica 
declared that Serbs had been the victims of ‘the greatest ethnic cleansing after the Second 
World War’ (Return of Krajina Serbs 2005) during Croatia’s 1995 Operation Storm.  
Furthermore, during government sponsored commemorations of the Operation Storm, 
Serbian officials failed to mention that the ICTY indicted three Croatian Army generals 
for their part in the Operation.28   
 
 
                                                 
26 Personal interview with Andrej Nosov of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Belgrade, 23 January 
2007. 
27 The short film Istina [Truth] was available for download on the Serbian Radical Party’s official website 
as of 2006: [www.srs.org.yu]. 
28 Personal interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY field office in Belgrade, 23 January 2007. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 99
3.1 The ICTY and Transnational Advocacy Networks 
 
Negative perceptions of the ICTY remained persistent in domestic public opinion in the 
years following the collapse of the Milošević regime and were symptomatic of a failure 
of the Tribunal to directly engage with public opinion in Serbia.  It should be noted that 
during the 1990s the ICTY invested almost no effort in engaging with Serbian public 
opinion, in contrast to substantial efforts invested in engagement with North American 
and Western European media, during the Tribunal’s early years.29  As mentioned in 
Chapter Two the Tribunal failed to initiate outreach programs until 1998 and it was not 
until 1999 that the Tribunal employed staff able to answer reporters’ questions in Serbo-
Croatian.30  The failure of the Tribunal to effectively engage in outreach activities may 
have damaged the ICTY’s ability to mobilize public support for international war crimes 
trials especially as the above described ‘victim-centered’ propaganda of the Milošević 
regime went unchallenged.  However, it is impossible to empirically test whether or not 
Tribunal outreach during the 1990s would have had a transformative effect on public 
opinion given the fact local media was for the most part monopolized by the state. 
 
As previously noted, Keck and Sikkink’s ‘boomerang pattern’ depends on local civil 
society acting to mobilize transnational civil society.  Absent local mobilization, the 
causal pathway identified by Keck and Sikkink lacks a crucial antecedent condition 
(1998, p. 13).  The failure to moblize social protest within Serbia itself may serve as a 
more plausible explanation for the absence of a domestic justice constituency than 
Obradović’s 1994 observation that Serbs find international tribunals particularly ‘unjust.’  
After all, during the 1990s Serbian elites often appealed to human rights norms.  Even 
Slobodan Milošević attempted to legitimize the actions of the Serbian government 
through appeals to human rights norms.  In a speech to the Serbian parliament in 1991, 
Milošević declared, ‘If the human rights of Albanians really were threatened in Kosovo-
                                                 
29 In the ICTY’s 1995 annual report to the UNSC the Tribunal included a section on ‘The Tribunal and 
World Public Opinion,’ which detailed coverage of the ICTY by major western news outlets, such as The 
New York Times and Le Monde, while including only a single paragraph on ‘sporadic’ contact with media 
based in Belgrade and Zagreb (Report of the International Tribunal 1995, pp. 36-40).  
30 Personal interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY field office in Belgrade, 23 January 2007. 
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Metohija, we certainly would not hesitate to protect them’ (1991).31  Moreover, it was 
Belgrade that made one of the first appeals to the 1948 Genocide Convention during the 
wars in the former Yugoslavia.  A 1992 Yugoslav Government memorandum noted: 
…we regret to inform the Organization of the United Nations, … that Croatian 
authorities and their paramilitary and illegal armed forces have committed, in 1991 
and early 1992, for the second time in the past fifty years, the crime of genocide 
against the Serbian people in Croatia (Memorandum of the Government of 
Yugoslavia 1992). 
 
The 1992 Memorandum also appealed to United Nations member states to take action 
against perpetrators of genocide, although it stopped short of explicitly calling for the 
creation of an international criminal tribunal (Memorandum of the Government of 
Yugoslavia 1992). 
 
Belgrade’s appeals to norms of human rights suggest Belgrade sought to avoid being seen 
as violating human rights norms, even at the height of the Bosnian and Croatian wars.  
Polling data accumulated by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights (Appendix V: Chart 
2) confirms respondents accept the statement: a war criminal is a criminal irregardless of 
nationality.  Thus, although the percentage of Serbian citizens who agree with the 
statement ‘A war criminal is a criminal irregardless of nationality’ has decreased from 84 
to 73 percent from 2004 to 2005, the percentage of Serbs who either completely agree or 
mostly agree with the above statement represent an overwhelming majority of 
respondents (Belgrade Center for Human Rights 2005). 
 
ICTY indictments and trial processes failed to penetrate domestic public opinion, and 
compliance feed back from trials in The Hague was not observable during the period of 
time under study.  In fact, the percentage of Serbs who believed atrocities were 
committed by Serb forces decreased from 2001 to 2005 (Appendix V: Chart 3).  Polling 
data from Chart 2 suggests that Serbian citizens accept criminality can transcend 
ethnicity combined with Chart 3’s demonstration of a decrease in the percentage of 
Serbian citizens who accept certain events documented in ICTY indictments have 
                                                 
31 Of course Milošević’s norm affirming rhetoric was inconsistent with the conduct of Serbian security 
forces, which were involved in a brutal campaign of repression of in Kosovo that followed the revocation 
of Kosovo’s status as an autonomous province.   
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occurred suggest that war crimes trials at the ICTY have failed to effectively penetrate 
Serbian domestic opinion. 
 
In Serbia, as in Croatia, the ICTY faced significant challenges from the domestic media 
and elements of civil society, and the very impetus of the establishment of the Tribunal 
was external and did not emerge from the demands of local civil society.32  Furthermore, 
while media coverage of ICTY trials has been greater in Serbia than in Croatia, media 
hostility toward the Tribunal throughout the 1990s created an environment in which war 
crimes committed by non-Serbs were profiled in the domestic media in an attempt to de-
legitimize Tribunal indictments and proceedings against Serbs.  In response to these 
challenges, ICTY outreach efforts in Serbia, while more substantial than those that exist 
in Croatia, remain largely inadequate as a means of transforming public opinion as 
international actors have favored coercive methods of bringing about compliance over a 
normative engagement with Serbian public opinion.33  However, before moving on to the 
international politics of state compliance, let us first explore Serbian civil society in 
greater detail. 
 
3.2 Civil Society: Human Rights NGOs and the Ethno-Nationalization of Civil Society 
 
There was almost no domestic pressure from civil society to investigate war crimes 
committed by Serb forces during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the impetus 
for war crimes investigations and prosecutions was largely external.34   In explaining the 
relative lack of a domestic demand for international justice, Alexandra Milenov of the 
ICTY Belgrade Field Office noted that the failure to establish an Outreach Office in the 
early years of the Tribunal was a serious error and considers contact with local NGOs to 
                                                 
32 This is despite the fact that ICTY proceedings have included trials against individuals accused of war 
crimes committed against Serbs, see for example the Haradinaj et al, Orić and Gotovina et al, trials. 
33 It should also be noted international actors at times even contributed to Serbian perceptions that war 
crimes had not been perpetrated by Serbs.  In fact, genocide denial by international actors such as US 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s statements denying the actions of Serb forces constituted 
‘genocide’ were directly incorporated into domestic war propaganda and were even quoted by Radovan 
Karadžić to rationalize the Serbian campaign against Srebrenica in 1995 (Williams & Waller 2002, p. 839).   
34 The Humanitarian Law Center and the Helsinki Committee are examples of NGOs which have demanded 
the investigation of war crimes perpetrated by Serb forces and the prosecution of perpetrators. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 102
be an important element of the Tribunal’s work in the region.35  The ICTY Office in 
Belgrade maintains contacts with both domestic human rights groups and victims 
organizations.  Although human rights organizations which focus on war crimes 
committed by Serb forces are few in number, they include the Humanitarian Law Center, 
the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, the Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the 
Women in Black.  Activists from the Youth Initiatiave for Human Rights and Women 
and Black have been subjected to violent intimidation by nationalist organizations such as 
Obraz.  Moreover, seven years after the collapse of the Milošević regime, the 
Humanitarian Law Center noted that rather than act to protect human rights activists, 
state security organs continue to view human rights activists as ‘enemies of the state.’36 
 
Although anti-war groups emerged in the 1990s, such as the Women in Black, anti-
regime mobilization was stunted in the 1980s as human rights organizations were 
subsumed by groups that focused on the defense of national or collective rights over 
individual human rights such as the Kosovo Serb movement (Bieber 2003, p. 83).  In fact, 
Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power in the SKS was the result of Milošević’s receptivity 
to the demands of what was essentially a civil society grassroots movement of Kosovo 
Serbs (Vladisavljević 2002).  As a result, non-nationalist civil society was largely 
marginalized in the early to mid 1990s (Bieber 2003, p. 83).   Additionally, the attribution 
of the collapse of the October 2000 Milošević regime to civil society movements should 
not be interpreted as a signal that a non-nationalist civil society has become increasingly 
robust in post-Milošević Serbia.  In fact, as Beiber points out, the Otpor movement, 
credited with bringing down the Milošević regime, destroyed its own raison d’être in 
through its success because the organization was highly dependent upon foreign sources 
of funding, which was for the most part discontinued after October 2000 (2003, p. 87).  
Thus, in post-Milošević Serbia, as in post-Tuđman Croatia, civil society was unable to 
mobilize social protest against state non-compliance decisions, and instead, anti-ICTY 
advocacy groups dominated the domestic compliance debate.  
                                                 
35 Personal interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY field office, Belgrade, January 2007. 
36 See the Humanitarian Law Center’s report of the ‘State of Human Rights Defenders in Serbia’ 19 
September 2007.  The report is available in Serbo-Croatian on the Humanitarian Law Center’s website: 
[http://www.hlc-rdc.org/PravdaIReforma/POLOZAJ-ZASTITNIKA-LJUDSKIH-PRAVA-U-
SRBIJI/820.sr.html]. 
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4.  The International Politics of Compliance 
 
Absent a domestic preference for compliance or domestic social protest that could serve 
to alter the pre-existing preferences of local elites the extent to which Belgrade 
cooperated with the ICTY would be dictated largely by external variables, with the 
exception of a brief, but significant, period following the 2003 assassination of Serbian 
prime minister Zoran Đinđić.  However, unlike Croatia external coercion and incentives 
proved far less effective in transforming state preferences during the period of time under 
examination.  Yet, before attempting to draw conclusions regarding why external material 
incentives and disincentives proved less effective in altering state behavior in the case of 
Serbia let us first explore the international politics of Belgrade’s interaction with the 
ICTY. 
 
4.1 Phase I:  From Pariah State to Peace Partner 
 
Images of concentration camps established by Bosnian Serb forces at Omarska and 
Keraterm broadcast by ITN during 1992 had a transformative effect on how the 
international community perceived the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually 
shocked the United Nations Security Council into adopting Resolution 827 in 1993.37  
Yet, despite the fact the establishment of the ICTY was brought about in response to war 
crimes perpetrated by Serb forces during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kerr 2004, 
p. 34), the Milošević regime never faced substantial coercive pressure to comply with 
ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  Moreover, at the time of the Tribunal’s creation the 
Bosnian war was at its height and the priority of international diplomacy in the region 
was to bring the conflict to an end rather than support the work of the Tribunal (Gow 
1997; Williams & Waller 2002).38  The ICTY’s efforts to secure custody of Radovan 
                                                 
37 Croatian foreign minister Mate Granić explained how images of Serb-run concentration camps emerging 
from Bosnia had a transformative effect on perception of Belgrade in the international community (Granić 
2005). 
38 Matias Hellman also noted that in the early years the Tribunal struggled to survive as an institution as 
many states that supported the creation of the Tribunal did not expect the ICTY to actually function. 
Personal interview with Matias Hellman of the ICTY field office in Sarajevo, 16 January 2007. 
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Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, who were both indicted in July 1995, were further 
complicated by the fact the Tribunal was viewed as a threat to peace in the region by 
international mediators, such as Cyrus Vance and David Owen, attempting to broker an 
end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Williams & Waller 2002, p. 843).  Matias 
Hellman of the ICTY Registry recalled, many states that supported Resolution 827 never 
expected the court to function as anything more than a ‘paper tiger.’39  And, as if in 
confirmation of Hellman’s observation, war crimes suspects on the territory of the SRJ 
were granted de facto immunity from ICTY indictments after the Contact Group rejected 
attempts by the Bosnian delegation at Dayton to include the SRJ into a robust ICTY 
compliance regime that would have included the automatic re-imposition of UN sanctions 
should the Tribunal determine Belgrade was in non-compliance with its Article 29 
obligations.  
 
The de facto immunity granted at Dayton to ICTY accused residing in the SRJ began to 
take shape in early 1995, when the United States adopted what was known as the 
‘Milošević strategy,’ which entailed a lifting of economic sanctions against the SRJ in 
return for Milošević pressuring the Bosnian Serb leadership into accepting a peace 
agreement (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 232).40  The perceived need to engage the Milošević 
regime in order to bring about an end to the Bosnian war led to the almost complete 
marginalization of the ICTY in 1995 (Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 161-166).  Even 
before 1995, Milošević was perceived in Europe as moderate within the Serbian political 
spectrum and as an important player in any potential peace settlement, which explains the 
hostile response in European capitals to a 1994 attempt by the US to give the ICTY the 
investigative capability necessary to begin issuing indictments (Hazan 2004, p. 53).41  
                                                 
39 Personal interview with Matias Hellman of the ICTY field office in Sarajevo, 16 January 2007. 
40 The pragmatic need to engage with the SRJ despite earlier declarations by US officials that Slobodan 
Milošević was a ‘war criminal’ stemmed from the belief that because previous attempts to negotiate 
directly with the Bosnian Serb leadership under Radovan Karadžić ended in failure, the most effective way 
to bring about an immediate end to hostilities was to bypass the Bosnian Serb leadership and negotiate 
directly with Belgrade (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 232; W. Bass 1998, p. 101).  Bass emphasized the key role 
Milošević played in forcing Bosnian Serb elites to acquiesce to Dayton by noting that for the Bosnian Serbs 
the Dayton agreement represented an imposed peace (1998, p. 102).  
41 For more on the reaction of western European states to US assistance to the ICTY in 1994 see Chapter 
Two pp. 83-84. 
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Belgrade became the epicenter of European attempts to resolve the Bosnian conflict.  
David Owen, architect of the failed Vance-Owen plan, confidently declared: 
When we visited Belgrade, Vance and I always sought him [Milošević] out, even 
when he was electorally unpopular, because we could see he was potentially a very 
powerful figure… I think Milosevic is the most important figure in the whole 
region.  The question is will he stand up to the likes of Seselj and Arkan or go with 
them further down the path of repression?  I sense a realistic politician who will 
distance himself from them (1993, p. 9).42 
 
Despite Milošević’s role in the initiation of violent conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the summer of 1995 brought about an acceptance that Milošević’s SRJ 
must be accommodated in any peace settlement even if this meant keeping Mladić and 
Karadžić out of ICTY custody.  The extent to which Milošević was embraced as a 
peacemaker in the former Yugoslavia cannot be overstated.  Silber, at the time observed: 
Just three years after Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger had named 
Milosevic a suspected war criminal, the Serbian president was in Dayton being 
praised as a peacemaker.  When the Dayton Agreement was signed in September in 
Paris, President Bill Clinton applauded Milosevic and shook his hand.  As Clinton 
said, quoting the late Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, “You cannot negotiate 
peace only with friends.”  Washington, with its newly formed Balkan pragmatism, 
had met its match in Milosevic (Silber 1996, pp. 63-64). 
 
At Dayton, Milošević delivered a peace agreement and the UN sanctions regime against 
the SRJ was dropped.  Absent the diplomatic backing of either the United States or 
European Union member states, the ICTY could not independently sanction non-
compliance on the part of Belgrade.  As mentioned in Chapter One the only institutional 
mechanism through which the Tribunal could request sanction was through referral to the 
UNSC.  The UNSC could take any measure under Article 41, short of the use of force, or 
invoke Article 42, for the use of force against a non-compliant state (Kerr 2004, p. 138).  
However, it must be pointed out that punitive action has never been taken by the Security 
Council against non-compliant states. 
 
Although the Dayton agreement obliged the states of the former Yugoslavia to cooperate 
with the ICTY, a clear signal was transmitted by the Contact Group that the removal of 
sanctions would not be linked to cooperation with the Tribunal.  In fact, the European 
                                                 
42 Emphasis added by author. 
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Union’s representative at Dayton, Carl Bildt, made clear war crimes conditionality would 
not be part of any post-Dayton order by warning the Bosnian Muslim delegation not to 
even mention war criminals during the course of peace negotiations (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 
242).  Moreover, although the ICTY indicted three SRJ citizens for the 1991 Vukovar 
hospital massacre, Mile Mrkšić, Miroslav Radić and Veselin Šljivančanin, there was no 
attempt by European Union member states to pressure Belgrade into transferring the three 
accused to The Hague (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 242).  Quite the opposite, non-compliance was 
rewarded when the European Union extended an Autonomous Trade Preference regime 
to the SRJ absent a commitment to cooperate with the ICTY on the part of the Milošević 
government.43  The result was a period of economic growth that saw the US dollar value 
of SRJ foreign trade grow by 42 percent between 1996 and 1998 (OECD 2003, p. 23).  
Meanwhile, in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO reaffirmed the international 
community’s laissez faire approach to international criminal law enforcement as the first 
NATO commander in Bosnia, Admiral Leighton Smith appeared on Bosnian Serb 
television to reassure Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić that NATO, ‘did not have the 
authority to arrest anybody’ (W. Bass 1998, p. 107).  Further underlining NATO’s 
commitment not to enforce ICTY arrest orders, a NATO spokesperson explained to 
Bosnian Serbs that IFOR, ‘…is not a police force and will not undertake police duties’ 
(Meštrović 1997, p. 23).44 
 
4.2 Phase II: The Kosovo Crisis and War with the West 
 
Events in Kosovo during 1998 and 1999 transformed the relationship between the ICTY, 
the United States, European Union member states and the SRJ.  At Rambouillet the 
Contact Group brought together representatives of the SRJ and Kosovar Albanians in an 
attempt to secure a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Kosovo.  While Kosovar 
Albanians pushed for the inclusion of a binding ICTY compliance regime into the 
                                                 
43 Nosov compares the EU’s embrace of Koštunica in 2006 as a ‘pro-European’ reformer to that of the 
EU’s embrace of Milošević in 1996 as a regional ‘peacemaker.’ Personal interview in Belgrade, 23 January 
2007. 
44 For more on NATO’s failure to arrest individuals indicted by the ICTY during 1996 and the first half of 
1997 see Chapter 5. 
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Rambouillet agreement,45 the Serbian delegation redlined any mention of the ICTY.  For 
the most part, the Contact Group sided with Belgrade and only included references to 
existing obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal into the final agreement (Williams & 
Scharf 2002, pp. 196-201).  Williams and Scharf observed: 
…the delegates…seemed to be under the impression that the Serbian government 
did not intend meaningful cooperation with the Yugoslav Tribunal no matter which 
provisions were included in the accords, and thus it was unnecessary and 
inconvenient to propose such specific principles that would give the Serbian 
delegation an opportunity to object to the accords (2002, p. 202). 
 
Belgrade did not need this ‘opportunity’ to object to the agreement, and the SRJ 
abandoned Rambouillet on the grounds Belgrade could not accept a NATO led mission 
within its borders.46   
 
The failure of the parties to come to an agreement at Rambouillet marked the beginning 
of NATO’s Operation Allied Force.  The initiation of hostilities in March 1999 and the 
subsequent indictment of Slobodan Milošević in May 1999 by the ICTY crystallized a 
policy of regime change that was supported by both the United States and European 
Union member states (Albright 2003, p. 502; Williams & Scharf 2002, p. 207).  The 
indictment of Slobodan Milošević along with the SRJ military high command during 
Operation Allied Force meant that a post-Kosovo rehabilitation of the Milošević regime, 
similar to that which took place post-Dayton, could not take place without directly 
undermining the ICTY’s first indictment of a head of state.  While decisions of when and 
whom to indict lay outside the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that the timing of 
Milošević’s indictment was precipitous as an indictment before the SRJ delegation’s 
rejection of Rambouillet could have made conflict inevitable by making it difficult for the 
United States and European Union member states to negotiate with a Belgrade 
government led by Milošević.  Moreover, the US even expressed a preference that 
                                                 
45 A binding compliance regime would have required the SRJ to transfer ICTY accused on its territory to 
the Tribunal as condition for the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo. 
46 Belgrade also objected to the inclusion of the word ‘peace’ in the Rambouillet agreement (Albright 2003, 
pp. 405-406).   
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Milošević himself be present at Rambouillet (Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 194-195).47  
Despite the existence of evidence linking Milošević to war crimes to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
being in the possession of US intelligence agencies (Democracy, Rule of Law and Human 
Rights in Serbia 2003), it was only in May 1999 that Milošević was indicted by the 
Tribunal for war crimes in Kosovo.48  Nevertheless, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise 
Arbour claimed that there was considerable anger within NATO as a result of her 
decision to indictment Milošević (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 313).49  Even though there was a 
fear that the Milošević indictment could prolong the Kosovo conflict, US Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright appeared to welcome Arbour’s decision and made clear that the 
US saw the ICTY as having further legitimized the NATO campaign against the SRJ: 
We believe that the indictment actually shows the validity of our campaign…We 
had said all along that the behavior of the Serb authorities and Milosevic himself in 
Kosovo was unacceptable in terms of how we deal with situations like that at the 
end of the twentieth century’ (Serbia Must Hand over Milošević to Remain in 
Community of Nations says Albright 1999). 
 
Furthermore, the transfer of Milošević to the ICTY became a pre-condition to the ending 
the diplomatic isolation of the SRJ, which effectively locked-in a demand for SRJ 
cooperation with the ICTY through a policy of regime change (Albright 2003, p. 500).  
Albright stated that the SRJ: 
…[had] an obligation to turn [Milošević] over and I think that it is very important 
that we see a future for a democratic Serbia which could rejoin the community of 
nations if it followed through on its obligations … to turn an indicted war criminal 
over to the Hague (Serbia Must Hand over Milošević to Remain in Community of 
Nations says Albright 1999). 
 
In support of the US’ campaign to push Milošević ‘out of power, out of Serbia and in[to] 
the custody of the war crimes tribunal’ Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer adopted a strategy that combined economic sanctions with engagement 
                                                 
47 In fact, given the presence of senior Serbian officials such as Milan Milutinović, who was later indicted 
by the ICTY, indictments against Milošević regime officials would have likely precluded SRJ participation 
in Rambouillet.  Interestingly, Williams and Scharf note that despite a desire on the part of an unnamed US 
government official to have Milošević attend Rambouillet, Milošević feared the existence of a sealed ICTY 
arrest warrant and therefore chose not to attend so as not to risk arrest (2002, p. 194). 
48 Slobodan Milošević would not be charged with genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and violations of IHL in 
Croatia for another two years. 
49 While Arbour gives the impression the US opposed her indictment of Milošević, Williams and Scharf 
claim Arbour was reluctant to indictment Milošević and only did so after a meeting with a US State 
Department official who asked for Milošević to be indicted (Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 206-207). 
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with opponents to Slobodan Milošević in Serbia itself to help bring about a change of 
regime in Belgrade (Albright 2003, p. 500).  In the face of almost complete isolation 
within Europe and the United States’ commitment to a policy of regime change, the SRJ 
increasingly turned to Russia and China for financial and diplomatic assistance.  With 
regard to Russia, the SRJ even proposed Yugoslavia’s accession to a new state that was 
to be formed through a merger of Belarus and Russia, in effect transforming the SRJ into 
a Russian province (Lazić 1999).50 
 
In June 1999, Belgrade agreed to withdraw from Kosovo under an agreement brokered by 
Marrti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin and a NATO led international peacekeeping 
force moved into the province.  UNSC Resolution 1244 established the legal foundation 
for an international security presence in Kosovo; however the Security Council failed to 
put in place a regime that would secure the ICTY access to SRJ territory outside of 
Kosovo (Williams & Scharf 2002, p. 208).  Because France and Russia opposed any 
attempt by the Security Council to specifically address the question of continued SRJ 
non-compliance with ICTY obligations (Williams & Scharf 2002, p. 208), there was little 
expectation Belgrade would provide any meaningful cooperation with the Tribunal absent 
regime change. 
 
4.3 Phase III: the US, the EU and Coercing Post-Milošević Serbia 
 
After the collapse of the Milošević regime in October 2000, the EU raised the prospect of 
EU membership for the SRJ;51 however, unlike in Croatia where there existed an elite 
level consensus in favor of integration into the EU and NATO, Serbia’s political elite 
remained divided along the lines of two competing visions of Serbia’s place in the 
international community.  Absent a consensus for EU accession in Belgrade, EU 
conditionality would prove significantly less consequential to bringing about Serbian 
                                                 
50 The Russian State Duma went on to pass a non-binding Resolution endorsing the proposed merger of the 
SRJ with the Russian Federation and Belarus (The State Duma votes for accepting Yugoslavia into the 
Union, Regional Leaders Outraged’ 1999). 
51 Although at the Feira European Council meeting in June 2000 all Western Balkans states were described 
as ‘potential candidates’ for EU membership, it was only in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the 
Milošević regime that the Council extended an invitation to the SRJ to begin the Stability and Association 
process. 
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compliance than in the context of Croatia.  Instead, it was the threat of direct sanction by 
the United States which would trigger a domestic political crisis between Đinđić and 
Koštunica in 2001 and bring about the transfer of Slobodan Milošević to ICTY custody. 
 
4.3.1 Explaining Compliance and Rationalizing Non-Compliance 
 
After the collapse of the Milošević regime, the initial position of the first post-Milošević 
president of the SRJ, Vojislav Koštunica, regarding the ICTY was a continued denial of 
Tribunal jurisdiction (US Assistance to Serbia: Benchmarks for Certification 2001, p. 
13).  Yet, despite public opposition to cooperation with the Tribunal it was during early 
2001 the most spectacular transfer of an SRJ accused to the ICTY occurred, that of 
Slobodan Milošević.  Milošević’s transfer to the ICTY, while having occurred in the 
context of a domestic political conflict between the Yugoslav president and the Serbian 
prime minister, was the direct result of coercive pressure applied by the United States, 
which threatened to use its votes in the IMF to block Belgrade’s access to international 
financial assistance during the crucial period in the immediate aftermath of the collapse 
of the Milošević regime.  Furthermore, unlike Croatia, the SRJ was the subject of US 
legislation that required an annual certification by the US Secretary of State of Serbian 
compliance with Article 29 obligations.52  This certification process, which relied on 
disincentivizing non-compliance through the threat of financial sanction, proved far more 
consequential in bringing about the arrest and surrender of individuals indicted for war 
crimes than the more long-term incentives subsequently offered by the European Union 
such as the linkage of Stability and Association Agreement negotiations to cooperation 
with the ICTY.  This was because rather than providing for a long-term incentive for 
cooperation, the US was willing to impose significant and immediate costs upon the SRJ 
for non-compliance as failure to secure US certification meant that not only would Serbia 
lose access to direct assistance from the US, but the US could also use its votes in the 
IMF and World Bank to block financial assistance to Serbia from international lending 
institutions. 
                                                 
52 Failure to meet the above mentioned US imposed deadline for demonstrating cooperation with the ICTY 
led to the suspension of US$40 million in direct aid ('U.S. Pressure on Serbia to Transfer ICTY Indictees' 
2002). 
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After Milošević’s transfer to the ICTY, Serbia once again failed to comply with Article 
29(d) and (e) obligations and overall cooperation with the Tribunal once again 
deteriorated as the United States proved less willing to coerce Belgrade into surrendering 
the remaining ICTY indictees on the territory of the SRJ.  While the linkage of EU 
accession to compliance with Article 29 obligations did not bring about actual arrests,53 
by 2005 the Serbian government began to increasingly perceive the presence of ICTY 
fugitives on its territory as a liability and began to actively encourage persons indicted for 
war crimes on the territory of Serbia to ‘voluntarily surrender’ themselves to the 
Tribunal.54  However, Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY field office in Belgrade noted that 
these surrenders were always characterized as ‘patriotic’ acts and no mention was ever 
made of the contents of the ICTY indictments against persons accused of war crimes.55  
Furthermore, in instances were voluntary surrenders were not forthcoming, such as with 
regard to Ratko Mladić, the Serbian government failed to take action to bring about an 
arrest. 
 
Despite the characterization of voluntary surrenders as patriotic acts on the part of the 
state, the rationalization of non-compliance on the part of Belgrade evolved from a 
complete rejection of Tribunal jurisdiction to that of acceptance of obligations imposed 
by the Tribunal Statute.  As of 2007, the Belgrade government’s public rationalization of 
non-cooperation with the Tribunal consisted largely of arguments which identified 
functional law enforcement difficulties, such as an inability to locate ICTY suspects, 
instead of a rejection of legal obligations toward the Tribunal that were voiced as late as 
2001.56  The transformation in Belgrade’s rationalization of non-compliance with Article 
29(d) and (e) obligations illustrates that post-Milošević governments were concerned 
about the perception of non-cooperation inflicting costs upon Belgrade.  However, also in 
2007, Serbian government officials suggested that despite a change in rhetoric, the 
                                                 
53 As previously mentioned, in 2003 arrests were carried out in response to the assassination of Zoran 
Đinđić. 
54 As previously mentioned, Koštunica opposed carrying out arrests in support of the ICTY, but his party, 
the DSS, was willing to encourage voluntary surrenders. 
55 Personal interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY Field Office in Belgrade, 23 January 2007. 
56 Serbia’s foreign minister Vuk Jeremić emphasizes that Serbia 
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transfer of ICTY accused remains dependent upon an extralegal bargaining process 
linked to the negotiation of a final status agreement for Kosovo.  For example, 
Aleksandar Vasović quoted an anonymous government official as describing Mladić as 
‘an asset’ and stating, ‘We can get him and hand him over easily but only when we get 
Kosovo-related assurances from major powers, specifying what Serbia and Kosovo Serbs 
will receive in return’ (2007). 
 
4.3.2 Ratko Mladić and the End of Conditionality 
 
In the case of Ratko Mladić, the Serbian state denied that it was in non-compliance with 
Article 29(d) and (e) obligations and instead argued it was unable to locate the accused.   
The nuance in Serbian government descriptions of a non-compliance event suggests that 
the there was a desire to avoid being seen as not complying with state international legal 
obligations, which was absent from 1995 to 2002.  However, the ICTY countered that the 
Serbian state was actually aware of Ratko Mladić’s location and Mladić could be arrested 
and transferred to The Hague by Belgrade.57  As previously mentioned, the European 
Union adopted a policy that linked the start of Stability and Association Agreement talks 
with Belgrade to the handing over of the remaining ICTY fugitives on Serbian territory 
including Ratko Mladić (Thessaloniki Agenda 2003).  Yet, the incentive of SAA and EU 
candidacy proved insufficient to bring about Serbian compliance.  Recall that in the case 
of Milošević, compliance only occurred after the costs of non-compliance, denial of 
access to financial assistance, was clearly transmitted to Belgrade; however, in the case of 
Mladić the only cost associated with non-compliance was a delayed initiation of SAA 
talks.  Given Serbia’s long-term prospect of EU accession, the incentive of SAA proved 
unable to bring Serbia into compliance with Tribunal orders.  Furthermore, a significant 
bloc of EU member states, led by Italy and Austria opposed the linkage of cooperation 
with the ICTY to Serbia’s EU accession process and actively lobbied the European 
Council to decouple Serbia’s EU accession process from cooperation with the ICTY 
                                                 
57 Confidential interview with an ICTY official, 23 January 2007. 
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(Brunnstrom 2007).58  Following January 2007 elections in Serbia, which saw the Serbian 
Radical Party gain the largest bloc of votes, an increasing number of EU member states 
saw the immediate re-launch of Serbia’s EU accession process as a means of 
strengthening ‘pro-European’ political parties in Serbia ahead of Kosovo’s recognition as 
an independent state (International Reactions to Elections Results 2007) and the linkage 
between cooperation with the ICTY and the onset of SAA talks was abandoned.59  
 
5.  Conclusions: The Limits of Coercion 
 
From the very establishment of the ICTY in 1993, Serbia’s interaction with the Tribunal 
often proved contentious and as of 2007, Serbia failed to gain a single positive 
assessment of cooperation from the Tribunal.  In attempting to coerce an ‘unwilling’ state 
into compliance with Article 29 obligations, the ICTY relied heavily on third party 
coercion and incentives during the post-Milošević period, which produced sporadic 
compliance events.  Unlike in neighboring Croatia, where the partnership between the EU 
and the ICTY, in the form of conditionality, brought about Croatian cooperation with the 
Tribunal, Serbian non-compliance with not just Article 29(d) and (e) obligations, but also 
(a), (b) and (c), persisted despite a change of domestic regime and the linkage established 
between eventual EU membership and cooperation with the Tribunal.  This failure 
eventually resulted in the EU abandoning conditionality in order to re-launch SAA talks 
(Kavran 2007).  Despite a decade of non-compliance, the OTP argues that the continued 
application of coercive pressure is necessary to bring about Serbian cooperation.  Because 
external coercion proved effective in bringing about Croatian compliance, Carla Del 
Ponte has advocated a similar approach be taken by the EU, ‘…the Croatian case 
demonstrates that if the EU sticks to its principles it can achieve a lot’ (Del Ponte: 
Serbia's Painful Inability 2006).  Del Ponte’s comparison of Serbia with Croatia, 
however, obscures divergent ideational and material incentives operating within the two 
states that have proven consequential to compliance outcomes. 
                                                 
58 As of February 2008, only the Netherlands demanded Serbian compliance with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders be maintained as a pre-condition for signing an SAA with Belgrade (Dicker & Leicht 
2008). 
59 Instead, the signing of the SAA was to be contigent on full Serbian cooperation with the ICTY. 
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With regard to ideational incentives, Belgrade’s appeals to countervailing norms made 
the rationalization of compliance acts considerably more difficult for Serbian 
governments.  Whereas Croatian elites engaged in international criminal justice norm-
affirming rhetoric throughout the 1990s, Belgrade initially rejected the ICTY regime and 
appealed to countervailing norms.  The antecedent condition which amplified the 
effectiveness of third party coercion and inducements identified in the Croatian case 
study, an acceptance of legal obligation, was absent with regard to Serbia.  Thus, while 
Croatian elites were able to domestically rationalize coerced compliance acts as the 
fulfillment of pre-existing legal obligations, when it came to rationalizing transfers from 
Serbia to the ICTY, Serbian elites instead framed transfers as pragmatic responses to 
external coercion.  Meanwhile, domestic material incentives for non-compliance included 
recalcitrant security services, which were responsible for the murder of Zoran Đinđić in 
2003 and significant opposition to cooperation with the ICTY amongst parliamentary 
political parties.  Moreover, unlike Croatia, in Serbia there was no parliamentary 
consensus for EU accession making an establishment of a linkage between ICTY 
cooperation and EU membership less likely to transform state compliance preferences 
with regard to ICTY arrest and surrender orders. 
 
It is important to emphasize that it is not argued here that material incentives are not 
consequential to compliance, but rather that how states rationalize compliance and non-
compliance acts can either serve to amplify or dilute material incentives for compliance.  
Endogenous material incentives locked-in a non-compliance preference that was not 
transformed by domestic or transnational human rights organizations even after the 
collapse of the Miloševic regime in October 2000.  Instead of a domestic ‘boomerang 
effect’ mobilizing third party coercion, the ICTY was left to directly appeal to both the 
US and EU member states to apply coercive pressure upon Belgrade to bring about 
compliance.  As a result of Belgrade’s challenging of the emerging international criminal 
justice regime during the 1990s, even when post-Milošević local elites sought to comply 
with ICTY arrest and surrender orders, domestic opposition to the ICTY served to block 
compliance acts.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Macedonia: Explaining First Order Compliance 
At about 8:20 a.m. on Sunday 12 August 2001 members of a police unit commanded by Johan 
TARCULOVSKI forcibly entered the yard of Rami JUSUFI’s house situated in the northern part of 
Ljuboten near Ljubanci. Rami JUSUFI, a 33 year old ethnic Albanian male, was asleep in bed when his 
mother called him to the front door. He went to the door in his pyjamas, unarmed, and was immediately 
shot at close range in his stomach through the open door by one of the police. He died two hours later. 
Excerpt from the ICTY’s indictment of Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, November 2005 
 
Nobody has the right on the basis of his own craziness to take someone's life in the name of the state. 
Mirjana Konteska, Spokesperson for the Macedonian Ministry of the Interior commenting on 
former Minister of Interior Ljube Boškoski at a press conference in Skopje in April 2004 
 
1. Introduction: Explaining First Order Compliance 
 
The Republic of Macedonia reluctantly declared independence in 1991 as Yugoslavia’s 
western republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina departed the federation 
amid violent conflict; however, unlike in Yugoslavia’s western republics, war did not 
breakout on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia until 2001, a decade after the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav state and eight years after the UNSC established the ICTY.  
As a result, the period of time and number of arrests and transfers covered in this case 
study are significantly shorter and lower than with regard to Chapters Two, Three, Five 
and Six.  ICTY investigations and indictments targeting Macedonian citizens only 
emerged after 2001 and the transfer of individuals to ICTY custody occurred in the 
context of post-Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) international engagement in 
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Macedonia.1  Furthermore, only two Macedonian citizens were indicted by the Tribunal, 
Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, and only Tarčulovski was transferred to the 
Tribunal by the Macedonian state.2 
 
Nonetheless, despite a lacunae of arrest and surrender orders addressed to the 
Macedonian government, Macedonia represents an important case study, as Skopje was 
never found to be in non-cooperation with the Tribunal.3  In fact, every ICTY annual 
report, which dealt with the question of Macedonian cooperation with the Tribunal, 
included a positive assessment of Macedonian interaction with the ICTY (Report of the 
International Tribunal 2002, p. 40; Report of the International Tribunal 2003, p. 54; 
Report of the International Tribunal 2004, p. 70; Report of the International Tribunal 
2005, p. 37; Report of the International Tribunal 2006, p. 21).  Macedonian cooperation 
with the ICTY stands in contrast to the previous two case studies, which demonstrated a 
pre-existing preference for non-compliance with regard to the enforcement of arrest and 
surrender orders.  Macedonia, therefore, presents us with an example of first order 
compliance with international legal obligations stemming from Article 29 of the Tribunal 
Statute, while Croatia and Serbia were problems of second order compliance.4  Fisher’s 
observation, ‘[s]hort of military defeat, governments might be unwilling to allow their 
officers to be punished by an international authority’ (1981, pp. 88-89), does resonate 
with previous case studies as Belgrade and Zagreb resisted cooperation with the Tribunal, 
albeit eventual compliance was not necessitated by military defeat.  Rather when 
Belgrade and Zagreb complied with arrest and surrender orders, compliance was the 
outcome of rational interest based calculations, or what Olsen and March described as a 
‘logic of consequences’ (1998).  Moreover, tools relied upon by external actors to either 
                                                 
1 The Ohrid Framework Agreement was agreed to by ethnic Albanian and Macedonian political parties in 
August 2001 and ended the brief Albanian-Macedonian civil conflict. 
2 Boškoski was a dual Croatian and Macedonian citizen and resided in Croatia at the time of his indictment 
for war crimes committed during the conflict in Macedonia.  Thus, Buškoski was arrested and transferred to 
ICTY custody by Croatian authorities in 2005. 
3 While the focus of this study is on compliance with arrest and surrender orders, Article 29(d) and (e) of 
the Tribunal Statute, it should be emphasized that cooperation with the Tribunal also includes a wide array 
of activities that includes providing assistance for in-country ICTY investigations. 
4 First order compliance refers to a state respecting standing rules, in this case pre-existing legal obligations 
to cooperate with the ICTY.  Second order compliance would pertain to a state complying with an arrest 
and surrender order only after being found to be in non-compliance of the Tribunal Statute.  For more on 
first and second order compliance see (R. Fisher 1981, pp. 28-29). 
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induce or coerce cooperation, after a state was found to be in non-compliance with 
standing legal obligations, were dependent upon a logic of consequences in guiding 
recalcitrant elites toward compliance.  Chapter Two demonstrated Croatian cooperation 
with the ICTY was largely dependent upon third party coercion, and later the inducement 
of EU membership, while Chapter Three noted that although a combination of third party 
coercion and inducements were relied upon to bring about compliance on the part of post-
Milošević Serbia, Serbian non-compliance preferences proved less malleable to external 
incentives and disincentives.  What makes Macedonia unique among the case studies is 
that coercive threats, such as denial of access to international financial assistance or the 
canceling of EU accession talks, were never deployed to transform non-compliant 
behavior because Skopje promptly arrested and transferred Johan Tarčulovski to Tribunal 
custody following his 2005 indictment. 
 
As Chapters Two and Three illustrated, ICTY compliance decisions must be 
contextualized within the broader foreign policy preferences of the target state.  Recall in 
the case of Croatia, Zagreb’s post-Tuđman foreign policy preference for integration into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions amplified the effectiveness of the coercive linkage of EU and 
NATO accession to cooperation with the ICTY, while in the case of Serbia the absence of 
consensus for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions diluted the effectiveness of 
conditionality.  While Zagreb’s preference for rapid integration into the EU and NATO 
emerged only after the death of Franjo Tuđman in 1999, throughout the 1990s Skopje 
voluntarily enmeshed the Macedonian state within a complex web of international 
institutional arrangements which saw external actors assume control of state security 
functions.  Skopje’s weakness and encirclement by more powerful neighbors, 
metaphorically labeled the ‘four wolves’ (Ackermann 1999, p. 71) led Macedonia to seek 
security within international institutions long before violent conflict broke out in 2001 
(Ackermann 1999, p. 84).  Moreover, Skopje’s receptivity to an in-country international 
presence, first on the part of the UN and later on the part of NATO and the EU, illustrates 
the extent to which Macedonia relied on external actors to ensure state survival at a time 
when hostile neighboring states harbored territorial ambitions over the embattled former 
Yugoslav republic (Ackermann 1999, p. 71; Rossos 2006, pp. 110-113).  It will be argued 
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that Macedonian compliance must be viewed in the context of a decade long engagement 
with international actors, with the UN even assuming responsibility for border control 
functions and security through UNPREDEP, United Nations Preventative Deployment.  
UNPREDEP was then succeeded by NATO and EU security missions in Macedonia 
which molded the Macedonian state’s interactions with external actors such as the ICTY. 
 
In order to explore compliance causation this Chapter will begin with an exploration of 
the domestic politics of compliance.  It will be noted Macedonia’s acceptance of the 2001 
OFA, which ended the brief civil conflict, marked a watershed moment in shaping the 
identity of the Macedonian state as Macedonia accepted its transformation from nation-
state into a decentralized multi-ethnic state (Brunnbauer 2002, p. 4).  While UNPREDEP 
provided security pre-1999, the security of the post-Ohrid Macedonian state was 
guaranteed by both NATO and the EU, and the domestic political order was stabilized by 
the inclusion of ethnic Albanian political parties into coalition governments.  Before 
turning to an exploration of the international politics of Macedonian cooperation with the 
ICTY, it must again be emphasized that unlike Croatia and Serbia, only two ICTY 
indictments were issued against Macedonian citizens and four investigations were 
referred back to the Macedonian judiciary by the Tribunal, which meant the question of 
enforcing arrest and surrender orders never achieved the political salience, domestic or 
international, that was observed in the previous two case studies.5  In our discussion of 
the international politics of compliance it will be noted that Macedonia was an extremely 
weak state, which did not possess an armed forces at independence and found itself 
reliant upon assistance from the United States and the European Union for security.  
While Macedonia’s vulnerability brought Skopje into a close relationship with the United 
States, Macedonian compliance cannot alone be explained by relative power 
distributions.  After all Croatia found itself dependent upon US assistance during the 
1990s, yet compliance on the part of various Zagreb governments could not be described 
as automatic.  Although the fragility of the Macedonian state contributed to compliance 
                                                 
5 In 2002 the ICTY requested five cases under investigation by the Macedonian judiciary be transferred to 
the Tribunal: the ‘NLA leadership’ case, the Mavrovo road worker case, the Lipkovo water reserve case, 
the Ljuboten investigation, and the Neprošteno investigation.  Of these cases and investigations, only the 
Ljuboten investigation resulted in prosecution before the ICTY (The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia Requested to Defer Five Cases to the Competence of the International Tribunal 2002). 
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outcomes, it will be argued here that Macedonia’s decade long engagement with 
international actors and the implementation of the OFA established a political context 
that made compliance with ICTY requests and orders acts of rule following as opposed to 
the outcome of a decisionmaking process in which the costs of non-compliance were 
weighed against the costs of compliance. 
 
2. The Domestic Politics of Compliance 
 
Parallel to elections held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia held its first post-communist multi-
party elections in November and December 1990.  Macedonia’s 1990 elections resulted 
in a nationalist coalition of four parties, led by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, (Vnatrešno 
Makedonska Revoluciona Organizacija-Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno 
Edinstvo, VMRO-DPMNE), winning the largest bloc of parliamentary seats and the 
communist successor party, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, 
(Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija, SSM), winning the second largest bloc of 
parliamentary seats (Perry 1997, p. 233).  As in Croatia, during the 1990 elections party 
cleavages broke down along the question of independence.  The VMRO-DPMNE 
advocated Macedonian independence while the SSM favored salvaging a Yugoslav state 
in an attempt to prevent Slovenia and Croatia from seceding from the federation.6  
Despite the nationalist bloc’s narrow victory, Kiro Gligorov of the SSM won appointment 
by parliament as president.7  In the months preceding the outbreak of war in 1991, 
Gligorov along with Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, attempted to prevent the 
dissolution of the Yugoslav state through the promotion of an inter-republican 
compromise that would have created a Yugoslav confederation (Poulton 2000, pp. 175-
                                                 
6 Of course, support for keeping Macedonia within Yugoslavia was conditioned on Slovenia, Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s continued participation in the union.  Once these three republics seceded, 
Macedonia’s inclusion into a Serb-dominated rump state was opposed by both major political parties and a 
referendum on independence was held in September 1991 following declarations of independence in 
Slovenia and Croatia. 
7 Gligorov’s appointment as president attested to the strength of personalities over parties in 1990.  Also, 
the VMRO-DPMNE party leader was only 24 years old and lacked political experience at the time of his 
party’s triumph. 
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176).  However, the Gligorov-Izetbegović proposal was rejected by Belgrade and failed 
to prevent the outbreak of violent wars of secession in Slovenia and Croatia (Libal 1997, 
p. 33).8 
 
2.1 Independence, Insecurity and the UN 
 
Macedonia became an independent state in November 1991, albeit reluctantly, and the 
November referendum even included a clause which would permit Macedonia’s inclusion 
in a future Yugoslav state (Poulton 2000, p. 177).9  At independence Macedonia found 
itself in a precarious situation as Skopje feared spillover from wars elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia and the territorial ambitions of neighboring states (Ackermann 1999, 
p. 71; Rossos 2006, pp. 110-113).  Skopje’s vulnerability was exacerbated by the fact 
Macedonia lacked both an armed forces and meaningful weaponry to confront what were 
perceived in Skopje to be hostile neighboring states.10  Given the lack of a domestic 
armed forces and fearing encroachment by neighboring states, Skopje turned to the 
United Nations for security and requested the deployment of a UN preventative force 
which would act as a deterrent to the encroachment of Serbia.11  In effect, Skopje 
outsourced its own state security to an external actor.  UNPREDEP, the United Nations 
Preventative Deployment mission to Macedonia, was exceptionally robust due to the fact 
UNPREDEP included troop contributions from the United States, European Union 
member states as well as from elsewhere,12 and therefore acted as a powerful deterrent to 
Belgrade by signaling a willingness on the part of the US to prevent a spillover of 
violence into Macedonia from the north (Ackermann 1999, p. 117).  During its existence 
UNPREDEP not only deterred Belgrade from spreading violent conflict south into 
                                                 
8 Following Slovenia and Croatia’s 1991 declarations of independence, Gligorov abandoned efforts to 
establish a Yugoslav confederation and authorized a referendum on Macedonian independence (Perry 1997, 
p. 234). 
9 The 1991 referendum was boycotted by the major ethnic Albanian political parties in protest of the 
perceived lack of minority rights accorded to Macedonian Albanians (Pettifer 1992, pp. 480-481; Poulton 
2000, p. 177). 
10 Macedonia was effectively disarmed by the retreating Yugoslav National Army, which withdrew under 
an agreement concluded between Gligorov and Belgrade (Ackermann 1999, pp. 71-72).   
11 Ackermann notes Skopje eventually came to perceive UNPREDEP as a substitute for a domestic armed 
forces (1999, p. 84). 
12 See Appendix VI for a comprehensive list of states which contributed troops to the UNPREDEP mission. 
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Macedonia, but also provided security to a state that failed to even gain diplomatic 
recognition from its immediate neighbors Greece and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
until 1995.  UNPREDEP also assumed border control functions along the Macedonian-
Albanian border and established monitoring positions along the Serbian and Albanian 
borders (Ackermann 1999, p. 119).13  The internationalization of Macedonian state 
security during the 1990s left a profound legacy upon the Macedonian defense 
establishment as Macedonia simultaneously created an armed forces and integrated its 
defense structures into international security institutions such as NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP).14 
 
Nevertheless, the international military presence in Macedonia was not engaged in 
addressing the grievances of Macedonia’s substantial ethnic Albanian minority, which 
throughout the 1990s increasingly perceived their community as being marginalized 
within the emerging Macedonian nation state (Poulton 2000, pp. 184-201).  Despite the 
participation of ethnic Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity in a coalition 
government with the SSM until 1998,15 numerous grievances, such as the Macedonian 
constitution’s distinction between majority ethnic Macedonians and ethnic minorities and 
the lack of linguistic rights for Albanian speakers, eventually culminated in a radical 
segment of the Albanian political community forming a paramilitary armed forces known 
as the National Liberation Army (NLA).16 
 
 
                                                 
13 UNPREDEP’s success in preventing violent conflict in Macedonia during the 1990s did not prevent 
China’s veto of the UNPREDEP mission at the UNSC in 1999.  China’s veto of an extension of the 
UNPREDEP mission was an act of retaliation for Skopje’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in January 
1999.  Although the termination of UNPREDEP’s mandate two years before the outbreak of violent 
conflict in Macedonia contributed to increasing regional insecurity, it should be noted that following 
NATO intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of KFOR, NATO maintained a support presence in 
Macedonia known as KFOR-REAR. KFOR-REAR was responsible for maintaining a ‘communications 
zone’ (COMMZ) in the KFOR theater’s rear area which encompassed Macedonia, Greece, Albania and 
Bulgaria. 
14 The Macedonian parliament passed a resolution supporting Macedonia’s membership in the NATO 
alliance on the 23 November 1993 and joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 1995 (Republic of 
Macedonia and the Partnership for Peace 2007).  For more on the perceived linkage between integration 
into international security institutions and state security see (International Cooperation 2007). 
15 After 1998, the VMRO-DPMNE formed a coalition government with the Democratic Party of Albanians. 
16 For a detailed exploration of the ‘Albanian question’ in Macedonian politics during the 1990s see 
(Poulton 2000, pp. 184-201). 
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2.2 The 2001 Conflict and Ohrid: A Limited War 
 
At the time conflict broke out on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, in March 
2001, the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE had been in government for four years after having 
deposed the SSM in parliamentary elections held during 1998.17  Despite the VMRO-
DPMNE having formed a coalition government with an ethnic Albanian political party, 
the Democratic Party of Albanians, relations between ethnic Albanians and ethnic 
Macedonians rapidly deteriorated following NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo.  
NATO’s ‘Operation Allied Force’ exacerbated ethnic cleavages as the 1999 war was 
highly unpopular amongst ethnic Macedonians, while widely supported by Macedonian 
Albanians (Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace 2001, p. 19).  Although causes of the 
2001 conflict are not within the scope of this study, ethnic tensions did escalate 
significantly following the Kosovo war; however, the flow of refugees across the 
Kosovo-Macedonian border itself did not lead to an outbreak of violence as most 
Kosovar Albanians returned to Kosovo following Operation Allied Force.  Instead, in the 
aftermath of the Kosovo war, there was a growing fear amongst ethnic Macedonians that 
Macedonia’s Albanian community would wage a separatist campaign modeled on the 
Kosovo Liberation Army’s campaign in Kosovo, and the formation of a Macedonian 
Albanian paramilitary organization, the NLA, appeared to confirm these fears.  However, 
unlike the Kosovo Liberation Army, the NLA had more limited objectives,18 which were 
achieved through the OFA that ended fighting between the NLA and Macedonian 
government forces in August 2001. 
 
During the 2001 conflict, the response of the Macedonian armed forces to the NLA led 
rebellion was significantly more restrained than military operations elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia and, therefore, the number of international war crimes investigations 
initiated against parties of the 2001 conflict never exceeded the single digits.  The 
Macedonian armed forces’ response to the ethnic Albanian rebellion were closely 
                                                 
17 After the 2001 conflict, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia was returned to government in 
parliamentary elections held in 2002. 
18 Among NLA demands were access to greater economic opportunities, social benefits, Albanian language 
university education and changes to the Macedonian constitution (Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace 
2001, p. 5). 
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monitored by the United States and European Union member states, which explicitly 
warned Skopje to adhere to a ‘proportional use of force’ against armed Albanian 
insurgent groups (Ordanovski 2004, p. 18). Given NATO’s in-country presence, the US’ 
and EU’s warnings not to use excessive force could explain the restraint of the 
Macedonian Army during the 2001 conflict.  Moreover, the NLA quickly proved itself to 
be an effective fighting force, and Ordanovski cited rumors that the NLA received 
assistance from MPRI, a US military contractor (2004, p. 18).19  At a crucial engagement 
with Macedonian government forces at Aracinovo the NLA demonstrated an ability to 
challenge the Macedonian Army: 
Aracinovo demonstrated that the NLA also had in its ranks a number of 
experienced, well-trained fighters armed with sophisticated weapons.  In some 
cases, the NLA was better trained and armed than Macedonian security forces, and 
posed a serious challenge.  If it could not be defeated militarily, some reasoned, 
then avenues of dialogue would have to be opened (Ordanovski 2004, p. 19). 
 
It was following the failure of Macedonian security forces to defeat the NLA at 
Aracinovo that momentum for a negotiated settlement emerged as a military victory 
against the NLA appeared less likely.  Overall, in terms of both scale and time, the 
conflict in Macedonia never came close to paralleling the significantly more intense 
conflicts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, making groups such as veterans and 
victims associations which mobilized against the Tribunal in Croatia less influential in 
post-conflict Macedonia.  For example, while 520,000 people were displaced during the 
war in Croatia20 in Macedonia the numbers displaced were far smaller totaling only 
74,000 ('Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: Macedonia' 2007).  With regard to 
actual deaths, only eight civilian deaths could be attributed to attacks mounted by the 
NLA (Ordanovski 2004, p. 17).  Moreover, Macedonian government forces only suffered 
38 combat deaths and 220 wounded (Ordanovski 2004, p. 17).21 
 
                                                 
19 Of course, the question could also be raised as to whether or not knowledge that the ICTY exercised 
jurisdiction over Macedonia had a restraining effect on Macedonian military and civilian elites; however, at 
this point, such a link remains difficult to establish. 
20 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that of the 520,000 displaced during the war in 
Croatia, 220,000 were ethnic Croats while 300,000 were ethnic Serbs (2006). 
21 At this point, accurate statistics for deaths on the side of the NLA are unavailable. 
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The Macedonian government’s failure to defeat the NLA militarily left a profound legacy 
upon post-Ohrid Macedonia and segments of the ethnic Albanian community maintained 
a capability to threaten the survival of the Macedonian state should the Macedonian 
government abandon the OFA: 
The ethnic Albanians have the political and underground paramilitary capability to 
destabilize the state at any time, but it is currently not in their interests to do so… 
(Pettifer 2006, p. 5). 
 
Thus, a radical shift in policy that would result in a break from the pro-EU/NATO 
consensus in favor of pan-Slavic nationalist policies, such as the alternative foreign 
policy presented by the Serbian Radical Party in Serbia,22 would entail a destabilization 
of Macedonia’s domestic political order and threaten the survival of a unitary 
Macedonian state.  Moreover, not only would ethnic Albanians leave the political 
process, but Skopje would jeopardize its strategic relationships with Ohrid’s guarantors, 
NATO, the US and EU member states.  Therefore, despite significant populist nationalist 
mobilization against the OFA on the part of ethnic Macedonians, all of Macedonia’s 
major political parties, including the VMRO-DPMNE, committed themselves to the 
implementation of the framework agreement. 
 
2.2.1 The Ohrid Framework Agreement 
 
The OFA constituted a re-founding of the Macedonian state and included significant 
alterations to the Macedonian Constitution in order to redefine Macedonia as a civic 
state.23  The OFA also directly addressed NLA grievances by affirming the status of 
Albanian as an official state language, and including a legislative program aimed at 
empowering local governments (Brunnbauer 2002, pp. 4-7).  Significantly, the 
framework agreement did not partition Macedonia into ethnically defined entities such as 
the Dayton agreement did for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather attempted to integrate 
ethnic Albanians into a decentralized Macedonian state.  In fact, Article 1.2 of the OFA 
specifically rejected ethnicity based territorial partition: 
                                                 
22 See Chapter 3. 
23 The preamble of Macedonia’s 1991 constitution defined Macedonia as a ‘national state of the 
Macedonian people.’ 
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Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the 
state are inviolable and must be preserved.  There are no territorial solutions to 
ethnic issues (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001). 
 
The maintenance of a unitary state permitted ethnic Albanian political parties to continue 
to participate in governing coalitions with ethnic Macedonian parties at the state and local 
levels.  Even during the 2001 conflict Macedonia’s four major parliamentary parties, two 
of which were ethnic Albanian, formed a national unity government in order to confront 
the NLA.  In addition to this parliamentary demonstration of inter-ethnic unity, all post-
OFA Macedonian governments have included major ethnic Albanian political parties 
within governing coalitions despite the recent legacy of violent conflict.  In 2002, a party 
formed by the NLA’s leader Ali Ahmeti was invited into a coalition government with the 
SSM, which had defeated the VMRO-DPMNE in parliamentary elections.  Although the 
NLA did not participate in negations at Ohrid, Ahmeti formed a political party, the 
Democratic Union for Integration (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim, BDI), following 
the acceptance of the OFA by the NLA.  The entrance of the BDI, which was formed by 
the NLA leadership, into the governing coalition illustrates the extent of post-Ohrid 
Macedonia’s transformation, and it was post-Ohrid Macedonia which would be 
confronted with the task of cooperating with the ICTY. 
 
2.2.2 Ohrid and External Actors 
 
The OFA committed signatories to substantial engagement with international actors 
through appeals for assistance from either the ‘international community,’ specific states, 
or international organizations; however, there was no transfer of sovereign control to 
external actors as assistance was limited to training, assistance, implementation, and 
monitoring: 
The parties invite the international community to facilitate, monitor, and assist in 
the implementation of the provisions of the Framework Agreement and its 
Annexes, and requests such efforts be coordinated by the EU in cooperation with 
the Stabilization and Association Council (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001). 
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Policing and the rule of law were specifically targeted for substantial external assistance.  
For example, Article 5.3 specifically invited the OSCE, the European Union and the 
United States to provide training and assistance for the Macedonian police (Ohrid 
Framework Agreement 2001), while Article 5.4 invited the ‘international community’ to 
assist in increasing minority participation within the judiciary: 
The parties invite the international community to assist in the training of lawyers, 
judges and prosecutors from members of communities not in the majority in 
Macedonia in order to be able to increase their representation in the judicial system 
(Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001). 
 
As will be demonstrated below, the engagement of international actors in post-Ohird 
Macedonia legitimized the new post-Ohrid order.  The European Union was also 
designated the role of ‘special coordinator’ for a wide range of capacity building 
activities, which were framed in the context of Macedonia’s EU accession process. 
 
2.3 Nationalist Mobilization in Post-Ohrid Macedonia 
 
While compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders remained largely a peripheral 
question in Macedonian politics, Macedonian nationalists did mobilize against the OFA 
almost immediately after the agreement had been signed in 2001.  However, no major 
political party transformed nationalist opposition to the OFA into political action that 
would have threatened the implementation of the 2001 framework agreement.  As noted 
previously, even the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE committed itself to the implementation 
of the OFA (Gruevski 2004, 2007).  The commitment to the OFA on the part of the 
VMRO-DPMNE was largely the outcome of a perception that implementation of the 
agreement was vital to Macedonian state survival (Maleski 2003).  Any failure to adhere 
to OFA, on the part of Skopje, would lead to a return to conflict and the potential 
partition of the Macedonian state along ethnic lines.  Nonetheless, there were significant 
grievances against the OFA expressed by Macedonian nationalists.  The primary 
grievance tended to focus around the argument that the framework agreement threatened 
the survival of the Macedonian nation state through constitutional amendments, which 
emphasized Macedonia’s new identity as a civic state (Brunnbauer 2002, p. 7).  Yet, 
Macedonia’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Denko Maleski, emphasized that 
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rather than threaten the survival of Macedonia, the OFA was ‘in the interest of ethnic 
Macedonians, because, with its implementation, Macedonia, as a state, is given the 
chance to survive’ (2003).  Given the linkage between adherence to the OFA and state 
survival, mobilization against agreement only served to delay rather than threaten its 
implementation.  Furthermore, because NATO, the European Commission and the 
European Council articulated a clear linkage between implementation of the OFA and the 
advancement of Macedonia’s NATO and EU accession processes, public opposition to 
the OFA was to a large extent muted as domestic public opinion strongly supported 
Macedonia’s membership into two international organizations.24  In addition, both NATO 
and the EU established ICTY conditionality for aspirant states in the Western Balkans as 
a prerequisite to membership negotiations in 2003.  Importantly, in neither of the two 
preceding case studies was the establishment of conditionality alone effective in bringing 
about first order compliance. 
 
2.4 Nationalist Mobilization and the ICTY 
 
The indictment of Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski in March 2005 was met by 
little public reaction in Macedonia (Petruševa 2005a), and stands in sharp contrast to the 
mass demonstrations that followed the indictments of Ante Gotovina and Janko Bobetko 
in Croatia (Peskin & Boduszyński 2003, pp. 1117-1142).  The relative absence of social 
protest against the ICTY does not, however, mean there was not significant questioning 
of the Tribunal among ethnic Macedonians.  For example, the fact the ICTY failed to 
indict members of the NLA for war crimes led to claims of bias on the part of the 
Tribunal being expressed by Macedonian Prime Minister Vlado Bučkovski (Petruševa 
2005a).  Yet, the questioning of ICTY indictments did not translate into state obstruction 
of Tribunal investigations and attempts to secure custody of indicted persons.  The 
relative absence of institutional obstruction can be explained by the fact that the targeting 
of a civilian minister of interior and the head of paramilitary unit, the Lions, meant that 
unlike in Croatia and Serbia where the high commands of both the Serbian and Croatian 
armed forces perceived themselves as threatened by the ICTY (Edmunds 2003, pp. 6-7), 
                                                 
24 For public opinion and NATO and EU accession see Appendix VII. 
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in Macedonia the ICTY did not pose a threat to a wide range of military and civilian 
elites.  Therefore, the external pull for compliance did not encounter powerful 
institutional resistance within state security services.25  Because the security services did 
not mobilize against the Tribunal, the civilian elite were granted increased leverage for 
cooperation with the ICTY.26   
 
Absent institutional resistance to cooperation from the military, a marginal movement did 
emerge, which attempted to mobilize nationalist support for Ljube Boškoski through an 
organization known as the ‘Associations of Citizens for the Support of Ljube Boškoski,’ 
which maintained a website providing news updates from developments in the Boškoski 
trial in The Hague.27  In parallel to organizations formed to support persons indicted by 
the ICTY in both Croatia and Serbia there has been an attempt to cast the indictments 
against Boškoski and Tarčulovski as indictments against the Macedonian state.  The 
Association claims, ‘the primary aim of the Association is to defend the honor of the 
Republic of Macedonia put at the pillar of shame’ (Boškoski 2007).  Attempts to frame 
the ICTY’s investigation against Boškoski as an indictment of the Macedonian state, 
were echoed by an independent deputy in the Macedonian parliament who argued, ‘If 
Macedonia is a real state it must stop these foreigners carrying out these exhumations 
without any permit’ (Jovanovski 2002).   
 
The failure of anti-ICTY organizations such as the Association for the Support of Ljube 
Boškoski to mobilize support is underlined by the fact Boškoski’s own political party, the 
VMRO-DPMNE, failed to mention cooperation with the ICTY in its 2006 party program 
(Program of VMRO-DPMNE 2006).  The omission of the ICTY in the VMRO-DPMNE 
is striking given the fact two of the party’s former leading members had been indicted by 
the Tribunal during the previous year.  The VMRO-DPMNE decision not to support 
                                                 
25 In both Croatia and Serbia, the armed forces developed close ties with the Tuđman and Milošević 
regimes, and armed forces elites were threatened by domestic political change (Edmunds 2003, p. 1). 
26 Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated by members of an elite paramilitary force, ‘the 
Red Berets’ in response for cooperation with the ICTY.  Moreover, in the case of Serbia, political party 
leaders along with heads of state and government were indicted by the ICTY, while with regard to Croatia 
ICTY indictments were issued against the former military elite. 
27 The site can be found at: [http://www.ljubeboskoski.com.mk/] and is available in both English and 
Macedonian. 
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Boškoski can be partially explained by the fact Boškoski’s own political extremism led to 
his marginalization within the party even before his indictment by the ICTY.  In fact, 
after the VMRO-DPME was removed from government following parliamentary 
elections held in 2002, Boškoski was prevented from contesting presidential elections 
held in 2004, when Macedonia’s Electoral Commission barred his candidacy in elections 
held following the death of President Boris Trajkovski on the grounds Boškoski had not 
continuously resided in Macedonia for 15 years (Petruševa 2005b).   Shortly after the 
electoral commission’s decision, Boškoski was indicted by the Macedonian judiciary on 
charges of murdering seven immigrants from South Asia and fled to Croatia.28  Instead, 
of expressing support for the former minister of interior, wanted on charges brought by 
both the domestic judiciary and later the ICTY, the VMRO-DPMNE again emphasized 
the pursuit of EU and NATO membership as the party’s two major foreign policy goals.  
In the words of the VMRO-DPMNE party program, ‘The goal of the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Macedonia is to integrate national security into the global security system of 
the EU and NATO’ (Program of VMRO-DPMNE 2006).   
 
2.5 The Boškoski and Tarčulovski Transfers 
 
Although Macedonia promptly arrested and transferred Johan Tarčulovski to ICTY 
custody, Macedonia benefited from the fact the most high profile Macedonian subject of 
an ICTY indictment, Ljube Boškoski, was a dual Macedonian-Croatian citizen, who at 
the time of his indictment was already imprisoned in Croatia on criminal charges 
pertaining to the murder of transient migrants from South Asia ‘for political gain.’  
Croatian authorities were, therefore, left with the responsibility of transferring Boškoski 
to Tribunal custody.  Thus, Tarčulovski became the only subject of an ICTY arrest and 
surrender order addressed to the Macedonian state.  Following the arrest and transfer of 
Tarčulovski to ICTY custody, the Tribunal noted: 
                                                 
28 Allegedly, on the orders of Boškoski, seven illegal immigrants in transit from South Asia to Western 
Europe were lured from Greece to Macedonia and executed near Skopje.  Weapons and documents were 
then planted on their bodies in order to give the appearance Boškoski’s security forces had foiled a 
‘terrorist’ plot that included a planned attack on the US Embassy in Skopje.  Shortly after the incident the 
Wall Street Journal reported Boškoski’s claims the deaths of the seven migrants provided evidence that 
Macedonia was ‘participating in the global war on terror’ (U.S. Questions Macedonian Claim That Slayed 
Men Were Terrorists 2002). 
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The authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia deserve credit for 
the prompt arrest and transfer to The Hague on 16 March 2005 of one accused (J. 
Tarčulovski).  In the reporting period there were no problems in cooperating with 
the Government (Report of the International Tribunal 2005, p. 37). 
 
Macedonia stands out among the cases studies as the only state to receive consistent 
plaudits for cooperation in the ICTY’s annual reports (Report of the International 
Tribunal 2002, p.40; Report of the International Tribunal 2003, p. 54; Report of the 
International Tribunal 2004, p.70; Report of the International Tribunal 2005, p.37; 
Report of the International Tribunal 2006, p.21).29  The close political cooperation 
between the Macedonian state and the ICTY was illustrated in 2006 when after meeting 
with ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola 
Gruevski pledged to maintain close cooperation with the ICTY to both facilitate trials in 
The Hague and to prepare the Macedonian judiciary for investigations referred back to 
the domestic courts (Gruevski Pledges for Close Cooperation with ICTY 2006).   In order 
to prepare Macedonia for domestic war crimes trials the ICTY pledged to provide 
assistance for the Macedonian judiciary, and in 2007, a series of training seminars was 
launched in Skopje which brought together Macedonian Ministry of Justice Officials with 
officials of the United States Department of Justice, the OSCE and the ICTY (Weekly 
Press Briefing 2007). 
 
3. Constructing International Justice – International Norms and Domestic Politics 
 
In Chapters Two and Three we observed mass populist mobilization against the ICTY in 
both Croatia and Serbia in response to the transmission of Tribunal arrest and surrender 
orders to state governments.  Moreover, it was also noted transnational advocacy 
networks and the ICTY failed to generate domestic social protest in support of the 
enforcement of ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  Here, an exploration of the 
construction of international justice presents us with a more complex task than 
encountered in Chapters Two and Three as cooperation with the ICTY never reached the 
political salience that was observed in the previous two case studies.  With regard to the 
                                                 
29 Prior to 2002 no assessment of Macedonian cooperation in available due to the fact ICTY investigations 
of war crimes committed on the territory of Macedonia only commenced in late 2001. 
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ICTY, the absence of in-country investigations until 2001 meant that for the first eight 
years of operation the Tribunal lacked an in-country presence and it was only in the 
aftermath of the 2001 conflict that the Macedonian state began to interact with the 
Tribunal. 
 
3.1 The ICTY and Transnational Advocacy Groups 
 
Given the lack of interaction between the ICTY and Macedonia, public opinion has only 
minimal exposure to ICTY trial processes.  Additionally, the ICTY’s interaction with 
Macedonian NGOs has been significantly less frequent than with regard to Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.  Instead, as previously mentioned, the ICTY has focused 
on attempts to ‘capacity build’ the domestic judiciary in order to prepare domestic courts 
to effectively process war crimes cases.  The ICTY does not maintain a permanent in-
country presence which is capable of liaising with domestic civil society and the domestic 
media.  However, in comparison to Belgrade, where the ICTY maintains staff capable of 
presenting the Tribunal’s opinions in the domestic media,30 cooperation with the ICTY 
has never become a salient political question within Macedonian politics. 
 
Unlike in Croatia and Serbia, the development of civil society in Macedonia was 
promoted by various international actors throughout the 1990s.  The United Nations took 
an active role in diffusing inter-ethnic tensions through the cultivation of inter-ethnic 
dialogue in what could be described as a civilian counterpart to the military mission, 
UNPREDEP (Ackermann 1999, p. 103).  Despite attempts to foster a human rights NGO 
community, international human rights NGOs have largely failed to engage public 
opinion with regard to the ICTY.  Although Ackermann notes ‘The Republic of 
Macedonia is host to an impressive number of non-governmental organizations, both 
international and indigenous…’ (Ackermann 1999, p. 149), one common feature of 
NGOs in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia was that foreign sources of funding 
made it possible for NGOs to operate without attracting grassroots support in the form of 
                                                 
30 In Belgrade Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY field office makes frequent statements to the local media 
and has appeared on local television. 
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members or donations from local populations (Grødeland 2006, p. 227).  In addition, 
indigenous Macedonian NGOs which did attract domestic support tended to be divided 
along exclusively ethnic lines (Ackermann 1999, p. 151).  Thus, it is not surprising NGOs 
failed to mobilize Macedonian public opinion in order to demand the prosecution 
individuals responsible for serious violations of IHL.   
 
3.2 Civil Society: Victims, Veterans and NGOs 
 
In Chapters Two and Three it was noted that anti-Tribunal activist organizations often 
emerged from groups directly affected by conflict, such as war veterans’ organizations.  
Because the intensity and duration of conflicts in Croatia, Serbia and particularly Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which will be dealt with in Chapter Five, powerful veterans’ and victims’ 
organizations emerged in these states.  HVIDR-a, mobilized Croatian war veterans 
through anti-ICTY demonstrations held in Croatia, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
Mothers of Srebrenica, advocated the prosecution of those responsible for committing 
atrocities.  Nothing similar to the above organizations ever emerged in Macedonia due to 
the limited nature of the conflict.  As previously mentioned, on the Macedonian side, war 
crimes indictments targeted only a single paramilitary unit, the Lions, formed by the 
Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boškoski, and not the officer corps of the 
Macedonian Army.  Edmunds notes in both Croatia and Serbia, cooperation with the 
ICTY became synonymous with attempts to transform powerful military establishments 
which maintained close ties with senior officials of the authoritarian ancien regimes 
(2003).  Recall, in Serbia elements of the security services assassinated Zoran Đinđić in 
an attempt to end state cooperation with the ICTY, while in Croatia military elites 
pressured the government not to cooperate with the Tribunal through HVIDR-a (S. Fisher 
2003, pp. 74-92).  In contrast to the previous two case studies, Macedonian cooperation 
with the ICTY did not incur high domestic costs.  The limited number of indictments 
issued against Macedonian citizens permitted the war crimes debate to be individualized 
to a much greater extent than in any of the other case studies where heads of state and 
government were either implicated or directly indicted for participation in joint criminal 
enterprises (Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak and Mladen Markač 2007; 
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Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević 1999, 2001).  Because Boškoski significantly 
discredited himself through his involvement in the murders of transient migrants from 
South Asia and fled Macedonia to Croatia following the initiation of an investigation to 
his crimes and Tarčulovski’s direct involvement in the Ljuboten massacres, very few 
organizations were willing to openly support the two ICTY indictees. 
 
4. The International Politics of Compliance 
 
A legal obligation for Macedonia to comply with an ICTY arrest and surrender order only 
emerged in 2005; however, ICTY investigations in Macedonia began in 2001 following 
the Ljoboten massacre, which was first brought to light by Human Rights Watch (Crimes 
Against Civilians 2001; Brunnbauer 2002, p. 3; Jovanovski 2001).  During Macedonia’s 
interaction with the ICTY, Macedonia was subjected to international pressure to fully 
implement the OFA which was agreed to in August 2001. Although there was an initial 
reluctance to implement legislation called for in the OFA, six years after Ohrid, most of 
the reforms called for by the framework agreement had been implemented (BIRN 2007).  
Cooperation with ICTY investigations into war crimes committed by Macedonian forces 
was a key demand of both European Union member states and NATO for Macedonian 
accession into the respective organizations.  In the case of the EU, progress on EU 
accession and cooperation with the ICTY were explicitly linked for the states of the 
Western Balkans at Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki Agenda 2003), while NATO made a 
similar linkage at Istanbul (Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004).  Yet, despite these 
linkages, coercive threats to delay ratification of a Stability and Association Agreement 
(SAA) or to cancel the commencement of EU accession negotiations were never 
articulated as throughout the six years of Macedonian interaction with the ICTY because 
Macedonia was never found to be in non-compliance with Article 29 obligations. 
 
Macedonian compliance with the arrest and surrender order issued against Johan 
Tarčulovski occurred shortly after the Tarčulovski indictment was transmitted to the 
Macedonian Ministry of Interior.  In explaining Tarčulovski’s transfer rationalists could 
point to Macedonia’s relative weakness vis à vis states demanding compliance.  Particular 
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attention would also be paid to the fact Macedonia’s interaction with the ICTY occurred 
parallel to Macedonia’s EU and NATO accession processes.  Failure to comply with an 
ICTY order could have been perceived as carrying significant costs upon the fragile 
Macedonian state.  However, before exploring compliance in the context of Macedonia’s 
pursuit of EU and NATO accession, it is first important to establish the regional context 
in which the independent Macedonian state emerged. 
 
4.1 Regional Insecurity 
 
As previously mentioned, at independence Macedonia perceived itself to be surrounded 
by hostile neighbors.  Among the neighboring states which presented a threat to the 
survival of the newly independent Macedonian state was Greece.  While UNPREDEP 
was deployed to Macedonia to prevent a spillover of conflict from Serbia, Greece, an EU 
member state, pursued the most aggressive and damaging foreign policy toward Skopje 
over a dispute over Macedonia’s constitutional name.  Essentially, the dispute between 
Athens and Skopje emerged from the use of the geographic term Macedonia and 
Macedonia’s alleged ‘theft’ of what Athens claimed to be Greek national symbols.  
Under the Macedonian constitution, Macedonia was to be known as the ‘Republic of 
Macedonia’; however due to Greek objection to use of the term ‘Macedonia,’ Skopje was 
only able to gain international recognition under title which it used to enter the United 
Nations,31 the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  Despite the fact 
neither Skopje nor Athens made territorial claims upon each other, the name dispute was 
responsible for significant tensions between the two states during the 1990s and remains 
unresolved.  Danforth’s description of Greek sentiment on the question illustrates how the 
term ‘Macedonia’ is viewed in Greece: 
…because ancient and modern Greece are bound in an unbroken line of racial and 
cultural continuity, it is only Greeks who have the right to identify themselves as 
Macedonians, not the Slavs of southern Yugoslavia, who settled in Macedonia in 
the sixth century AD and who called themselves ‘Bulgarians’ until 1944.  Greeks, 
                                                 
31 Under UNSC Resolution 817, Macedonia was admitted as a member state under the UN in 1993 under 
the condition that it is recognized only under the provisional name of the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.’ 
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therefore, generally refer to Macedonians as ‘Skopians,’ a practice which would be 
comparable to calling Greeks ‘Athenians’ (1993, p. 4). 
 
Greece’s response to Macedonian independence was extremely hostile and even included 
a successful campaign to bloc EU recognition of Macedonian independence and an 
economic blockade that deprived Macedonia access to the region’s only major 
international port at Thessaloniki.  Skopje, therefore, had good reason to fear Greek 
intentions as the long-term survival of an independent Macedonian state ran counter to 
Greece’s primary foreign policy objective for its northern neighbor, which was the 
reversal of Macedonian independence and its subsequent inclusion into a Serb-dominated 
Yugoslav federation: 
The Greek approach has been to use whatever leverage it can within the EU to 
prevent recognition of a state called ‘Macedonia’ and attempt to base diplomatic 
initiatives on the assumption that some sort of new Yugoslav federation may well 
emerge that will include Macedonia as a component part.  In essence, this differs 
little from the previous policy of backing Serbia to the hilt, and there is a general 
correspondence between Athens and the main currents of thinking in Belgrade 
(Pettifer 1992, p. 482). 
 
Greek hostility to Macedonia initially resulted in the blocking of Macedonian EU 
recognition (Libal 1997, p. 84), even though Macedonia, along with Slovenia, was one of 
only two former Yugoslav republics to meet the EU’s criteria for recognition set forth by 
the Badinter Commission (Perry 1997, p. 234).  In 1994, Greece imposed a second 
economic embargo on Macedonia in retaliation for the perceived Macedonian theft of 
Greek Macedonian identity.  The Greek embargo lasted 18 months, and was only brought 
to an end by a settlement sponsored by US assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke.  
The Holbrooke agreement required Macedonia to change its national flag and give 
assurances that Skopje would not pursue claims upon Greek territory (Perry 1997, p. 
270). During the 2001 conflict, Greece continued to press for a resolution of the name 
dispute, while also contributing to EU efforts to negotiate a peace settlement (Macedonia: 
The Last Chance for Peace 2001, pp. 18-19).32 
                                                 
32 During May 2001, Greece appeared confident that Macedonia would agree to a compromise solution that 
would result in the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ being recognized as the ‘Republic of Upper Macedonia’; 
however, the wide ranging constitutional changes proposed to resolve the conflict with the NLA made any 
concessions on the name issue untenable for Skopje (Macedonia: The Last Chance for Peace 2001, pp. 18-
19). 
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4.2 The United States, NATO and Compliance 
 
Although the United States only recognized the Republic of Macedonia as an 
independent state in February 1994,33 US participation in UNPREDEP signaled the 
United States’ willingness to ensure stability in the newly independent republic.34  
Ackermann also noted a close relationship between Macedonia and the US was cultivated 
by Skopje during the early 1990s (2000, p. 58).  Illustrative of the close relationship 
between Skopje and Washington was that, unlike Croatia and Serbia, Macedonia 
promptly adopted an Article 98 agreement35 with the United States and offered support 
for the US-led war in Iraq.  Boduszyński and Balalovska pointed to a combination of 
coercive threats and inducements in their explanation of Macedonia’s ratification of an 
Article 98 agreement.  Revealingly, however, they note there was little internal debate 
amongst Macedonian elites as the US had come to be perceived as a guarantor of 
Macedonian and regional security (2004, pp. 18-30).  Nonetheless, the US’ threat to cut 
off defense assistance in the event Skopje failed to ratify an Article 98 agreement did 
serve as a reminder of the costs of failing to ratify the agreement, which shielded US 
citizens from prosecution before the ICC (Boduszyński & Balalovska 2004, pp. 20-22).  
Thus, despite EU insistence that ratification of an Article 98 agreement with the US 
would not be consistent with EU expectations for aspirant states, Boduszyński and 
Balalovska argue the failure of the EU to provide an alternative to US security assistance 
led Skopje to ratify the agreement as the US was perceived to be the guarantor of regional 
stability, and not the EU (2004, p. 22).  Furthermore, in addition to the coercive threat of 
blocking Macedonia’s hopes for NATO accession through a denial of access to US 
                                                 
33 Although the US recognized Macedonia on 8 February 1994, full diplomatic relations were not 
established until 13 September 1995 (Background Notes: Macedonia 2007). 
34 Perry suggests the lack of US diplomatic recognition was the result of an influential US Greek lobby 
(1997, p. 271). 
35 The United States sought guarantees, in the form of Article 98 agreements, from state parties to the 
Statute of Rome that US citizens would not be transferred to the International Criminal Court.  Macedonia 
signed the Statute of Rome in 1998 and ratified the treaty in 2002. 
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military assistance, the US added the inducement of recognizing Macedonia by its 
constitutional name, as opposed to FYROM (Boduszyński & Balalovska 2004, p. 21).36 
 
It is not possible to overstate the perceived linkage between state security and the pursuit 
of NATO membership among Macedonian policy-makers, both ethnic Macedonian and 
Albanian.  For ethnic Albanians, NATO was the only institution in which they were 
prepared to entrust their ‘lives’ and 81.9 percent of Macedonian Albanians claimed to 
trust NATO more than the EU, while prominent Macedonian elites preferred the 
maintenance of a US presence in the Balkans to guarantee state security over what was 
perceived to be an ineffectual EU presence (Boduszyński & Balalovska 2004, p. 22).   
The perception of NATO as an anchor to regional security was reinforced by the fact that 
within a month of the Ohrid agreement, Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski 
requested NATO establish a longer term in-country peacekeeping presence to follow 
Operation Essential Harvest.  In response to Trajkovski’s request NATO initiated 
Operation Amber Fox.  It is also significant to note that concurrent to requests for NATO 
to maintain an in-state security presence, Macedonia made the pursuit of full NATO 
membership a central foreign policy objective.  While EU conditionality has been 
addressed in previous Chapters, here it will be noted that NATO membership also 
entailed the fulfillment of a broad range of criteria set by the Alliance, which went 
beyond the narrow issue areas of defense and security.  In a visit to Skopje in 2002, US 
permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council Nicholas Burns outlined 
democracy, economic reforms, a commitment to rule of law and combating corruption, 
and the trafficking in narcotics and people as benchmarks by which Macedonia’s NATO 
candidacy would be assessed.  Moreover, Burns committed the US to assisting 
Macedonia reform and restructure its military (2002). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 In 2004, the United States State Department began to refer to Macedonia as simply the Republic of 
Macedonia as opposed to the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (Crook 2005, p. 254).   
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4.3 The United States and Ljube Boškoski 
 
After the OFA was concluded in 2001, Ljube Boškoski and his paramilitary unit, the 
Lions, were increasingly perceived by the United States as a threat to the fragile peace 
that had emerged.  US Executive Order 13304 was issued in response to the perceived 
threat to the OFA posed by nationalist politicians and permitted, ‘[persons] to have 
actively obstructed, or pose a significant risk of actively obstructing, the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement of 2001…’ to be added to a list of ‘Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons’ deemed to either pose a threat to regional security or be 
under indictment by the ICTY (Federal Register 2003, p. 32316).  Boškoski became the 
first Macedonian citizen added to the United States’ register of individuals deemed by the 
US government as threats to regional stability (Specially Designated Nationals List 
2007).37  The designation of Boškoski as a ‘blocked person’ resulted in significant 
sanctions directed specifically against Boškoski.  These sanctions included a travel ban to 
the United States, a freezing of assets and the imposition of a prohibition upon US 
citizens from funding Boškoski (Petruševa 2005b).  The targeting of Boškoski by the 
United States facilitated his political marginalization in Skopje because Boškoski was 
increasingly identified within Macedonia as a threat to US-Macedonian relations, which 
as noted above, were perceived as vital to ensuring Macedonian state security in the 
framework of both defense assistance and support for Macedonian NATO membership. 
 
4.4 Compliance and the European Union 
 
In 2001 Macedonia signed a Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with the 
European Union; however, the outbreak of violence in the summer of 2001 brought a 
pause to Macedonia’s EU accession process.  However, it was also in 2001 that the EU 
became involved in a broad range of governance and security functions within 
Macedonia.  In fact, the EU was credited with facilitating the OFA (Risteska 2007, p. 10).  
Moreover, not only was the EU designated a ‘special coordinator’ for capacity building 
                                                 
37 Ljube Boškoski’s name is misspelled on the US OFAC list of specially designated individuals and 
appears as ‘Ljube Boškovski.’ 
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activities called for in the OFA, the EU also undertook a number of missions in 
Macedonia which included its first military mission, Concordia.38  Yet, despite the EU 
undertaking a broad range of activities within Macedonia, Skopje continued to perceive 
NATO as the primary guarantor or regional security (Boduszyński & Balalovska 2004, p. 
22). 
 
Nonetheless, the European Union played an important role in facilitating the 
implementation of the OFA through post-conflict reconstruction and the provision of 
financial assistance.  From 2000 until 2006 Macedonia received €298.2 million from the 
EU through the Community Assistance for Reconstruction Development and Stability 
(CARDS) program (Enlargement: Financial Statistics 2000-2006 2007).  Moreover, 
Macedonia saw a 500 percent increase in EU financial assistance in 2001, the year SAA 
was signed (Enlargement: Financial Statistics 2000-2006 2007), and the EU also 
provided assistance for drafting Macedonia’s 2002 budget in order to identify costs 
associated with the implementation of Ohrid. As a result of these estimates an 
international donors conference held in Brussels during 2002 raised €300 million in 
pledged assistance for in Ohrid (Rapid Reaction Mechanism 2003, pp. 1, 8).  In addition 
to financial assistance, the European Union established a Rapid Reaction Mechanism 
during the 2001 conflict in Macedonia, which carried out various reconstruction activities 
including facilitating refugee returns, the restoration of war affected regions, de-mining 
assistance, training of local journalists, advising the Ministries of Interior and Justice on 
restructuring and drafting legislation on local government as called for in Ohrid (Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism 2003, p. 1).   
 
Dependence on European Union financial and reconstruction assistance alone cannot 
explain Macedonian cooperation with the ICTY, as both post-Tuđman Croatia and post-
Milošević Serbia received significant amounts of financial assistance from the EU.  In 
fact, while financial assistance to Macedonia through CARDS totaled €298.2 million 
euros from 2000-2006, Croatia received €523.8 million in CARDS and IPA (Instrument 
                                                 
38 Concordia was tasked with monitoring the security environment and facilitating post-conflict confidence 
building (Risteska 2007, p. 11). 
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for Pre-Accession Assistance) financial assistance from the EU during this same period 
of time (Enlargement: Financial Statistics 2000-2006 2007).39  Meanwhile Serbia and 
Montenegro, including Kosovo, received €2,559.8 million from 2000-2006 
(Enlargement: Financial Statistics 2000-2006 2007).  Of course, both Croatia and Serbia 
were often found to be in non-compliance with their respective obligations toward the 
Tribunal and therefore EU financial assistance cannot be identified as explaining 
compliance.  
 
4.5 Explaining Compliance: Macedonia, Ohrid, NATO, and the EU 
 
The rapid compliance on the part of the Macedonian government to the arrest and 
surrender order issued for Tarčulovski combined with five years of consistent cooperation 
with the Tribunal with regard to investigations was consistent with Macedonia’s post-
independence foreign policy which favored integration into international institutions and 
organizations as a means of guaranteeing state survival.  In the words of the Macedonian 
Ministry of Defense: 
Beside building of its own defence system, [the] Republic of Macedonia has 
decided to build its strategy upon the collective security and defence systems 
membership since being a part of the European security mechanism is the only way 
to achieve greater efficiency and higher combat readiness as well as protection of 
the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country (International 
Cooperation 2007). 
 
Macedonian cooperation with the ICTY, which was mandated by both NATO and the 
EU, was consistent with Macedonia’s pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration.  However, 
Croatia provides an example of a state which both sought membership in the EU and 
NATO and failed to comply with ICTY arrest and surrender orders in 2001 and again in 
2002.  Macedonian cooperation with the Tribunal contrasts with the previous case studies 
where compliance was often preceded by periods of non-compliance as local elites 
gauged the costs associated with failing to execute ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  
Cooperation on the part of Skopje, on the other hand, was automatic as even the Tribunal 
praised Skopje’s assistance in a wide range of areas.  Therefore, rather than seeing 
                                                 
39 In 2005, Croatia was moved from CARDS to IPA when Croatia became an EU candidate state. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 141
compliance as another example of the ‘logic of consequences’ dictating a course of 
action, there does appear to be a degree of rule or norm following when it comes to 
Macedonian interaction with the ICTY. 
 
In fact, a crisis between Macedonia, the EU and the US was not precipitated by the 
ICTY’s indictments of Macedonian citizens, but instead was the outcome of a conflict 
between the EU and US over Macedonia’s ratification of an Article 98 agreement.  The 
US’ successful campaign to secure an Article 98 agreement with Macedonia, despite 
explicit warnings from the EU that aspirant states should not sign such agreements raises 
questions about the independent impact of EU enlargement conditionality upon Skopje.  
The Article 98 debate presents an important insight into perceptions of the EU and 
NATO, and allows us an opportunity to attempt to disentangle various external pressures 
for compliance.  Boduszyński and Balakovska note the EU lacks trust as a result of 
having raised expectations of ‘fast track’ membership in return for Macedonia agreeing to 
accept large numbers of refugees and host NATO troops during the 1999 Kosovo war 
(2004, pp. 21-22).  In fact, it was noted there was ‘deep disappointment when the 
promises were left unfulfilled’ (Boduszyński & Balalovska 2004, pp. 21-22).  
Additionally, despite being the first Western Balkans state to sign a SAA with the EU, 
Macedonia’s accession process has lagged behind that of Croatia, which began accession 
negotiations in October 2005. 
 
Interestingly, with regard to Croatia, where NATO and the US also demanded 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders, a causal linkage was established 
between EU conditionality and compliance which explained the policy shift in Zagreb.  
And despite significant pressure from the US, Croatia did not ratify an Article 98 
agreement and therefore lost access to US military assistance.  Nevertheless, it is 
important to emphasize that ratification of an Article 98 agreement with the US occurred 
after a specific threat of sanctions was transmitted from Washington to Skopje.  In the 
case of the Tarčulovski arrest, no such threat was necessary as compliance on the part of 
Skopje occurred within hours of the issuing of an arrest and surrender order. 
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5. Conclusions: First Order Compliance 
 
Macedonia’s interaction with the ICTY began much later than that of Croatia and Serbia 
and involved the arrest and surrender of only a single individual, yet nonetheless, the 
Macedonian government assisted the Tribunal in its investigative work and promptly 
executed an ICTY arrest and surrender order during the period under examination (2001-
2006).  Macedonia’s half decade of cooperation with the ICTY stands in sharp contrast to 
the previous two case studies where episodes of non-compliance were observed.  
Macedonian first order compliance was the outcome of a decade long engagement with 
international actors and the embedding of the Macedonian state in international 
organizations through the OFA.  While not discounting that Croatian compliance acts 
were defined by a logic of expected consequences,40 a narrow focus on rationalist 
explanations provides only a partial picture of the dynamics behind state compliance.  As 
March and Olsen note, ‘[l]inking action exclusively to a logic of consequences seems to 
ignore the substantial role of identities, rules, and institutions in shaping human behavior’ 
(1998, p. 951). 
 
Dependence upon external actors for state survival and security, particularly after the 
2001 OFA, meant non-compliance with an ICTY arrest and surrender order had the 
potential to subject Macedonia to significant material costs.  However, that cannot in 
itself explain compliance as Macedonia never waited for third party states to articulate the 
costs of non-compliance in the days and months following the Tarčulovski indictment.  
Instead, Skopje simply complied with a standing international legal obligation.  Thus, 
coercive threats and economic inducements, which characterized attempts to secure 
compliance in Croatia and Serbia, were not required to bring about compliance as Skopje 
promptly executed an ICTY arrest and surrender order without waiting to measure the 
response of external actors to non-compliance.  Furthermore, domestically, Macedonian 
cooperation with the ICTY did not entail significant costs upon local elites as the limited 
number of indictments and lack of intensity and duration of violent conflict meant there 
                                                 
40 Croatian compliance acts were rationalized in terms of appropriate action, unlike Serbian compliance 
acts, which were rationalized as a state response to external coercion. 
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was no significant public mobilization against the Tribunal on the part of the security 
services, veterans’ organizations or victims’ groups.  That is not to say, however, there 
was not criticism of the ICTY for having issued indictments against Macedonian ministry 
of interior officials, while not indicting members of the NLA.  Nevertheless, public 
opinion was never engaged with the ICTY to the extent observed in Croatia and Serbia 
granting the Macedonian government significantly greater leeway in constructing policy 
toward the ICTY.  Absent significant domestic opposition to compliance and given 
Macedonia’s decade long interaction with international actors ranging from the UN and 
OSCE to NATO and the EU, Skopje’s compliance with the Tarčulovski arrest and 
surrender order was consistent with an established pattern of Macedonian compliance 
with international legal obligations.  Thus, Macedonia is the only state case study where 
first order compliance was forthcoming. 
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Part II 
 
 
Compliance and Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and 
Kosovo 
 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 145
Chapter Five 
 
 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
 
 
Immediately after the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, senior [Bosnian Serb Army] officers 
including Ratko Mladic and Radislav Krstic surveyed the town. At this time, Ratko Mladic 
announced that "the moment has finally come for us to take revenge upon the Turks here." 
 
Excerpt from the Amended Joinder Indictment of Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić May 
2003 
 
 
Remember what I said about the war criminals? You want me to do that, it's going to cost you 
lives. We're going to get people killed doing this. I might have to go to Kansas and tell Johnny's 
mama that he got his head blown off trying to arrest Mladic in a coffee shop somewhere. Or 
better, in a bunker. 
 
US Admiral Leighton Smith, former Commander of IFOR at the University of California at 
Berkeley April 1997 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: International Law Enforcement under Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
Although previous case studies took into consideration the interaction between the ICTY 
and states, a discussion of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)1 will introduce the question of 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders in the context of a state under 
international military and civilian administration.  Chandler notes the most extensive 
post-conflict state building project since the Second World War was undertaken in post-
war BiH (Chandler 2005, p. 307), and the ICTY’s role in BiH cannot be viewed in 
isolation from this project.  Because engagement with the ICTY occurred during an 
                                                 
1 The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina came into existence through the Dayton Peace Agreement of November 
1995 ending the international legal existence of the previously recognized ‘Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’ (Gow 1997, p. 288). 
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externally imposed process of post-war state building, this Chapter will explore the 
question of compliance in the absence of a traditional Westphalian state and, as a result, 
will require an analytical framework which moves beyond dominant theories of IR that 
continue to rely on the state as an ontological given.2  Rather than being viewed as a 
state, BiH should be seen as an illustrative empirical example approaching Kranser’s 
concept of ‘shared sovereignty’ (2004, p. 108).  BiH remains formally sovereign as an 
international legal subject, yet at the same time has had its ability to act autonomously 
curtailed by external actors.  Thus, even though Krasner suggests BiH is under a form of 
‘transitional administration’ (2004, pp. 101-103),3 Krasner’s observation, ‘[f]oreigners 
have been running many of the ministries in Bosnia’ (2004, p. 115) underlines the extent 
to state-centric approaches to IR are ill equipped to address the question of compliance in 
post-Dayton BiH. 
 
Despite the limitations on sovereignty imposed by the 1995 General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, subsequently referred to as the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA), when referencing BiH, the term ‘state’ will be used to describe 
BiH’s international legal identity.4  The use of the term ‘state’ should not be read in terms 
of Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty which imply sovereign control over a given 
territory because although BiH maintained the legal identity of a state, Sarajevo 
surrendered its autonomy to act within its own borders to external actors.  Thus, 
traditional interpretations of the nexus between sovereignty and international law 
enforcement, such as the following put forth by Morgenthau, cannot be applied to post-
Dayton BiH: 
…the sovereignty of the nation as the intended object of a law-enforcing action 
manifests itself in what is called the “impenetrability” of the nation.  This is another 
way of saying that on a given territory only one nation can have sovereignty – 
                                                 
2 By dominant theories of IR, realism and its neorealist variants can be included along side neoliberal 
institutionalist theories.  Also of interest is the fact international legal obligations remain largely state-
centric creating a situation whereby although the ICTY brings to trial individuals, legal obligations to 
cooperate with the Tribunal were assigned to states, see Appendix I. 
3 Krasner does not take into account that there has not been a substantial transfer of powers from 
international to domestic ownership in the decade following Dayton.  Instead, there has only been a transfer 
of powers from the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which was established in December 1995 to 
oversee Dayton and included 55 member states and organizations, to the European Union (Chandler 2006, 
p. 18). For a complete list of PIC membership see Appendix IX.  
4 See Krasner’s definition of legal sovereignty (Krasner 1999, pp. 14-20). 
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supreme authority – and that no other state has the right to perform governmental 
acts on its territory without consent (1978, p. 317). 
 
The assumption that only a single actor should exercise sovereignty over a given 
territory, while more applicable to the previous case studies, serves only to obscure 
understandings of compliance in the Bosnian context.  In BiH tasks related to local 
governance fell under the authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).  The 
OHR was invested with wide ranging powers which included the ability to prohibit 
individuals or political parties from participation in domestic political life, the power to 
impose legislation by decree, and ban local media perceived as hostile to the ‘spirit’ of 
the DPA (Chandler 2006, p. 27).5  Furthermore, external actors such as the European 
Court of Human Rights and the IMF were delegated the authority to appoint non-BiH 
citizens to key positions within the Bosnian judiciary and Central Bank, thereby 
introducing an international component to the state (Gow 1997, p. 293).  Given the above 
sampling of powers delegated to external actors through the DPA, Morgenthau would 
assume BiH is a state that has ‘lost’ sovereignty, and perhaps is no longer a state at all: 
Sovereignty is the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law 
within a certain territory and, in consequence, independence from the authority of 
any other nation and equality with it under international law.  Hence, the nation 
loses its sovereignty when it is placed under the authority of another nation, so that 
it is the latter that exercises supreme authority to give and enforce the laws within 
the former’s territory (1978, p. 321). 
 
However, Morgenthau’s observation is itself problematic, because the alternative 
presented is that of being ‘placed under the authority’ of another state and not the 
delegation of sovereignty to international organizations.  As will be demonstrated in this 
Chapter, BiH did not come under the authority of another state, but rather became 
integrated into a complex network of international organizations and states, which 
assumed executive, legislative and even law enforcement powers.6  
 
While the above illustrates why it is difficult to explore compliance through the lens of 
state compliance, especially when sovereignty on a given territory is shared between 
                                                 
5 A more detailed discussion of the OHR’s mandate in BiH will follow shortly.  For more on the post-
Dayton Bosnian state see (Bojičić-Dželilović 2003) 
6 For a comprehensive list of states and international organizations which presided over the international 
presence in BiH see Appendix IX. 
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domestic and external actors, the fact that international organizations such as the OHR 
and NATO played instrumental roles in bringing about the arrest and transfer of ICTY 
fugitives in BiH further underlines the limitations of state-centered theories of 
compliance as the very act of compliance was not generally carried out by the state under 
examination.  For example, a majority of individuals arrested and transferred to Tribunal 
custody from the territory of BiH were apprehended by NATO rather than appendages of 
the Bosnian state.7  Of course, in a 1996 incident, which would later prove to be an 
exception to the rule, BiH became the first state in the former Yugoslavia to execute 
ICTY arrest warrants (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 237).8 Despite an increasing reliance by the 
ICTY upon multinational peacekeeping or police forces to enforce arrest and surrender 
orders, existing compliance literature, with the significant exception of Zhou (2006) and 
Kerr (2004, pp. 154-169), has almost exclusively focused on state compliance with 
international legal obligations rather than compliance on the part of multinational 
peacekeeping forces. 
 
The relative absence of compliance literature on partially sovereign territories represents 
a significant gap in the literature as BiH’s partial sovereignty is far from sui generis.  
Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor, Iraq and Kosovo are all territories which, to varying 
degrees, have also had their sovereignty curtailed by external actors (Chandler 2006, p. 
20).9  Moreover, Zhou points out that there is an increasing acceptance of the assumption 
that following genocide or other serious violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
local authorities will be left either unable or unwilling to bring to trial perpetrators (Zhou 
2006, p. 203) making the role of international peacekeeping forces, where present, crucial 
to IHL enforcement.  Given the inability of theories of state compliance to explain 
international law enforcement, or the lack thereof, within shared or partially sovereign 
                                                 
7 Between 1997 and 2004 NATO transferred 27 individuals to ICTY custody.  Three individuals under 
ICTY indictment were killed by NATO personnel during arrest operations.  The Bosnian Serb republic 
transferred only a single individual, Zdravko Tolimir, to the ICTY, while the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina transferred two individuals to ICTY custody in 1996. 
8 Although exceptional, this incident should not be underplayed as the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
took the unprecedented step of arresting Bosnian Muslims for war crimes against Bosnian Serbs at a time 
when both Croatia and Serbia were failing to comply with ICTY arrest and surrender orders. 
9 In the case of Kosovo, which will be addressed in Chapter Six, the province was transformed into an 
international protectorate under UN Resolution 1244, while concurrently remaining within the Republic of 
Serbia. 
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entities, this Chapter will explore compliance not just on the part of domestic actors but 
also international actors with a presence in BiH.  However, first a historic-institutional 
context will be provided which will both explore the DPA and international and domestic 
institutions of governance created at Dayton.  Second, there will be an exploration of 
compliance on the part of domestic (local) actors, which will be followed by an 
exploration of the construction of international justice within BiH.  Then, we will turn to 
compliance on the part of international actors, which will include a discussion of 
compliance as capacity-building. 
 
2. Contextualizing Compliance in Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
The DPA, which established the framework for the post-war international administration 
of BiH, contained only ten points and was supplemented with eleven annexes (Gow 
1997, p. 286). The DPA brought an end to the war in BiH and was agreed upon on 12 
November 1995 by representatives of BiH, Croatia and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Kaufman 2004, pp. 132-134) and signed by the parties in Paris.  For the 
relevant period under examination (1995-2006), BiH was a state under international 
administration legalized through the 1995 peace agreement.  The powers ceded to 
external actors by the warring parties were robust.  Allin even observed, ‘[a]t Dayton, the 
Bosnian parties effectively submitted themselves to military occupation’ (2002, p. 83).   
Yet, while post-Dayton BiH cannot be described as exercising Westphalian sovereignty 
over its own territory, the DPA paradoxically reaffirmed BiH’s status as a state under 
international law: 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the official name of which shall 
henceforth be "Bosnia and Herzegovina," shall continue its legal existence under 
international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as provided herein 
and with its present internationally recognized borders. It shall remain a Member 
State of the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply 
for membership in organizations within the United Nations system and other 
international organizations (Annex 4, Article 1).10 
 
                                                 
10 Emphasis added by author. 
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The DPA also laid the foundation for an international presence which effectively 
decoupled the linkage of the state and sovereign control over a given territory.  Chandler 
gives us perhaps the most succinct description of post-Dayton Bosnia: 
BiH highlights the contradictions of having the existence of a formally sovereign 
state with regularly contested elections at state, entity and local levels and, along 
side this, the existence of a parallel administration headed by unaccountable 
international appointees with the power to draw up and impose legislation and sack 
elected officials (2005, p. 314). 
 
It will be illustrated that it was the powers of the parallel international administration 
which would prove instrumental to ensuring the transfer of persons indicted by the ICTY 
to Tribunal custody. 
 
Despite BiH’s autonomy deficit, the fact the DPA preserved the international legal 
personality of the Bosnian state meant Sarajevo remained the legal subject of an 
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY.  This obligation was reaffirmed by Sarajevo in the 
DPA which committed the three signatory parties to cooperate fully with the Tribunal.  
Although BiH assumed a legal obligation to comply with Tribunal orders, it must be 
emphasized state-level institutions were unable to fulfill an obligation to cooperate with 
the ICTY.  BiH’s state-level autonomy to act was constrained by external actors, such as 
the OHR and NATO, and internally state-level autonomy was further limited by the 
creation of powerful sub-state entities, the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS) and the 
Muslim-Croat Federation of BiH (FBiH).  BiH’s division into two sub-state entities not 
only permitted the RS to maintain an independent law enforcement capability and judicial 
system, but also restricted coercion on the part of the UNSC, which was limited to action 
against the international legal subject, or the Bosnian state, for non-compliance on the 
part of sub-state actors.11   
 
 
                                                 
11 Rule 7bis permits the Tribunal president to refer to the UNSC non-cooperation on the part of states and 
not sub-state entities within a UN member state.  Thus, when Serbia and Montenegro were reported to the 
UNSC in 2004, non-compliance on the part of the Bosnian Serb republic was not.  For more in the 
application of Rule 7bis see (Del Ponte 2006, pp. 556-557).  However, the United States did adopt 
legislation which held each individual municipality accountable for the arrest or war crimes suspects 
(Scheffer 2003, p. 323). 
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2.1 BiH under International Administration 
 
Any description of the international civilian presence in BiH must begin with the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), which was established through Annex 10 of the DPA 
to provide international civilian oversight for domestic governance. The OHR was 
presided over by a High Representative, who was tasked with coordinating civilian 
implementation of the DPA, coordinating activities with the NATO mission in BiH and 
maintaining contacts with international actors (Gow 2006, p. 54).  The High 
Representative was nominated by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation 
Council and nominations were then subject to endorsement by the United Nations 
Security Council.12  Since 1996 there have been six High Representatives.13  In addition, 
the appointment of Lord Paddy Ashdown as High Representative in March 2002, 
coincided with the position of High Representative assuming the additional role of EU 
Special Representative to BiH (EUSR).  The appointment of a EUSR was intended to 
permit the EU to inherit the wide ranging powers which the OHR had by then 
accumulated (Chandler 2006, p. 32).14 
 
The double hatting of the position of High Representative as both the head of the OHR 
and the EUSR combined with the double hatting of lower administrative positions and 
the creation of positions exclusively under the authority of the EUSR, was part of a wider 
process designed to bring about an increasing EU-ization of post-Dayton BiH. The 
European Commission Delegation to BiH has become one of the Commission’s largest 
out-of-EU delegations numbering over 100 staff and including offices in both Sarajevo 
and Banja Luka ('The EU and BiH: The EC Delegation to BiH' 2007).  Moreover, the 
                                                 
12 Members of the PIC Steering Board include: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United 
Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, represented by Turkey (OHR General Information 2007). 
13 BiH’s first High Commissioner was Carl Bildt who had previously served as the EU’s peace mediator for 
the Former Yugoslavia.  See Appendix VIII. 
14 This transition has yet to be completed.  The European Commission Delegation to BiH website notes that 
when the OHR is closed in June 2008, the position of EUSR will remain ('The EU and BiH: The European 
Presence in BiH' 2007). In addition to a EUSR for BiH, the EU has appointed EUSR’s for Afghanistan, 
Central Asia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Great Lakes region, the Middle East, 
Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Sudan.  In addition, at the time of writing planning was underway for 
the appointment of a EUSR for Kosovo (EU Council Secretariat Factsheet: EU Special Representatives 
(EUSRs) 2007). 
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European Commission established a broad range of objectives for its Delegation to BiH 
which include consolidation of the peace process and fostering inter-entity cooperation 
('The EU and BiH: The Main Objectives of Assistance' 2007).  As the OHR prepares to 
close in the summer of 2008, the European Union will increasingly assume a leading role 
in BiH.  This shift is contextualized as part of BiH’s EU accession process: 
As BiH moves from the era of Dayton onto the road to Brussels, the EU itself has 
assumed a leading position in BiH’s international engagement – not to the 
exclusion of other partners, but through a naturally evolving relationship based on 
BiH’s aspiration to obtain EU membership ('The EU and BiH: The European 
Presence in BiH' 2007). 
 
However, while the EU-ization of BiH’s international administration began in 2002 with 
the appointment of Paddy Ashdown as both the High Representative and EUSR, for the 
period of time examined in this case study, the OHR remained at the apex of the 
international presence in BiH.15 
 
2.1.1 Powers of the OHR 
 
The High Representative was invested with significant powers which included the ‘final 
authority’ to interpret civilian provisions of the DPA (Gow 2006, p. 54).  The OHR’s 
powers were amplified at a Peace Implementation Council (PIC) meeting in Bonn during 
1997 to include the ability to remove from office any individual who violates legal 
commitments to which the belligerent parties committed themselves at Dayton, impose 
legislation by decree and amplified the OHR’s ability to censor the domestic media.  
These powers subsequently became known as the Bonn Powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 This, of course, does not include NATO’s military presence, which operated under a separate command 
structure independent from the OHR. 
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Figure 5.1: The Bonn Powers and the State of BiH 
 
Despite an effort to reduce the frequency the Bonn Powers were used by the OHR,16 the 
Bonn Powers have continued to be employed a decade after the DPA to both implement 
legislation by fiat and remove individuals from public office.  The authority to remove 
individuals from public office has even been exercised against the highest officials of the 
Bosnian state.  For example, Carlos Westendorp relied on the Bonn Powers to remove 
nationalist Bosnian Serb politician Nikola Poplasen following his electoral triumph over 
the more moderate Biljana Plavšić in 1998 (Gow 2006, p. 60), and Paddy Ashdown relied 
on the Bonn Powers to dismiss the Bosnian Croat member of the BiH presidency, Dragan 
Čović, following Čović’s indictment on corruption charges (Ashdown 2005).  More 
recently, in July 2007, the Bonn Powers were exercised when High Representative 
Miroslav Lajcak imposed legislation with the aim of making prison escapes more 
difficult.  Lajcak also removed a number of officials suspected of either assisting ICTY 
fugitives or suspected of involvement in war crimes from RS police forces (Clifford 
2007). 
 
                                                 
16 Former political advisor to the OHR, Siw Skjold Lexau, notes that from 2002 onwards there was an 
attempt to use the Bonn Powers to stimulate reform rather than as a negative sanction.  Skjold Lexau uses 
the example of the OHR chosing to amend locally drafted equal rights legislation rather than imposing 
legislation by decree (Skjold Lexau 2004, p. 5).  However, with Miroslav Lajcak’s appointment as High 
Representative in 2007 and the subsequent dismissal of entity-level personnel in the Bosnian Serb republic 
and the imposition of legislation pertaining to prison security, it does appear that negative sanctions remain 
an import tool of the OHR. 
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Not only could the OHR remove recalcitrant politicians and civil service from office, but 
the OHR also exercised the authority to censor media coverage within Bosnia-
Herzegovina that was perceived as a threat to the Dayton peace process.17  NATO forces 
in BiH have acted to seize transmission towers from broadcast media for ‘inflammatory’ 
news coverage and have also facilitated the transmission of media deemed ‘non-
inflammatory’ (W. Clark 1998).  Furthermore, local television broadcasters were also 
required to provide coverage of trials at the ICTY as a condition of maintaining their 
broadcasting licenses.18  Broadcast licensing legislation was even used to coerce the 
Bosnian Serb republic’s RTRS to air coverage of the Milošević trial, an act Bosnian Serb 
television was initially reluctant to carry out (Nettelfield 2006). 
 
2.1.2 Internationalization of the Bosnian State 
 
In addition to the OHR’s robust powers, the DPA stipulated key positions within the 
Bosnian government could not be held by citizens of BiH or its neighboring states (Gow 
1997, p. 293).  While the OHR existed as a parallel international administration to the 
state, which maintained the ability to intervene in the domestic governance of BiH, the 
Bosnian state itself acquired an increasingly international hue as judicial and economic 
governance positions were delegated to non-BiH citizens.  These positions included the 
Human Rights Ombudsman, appointed by the OSCE, the governor of BiH’s Central 
Bank, appointed by the IMF and nine representatives on the Constitutional Court, 
appointed by the European Court of Human Rights (Gow 1997, p. 293).   
 
2.2 The Rules of Road: The ICTY as Bosnia’s War Crimes Supreme Court? 
 
Not only were international actors granted substantial authority over domestic political 
life, but the ICTY was also integrated into the domestic judiciary to a much greater extent 
                                                 
17 The OHR was formally delegated the authority to censor Bosnian media by the Peace Implementation 
Council at a meeting in Sintra, Portugal in May 1997.  In July 1997 Bosnian Serb television, SRT, was 
taken off the air after broadcasting a news report which compared international peacekeeping forces in BiH 
to the Nazi SS (Deluce 2000/01).   
18 As of 2007, there are three public broadcasters in BiH, one broadcaster for each entity (RTFBiH – 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and RTRS – Republika Srpska) and a state-wide broadcaster 
(BHRT) and three major commercial broadcasters, OBN, TV Pink BiH and Mreza Plus (Haraszti 2007). 
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than in any previous case study.  In previous case studies the Tribunal Statute granted the 
ICTY ‘primacy’ over war crimes proceedings which meant the Tribunal could order 
domestic courts to defer a case to the Tribunal; however, the Tribunal had no authority to 
prevent domestic courts from bringing war crimes charges against individuals on their 
own accord.  With regard to BiH, the Tribunal’s powers went beyond primacy as the 
1996 Rome Agreement, informally known as the Rules of the Road agreement, placed 
domestic courts under a legal obligation to refer all war crimes cases to the Tribunal 
before domestic proceedings could commence.  In fact, the Rome Agreement stated that 
persons other than those already indicted by the ICTY could be arrested only ‘…pursuant 
to a previously issued order, warrant or indictment that had been reviewed and deemed 
consistent with international legal standards by the Tribunal’ (Report of the International 
Tribunal 1999, p. 35).  Thus, whereas in both Croatia and Serbia domestic courts could 
independently initiate war crimes proceedings the Bosnian judiciary could not bring war 
crimes charges against individuals without first submitting indictments to supra-national 
judicial review. 
 
The Rules of the Road agreement was established in order to prevent domestic judiciaries 
and police forces from inflaming inter-ethnic tensions through war crimes prosecutions 
and arrests.  This was a serious concern as at the end of 1995 local judiciaries tended to 
be staffed by members of the ethnic majority community and war crimes trial processes 
were deemed so unfair that war crimes prosecutions could serve to prevent members of 
an ethnic community from traveling to a region where they were in a minority as this 
could result in arbitrary arrest and detention (War Crimes Trials 2005, p. 4). Furthermore, 
convictions on war crimes charges in the domestic judiciary prior to the Rules of Road 
were highly flawed.  Sretko Damjanović, for example, was sentenced to death in 1993 by 
the District Military Court in Sarajevo, a sentence later commuted to 20 years 
imprisonment following BiH’s abolishment of the death penalty.  Then, in 1997 the 
Human Rights Chamber of BiH ruled the District Military Court, which convicted 
Damjanović, ‘lacked a sufficient appearance of independence’ and overturned the 
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conviction (War Crimes Trials 2005, p. 4).19  In order to prevent further abuse of the 
judiciary, the ICTY established classifications for BiH war crimes cases, A-H,20 of which 
only A,B,C were operationalized.  Only when a case was assessed to be category A could 
the domestic judiciary commence proceedings against an accused. 
Table 5.1: Rules of the Road Procedure 
RULES OF THE ROAD CLASSIFICATIONS  
Category A Evidence sufficient by international standards to 
commence prosecution 
Category B Evidence determined to be insufficient 
Category C Unable to determine sufficiency of evidence 
 
The Rules of the Road placed a significant burden on the Tribunal as the review of 
domestic cases was not adequately funded by international donors resulting in the 
accumulation of a significant backlog of cases (Report of the International Tribunal 
1999, p. 35).  Because the Rules of the Road program was funded through voluntary 
contributions (Report of the International Tribunal 1997, p. 24), the ICTY was reliant 
upon donations from organizations such as the Coalition for International Justice and the 
American Bar Association’s Central and East European Law Initiative to fund reviews 
during 1998 (Report of the International Tribunal 1999, p.35).  The Rules of the Road 
expired in October 2004 as the ICTY’s completion strategy committed the Tribunal to 
begin preparing for its closure; however, as the Rules of the Road exclusively dealt with 
domestic war crimes prosecutions, there must be a distinction between the domestic 
judiciary’s submission of cases to the ICTY for judicial review and the wider question of 
state compliance with arrest and surrender orders stemming from ICTY indictments.   
 
2.3 States within a State? The Creation of a Dual Entity State 
 
Before turning to an examination of the politics of compliance with arrest and surrender 
orders, it is of utmost importance to stress that in addition to establishing a mandate for a 
                                                 
19 It was later revealed two of the individuals Damjanović had been convicted of murdering were in fact 
alive (Garms & Peschke 2006, pp. 264-265).   
20 Categories D-H were created before it became apparent that the ICTY would be unable to provide 
adequate judicial review for the large number of cases falling under the Rules of the Road procedure and 
were thus left unused.   
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robust international civilian and military presence, the DPA created a two-entitied state 
with two separate legal systems, law enforcement agencies, and even two separate armed 
forces leading Gow to observe that post-Dayton BiH was a state which had been 
effectively partitioned (2006, pp. 50-51).21  The DPA not only constrained BiH autonomy 
to act from above in the form of the OHR, but also from below in the form of powerful 
entity-level governments.  In contrast to the entity level governments, the powers 
reserved for state-level were effectively limited to responsibility over foreign policy, 
certain aspects of economic policy, inter-entity communication and criminal law 
enforcement (Gow 1997, p. 289).  In regard to foreign policy, however, there were 
provisions which, subject to the approval of the Parliamentary Assembly, permitted 
entity-level governments to enter into agreements with states or international bodies 
(Gow 1997, p. 289), which would permit the RS to enter into agreements with Serbia and 
Montenegro and likewise for the FBiH and Croatia.  Additionally, the close relationship 
between the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnian Croat community in the FBiH led to the 
transfers of indicted Bosnian Croats being brought about by Zagreb rather than Sarajevo 
as throughout the 1990s Zagreb exercised considerable control over Bosnian Croat 
political life.22 
 
While the OHR exercised authority in both entities, the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, the two entity governments were held together by 
relatively weak state institutions.  Bergling notes: 
The entities … are best described as de facto mini-states within a very loose and 
uneasy confederation. Notably, there is no enforcement mechanism capable of 
compelling them to implement state-level decisions.  Further, as the state 
institutions depend on the entities for funding, these institutions are only as strong 
as the entities permit.  As there are strong constituencies, particularly in the RS and 
the Croatian dominated cantons of the Federation, that do not wish the joint 
structures to function, the institutions of state are often manipulated or even held 
hostage in a political game of give and take (2001, p. 494). 
 
Subsequent to Bergling’s observation, there has been an attempt by the OHR/EUSR to 
strengthen state level institutions through the creation of a state level VAT tax and the 
                                                 
21 While two entities were established through Dayton, the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, during the 1990s, there was a third Bosnian Croat de facto entity within the Federation. 
22 See the subsequent discussion of Croatian and Bosnian Croat compliance. 
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police and defense reforms (Freedom House 2006); however, overall the entity level 
governments have continued to hold significant powers vis à vis state institutions.   
 
Although BiH’s two entities compiled very different records when it came to cooperation 
with the Tribunal, paradoxically we are confronted with a single international legal 
personality both complying and failing to comply with its obligations toward the ICTY.    
Divergent levels of cooperation between entities became an almost constant feature of the 
BiH compliance landscape and will be described in greater detail below.  The dual entity 
structure of BiH led the Tribunal to issue two separate assessments of cooperation, for the 
Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the Republika Srpska.  Furthermore, within 
BiH indictments issued by courts within the FBiH could not be enforced in the RS or vice 
versa (War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska 2000, p. 9).  The difficulty in 
exploring state compliance in a dual entity state under international administration 
provides us with an opportunity to move beyond the question of state compliance with 
ICT orders and address the question of compliance on the part of sub-state actors. 
 
3. The Domestic Politics of Compliance 
 
Louise Arbour noted the greatest challenge facing the ICTY in its early years was the 
question of arrests of indicted individuals (2004, p. 397).  While Chapter Two 
demonstrated coercion on the part of the United States proved effective in bringing about 
Croatia’s transfer of Bosnian Croats to Tribunal custody in 1997, the failure to apprehend 
fugitives on the territory of BiH, in particular the Republika Srpska, and Serbia cast a pall 
over the ICTY.  As of February 1998, the ratio of indictments to individuals in custody 
remained 78:25 (Allison 1998).  Bringing about compliance with arrest and surrender 
orders in BiH required interaction with sub-state entities and international actors, in 
addition to the state-level institutions of BiH.  In order to disentangle the politics of 
compliance, first entity level compliance will be explored and second there will be an 
exploration of compliance on the part of international actors in BiH. 
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3.1 Entity-Level Compliance 
 
The following discussion of entity-level compliance will look at local compliance with 
international legal obligations imposed upon the state of BiH.  Because of BiH’s division 
into two distinct entities, such an exploration is unavoidable; however, the necessity of 
sub-state enforcement of international legal obligations itself is not unique to BiH.  For 
example, Henkin observed the United States’ Headquarters Agreement with the United 
Nations required the ratification of specific legislation in the state of New York and the 
adoption of local police regulations to accommodate this agreement (1968, p. 57).  Yet, 
unlike federal states such as the US, no enforcement mechanisms were established for 
BiH’s state level government.  Entity-level governments could effectively ignore state 
level decisions (Bergling 2001, p. 493).  It is the absence of an enforcement mechanism 
which separates BiH from other federal states because while mechanisms exist to bring 
about compliance with international legal obligations within federal state entities such as 
the United States, Sarajevo was unable to effectively counter non-compliance on the part 
of an entity-level government.   
 
Despite a perceived inability on the part of local actors to effectively execute ICTY arrest 
orders (Figà-Talamanca 1996, p. 173), cooperation with the ICTY was initially left to 
entity-level governments and local police forces resulting in the FBiH accumulating a 
good record of cooperation, while the Republika Srpska for the most part failed to 
cooperate with the Tribunal.  As will be discussed shortly, in the months immediately 
following the DPA, the FBiH initially proved too aggressive in its pursuit of war 
criminals garnering criticism from IFOR and praise from the ICTY.  In addition to 
divergent levels of cooperation between the two entities, perceptions of the ICTY varied 
greatly between the RS and FBiH as well.  Residents of the RS perceived the ICTY as 
disproportionately targeting ethnic Serbs in its investigations and indictments, while the 
Tribunal was viewed considerably more favorably in the FBiH.23 
 
 
                                                 
23 For more on perceptions of the ICTY as anti-Serb see (Saxon 2005, pp. 566-567). 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 160
3.1.1. Republika Srpska 
 
The RS consistently opposed cooperation with the ICTY and like Serbia was often 
singled out for non-compliance with its obligations toward the Tribunal (Report of the 
International Tribunal 1999, pp. 28-29).  RS opposition to cooperation with the Tribunal 
must, however, be placed in the context of RS obstruction regarding cooperation with the 
OHR, the creation of central state institutions, refugee returns and the restoration of 
property rights (Kerr 2005, p. 327).  The RS consistently obstructed not just the ICTY but 
also the strengthening of Bosnian state institutions since 1995.  Even at Dayton, the RS 
only reluctantly agreed to its inclusion within a Bosnian state.24  RS political leaders also 
continued to threaten a referendum on independence from BiH, leaving the state-level 
government fragile at best. 
 
The RS’ rejection of obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal was reaffirmed during 
1996 when the RS’ first post-Karadžić president, Biljana Plavšić, claimed ICTY 
indictments were not to be considered legitimate by RS authorities (Sharp 1997/98, p. 
120).25  Plavšić’s rejection of legal obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal was more 
than just rhetorical as the RS not only failed to transfer individuals to ICTY custody, but 
also failed to remove indicted persons from public office.  Non-compliance with ICTY 
arrest orders combined with an almost complete lack of war crimes prosecutions in the 
domestic judiciary during the first eight years following the DPA (Garms & Peschke 
2006, p. 274), transformed the RS, along with Serbia, into a safe haven for individuals 
suspected of war crimes.  In the Tribunal’s 1999 annual report to the UNSC it was noted: 
…the Republika Srpska has continued its policy of refusing to execute arrest 
warrants against indictees believed to be residing on its territory.  Of the 36 
publicly indicted persons at liberty at the end of the reporting 
period…approximately 25 are in the Republika Srpska (Report of the International 
Tribunal 1999, pp. 28-29). 
 
Non-compliance on the part of the RS persisted until June 2007, when Zdravko Tolimir 
was arrested by RS police near the entity’s border with Serbia.   Tolimir’s arrest marked 
                                                 
24 Note the RS leadership was excluded from Dayton and Milošević negotiated on behalf of the RS. 
25 This argument of course ignores the fact the parties committed themselves to continued cooperation with 
the ICTY in the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
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the first time RS police executed an ICTY arrest warrant.  However, this event coincided 
with a renewed rhetorical commitment on the part of Belgrade to transfer remaining 
ICTY indictees to The Hague in exchange for the unfreezing of Serbian Stability and 
Association Agreement negotiations (N. MacDonald & Dombey 2007).  Moreover, as 
Tolimir was arrested crossing from Serbia into the RS, there is speculation Tolimir was 
delivered to RS police for transfer to the ICTY by Serbian authorities (Sadović 2007). 
 
3.1.2. RS Domestic Politics of Compliance 
 
Despite entity level non-compliance, Matias Hellman, of the ICTY Registry in Sarajevo, 
pointed out that because most of the crimes prosecuted by the ICTY occurred on the 
territory of the RS against non-Serb populations, non-Serb victims groups from the RS 
strongly support the Tribunal.26  But, given the domination of RS entity level government 
by ethnic Serb political parties, this support was not reflected in government policy.  
Even when Biljana Plavišić broke with Radovan Karadžić and established a more 
moderate tone in RS internal politics, cooperation with the ICTY was not forthcoming on 
the part of local governments within the RS.27  During the 1997 Plavšić-Karadžić 
conflict, the RS was internally divided between central and western regions under the 
control of Plavšić and eastern regions, which remained loyal to Karadžić.  It should be 
noted it was during this conflict that NATO forces began to execute ICTY arrest warrants 
against Karadžić supporters, in a move that was seen to decisively strengthen Plavšić’s 
faction (Gow 2006, pp. 59-60). 
 
In the RS, the Tribunal is perceived considerably more negatively than the FBiH. Polling 
data from 2002 suggests the ICTY is trusted by only 4 percent of the population (Kerr 
2005, p. 325), making the population of the RS the most Tribunal-skeptic in the entire 
former Yugoslavia.  It is the deep unpopularity of cooperation with the ICTY, which 
made any attempt at cooperation with the Tribunal on the part of elected RS officials 
                                                 
26 Personal interview with Matias Hellman of the ICTY Field Office in Sarajevo, 16 January 2007. 
27 Biljana Plavšić received substantial assistance from international actors in her successful ousting of 
Radovan Karadžić.  In 1997, the US released targeted loans to regions of the RS under the control of 
Plavšić (US Plans Loan Package to Bolster Plavsic 1997).  
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untenable over the long term (Gow 2006, p. 60).  Illustrative of the unpopularity of 
cooperation with the ICTY was the fact that the RS’ parliament was only able to secure 
passage of a law on cooperation with the ICTY by a single vote.28  However, obstruction 
of the DPA, while popular amongst the electorate was also untenable over the long term 
due to the threat of sanction by the OHR.  For example, following Plavšić’s defeat to 
hard-line nationalist Nikola Poplasen in 1998, Poplasen was promptly dismissed from his 
post by High Representative Carlos Westendorp (Gow 2006, p. 60).29  Over all, while 
coercion on the part of the OHR through the use of the Bonn Powers strengthened 
moderates within the RS, the persistent lack of cooperation with the ICTY within the 
entity continued until 2007. 
 
3.1.3. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The FBiH was the creation of the 1994 Washington Agreement which ended the Croat-
Muslim conflict and brought the two ethnic communities together into a single entity, and 
the FBiH’s existence as an entity was reaffirmed by the DPA.  The FBiH was subdivided 
into 10 cantons, which themselves enjoy a significant level of autonomy (Bergling 2001, 
p. 496).  The FBiH proved more supportive of the Tribunal’s mission as the ICTY was 
perceived as acting to bring to trial individuals responsible for massacres carried out 
against Bosnian Muslim civilian populations in places such as Srebrenica.30 In fact, while 
the ICTY is perceived negatively elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia it is in the FBiH 
where the Tribunal is viewed most favorably enjoying the trust of 51 percent of those 
polled in 2002 (Kerr 2005, p. 325). 
 
                                                 
28 The RS’ 2001 Law on Cooperation with the ICTY contained numerous caveats, such as granting the RS 
the right to not enforce ICTY arrest warrants should they be deemed a threat to the ‘interests’ of the RS.  A 
representative of the RS’ Bosnian Muslim community within the RS parliament even suggested the 2001 
law would be more appropriately titled the law on ‘obstruction of cooperation’ with the ICTY (The Wages 
of Sin: Confronting Bosnia's Republika Srpska 2001, p. 24). 
29 It should also be noted that Radovan Karadžić’s wartime Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska 
stranka, SDS) remained the largest single parliamentary party in the RS Assembly following elections from 
1996-2006 when moderate nationalist Milorad Dodik’s Union of Independent Social Democrats (Savez 
nezavisnih socijaldemokrata, SNSD) won an absolute majority of Assembly seats. 
30 One significant qualification is that Bosnian Croats within the FBiH at times attempted to obstruct 
cooperation with the ICTY. 
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Moreover, the very establishment of the Tribunal in 1993 was perceived as a triumph for 
the besieged Bosnian state (Saxon 2005, p. 563), and in 1995 Sarajevo requested the 
inclusion of stringent arrest and surrender procedures in the DPA.  These measures 
included a clear obligation imposed upon each party to the agreement to ‘arrest, detain 
and transfer’ ICTY indictees, the imposition of sanctions on parties failing to cooperate 
with the Tribunal, a constitutional provision requiring cooperation with the Tribunal on 
the part of sub-state entities, a vetting process to remove war criminals from positions of 
influence and a prohibition on ‘suspected’ war criminals from holding elected office or 
public positions (Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 163-164).  The response to the Bosnian 
delegations’ proposals from Contact Group representatives present at Dayton 
demonstrated the extent to which European governments sought to marginalize the ICTY 
in post-war BiH.  As Keith Doubt pointed out, ‘…the more the Bosnian delegation insists 
on justice, the less the Bosnian delegation is viewed as being interested in peace’ (Doubt 
1997, p. 125).31  Williams and Scharf noted Britain and France rejected any automatic re-
imposition of sanctions on recalcitrant parties and Contact Group military representatives 
rejected the inclusion of any binding obligation to arrest war criminals or even assign 
staff to identify individuals responsible for war crimes (2002, p. 165).  In the end, 
Bosnia’s requests to strengthen the role of the Tribunal in post-Dayton BiH were 
summarily rejected at Dayton (Sharp 1997/98, p. 120; Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 162-
164).  The Bosnian delegation was rebuffed out of an early fear that the aggressive 
pursuit of indicted persons would threaten the peace or, even worse, prove to be a deal 
breaker for the Serbian delegation at Dayton (Gow 2006, p. 50; Kerr 2005, p. 320).  In 
fact, IFOR would make it clear in 1996 that the international peacekeeping force would 
not tolerate the aggressive pursuit of war criminals by either the FBiH or the ICTY. 
 
An early desire to enforce ICTY arrest warrants on the part of Sarajevo may be partially 
explained by the fact that a preponderance of ICTY indictments issued during the 1990s 
targeted ethnic Serbs.  However, Sarajevo’s zeal for prosecutions extended beyond those 
publicly indicted by the ICTY and within three months of Dayton, Sarajevo would 
demonstrate a willingness to arrest high ranking Bosnian Serbs, even without IFOR’s 
                                                 
31 Also quoted by Williams and Scharf 2002, p. 163. 
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assistance.  In fact, when two senior Bosnian Serbs, Đorđe Đukić and Aleksa 
Krsmanović, made a ‘wrong turn’ into the FBiH in January 1996, they were arrested by 
FBiH authorities and war crimes proceedings were initiated.  Given the ICTY lacked a 
single high ranking suspect in custody, The Hague issued its own arrest warrants and 
requested Đukić and Krsmanović’s transfer to ICTY custody (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 251).  
Rather than express support for the ICTY and the FBiH’s efforts to bring to trial two 
senior Bosnian Serb officers, IFOR expressed outrage that Sarajevo and the ICTY 
worked in concert to force the Đukić and Krsmanović transfers.  RS authorities were also 
enraged and retaliated by breaking off relations with IFOR for a period of two to three 
weeks (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 251).32  Richard Holbrooke expressed his disapproval of the 
actions of the ICTY in his memoirs: 
[US Secretary of State] Christopher and I were greatly disturbed by this incident 
[the Đukić and Krsmanović transfers to ICTY custody].  The seizure of the two 
men, neither of whom were ever indicted, had disrupted the implementation process 
and set a bad precedent for the future.  We were determined to try to prevent any 
repetition of such an incident before it became a pattern (1999, p. 346). 
 
A month later, in February 1996, the Rules of the Road agreement was put in place, thus 
putting an end to any more surprise arrests of Bosnian Serbs on the part of the FBiH and 
unexpected transfer requests from The Hague. 
 
When the ICTY indicted lower ranking Bosnian Muslims for war crimes perpetrated 
against Bosnian Serbs in March 1996, Sarajevo promptly executed the ICTY’s arrest 
warrants and transferred the individuals in question to The Hague (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 
257).  BiH thus became the first state in the former Yugoslavia to execute an ICTY arrest 
warrant.  Although once indictments were issued against senior Army of BiH officers, 
there was a hesitance on the part of international peacekeeping forces to rely upon local 
authorities to carry out an arrest.  For example, when it came to the arrest of wartime 
Bosnian Muslim general, Naser Orić, the arrest was carried out by NATO as opposed to 
FBiH police (Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual Human Rights Report 2003, p. 
167). 
                                                 
32 Bass noted there were even fears the Bosnian Serbs would take US soldiers hostage in retaliation for the 
arrest of Bosnian Serb war crimes suspects (2002, pp. 250-251). 
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3.2. Croatia and Bosnian Croat Compliance 
 
Bosnian Croats indicted by the ICTY were often surrendered to the Tribunal via 
authorities in Zagreb as the Croatian government exercised de facto control over Bosnian 
Croat territory within the FBiH.  Furthermore, political decisions affecting the Bosnian 
Croat community, such as the selection of the Croatian Democratic Union’s Bosnian 
branch leadership, were often reached in Zagreb.  An example of the direct control 
Zagreb exercised over Bosnian Croats was Croatian president Franjo Tuđman’s dismissal 
of Bosnian Croat president Mate Boban (Granić 2005, pp. 92-93).  In fact, the direct 
control Zagreb established over the Croatian Democratic Union BiH branch during the 
1992-1995 war continued after the end of hostilities and only ended following the 
Croatian Democratic Union’s defeat in Croatian parliamentary and presidential elections 
in 2000.  However, because Zagreb brought about the transfer of high profile Bosnian 
Croats, such as Vinko Martinović and Mladen Natelilić, as opposed to institutions of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or even NATO, these transfers were dealt with in 
Chapter Two.33 But, it should be noted that despite Zagreb’s role in the transfer of 
Bosnian Croats to ICTY custody, Bosnian Croat veterans’ organizations have used ICTY 
indictments and judgments against Bosnian Croats as part of a wider campaign against 
Federation institutions (Bojičić-Dželilović 2004, p. 12).34 
 
4. Construction of International Justice under Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
The wartime Bosnian Muslim led government in Sarajevo was the ICTY’s strongest 
advocate among the states of the former Yugoslavia.  Even at Dayton, it was the Bosnian 
delegation alone that pushed for a stronger commitment to cooperate with the Tribunal to 
be built into the peace agreement.  Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslim victims groups 
                                                 
33 An exception to this would be the arrest of Anto Furundžija and Vlakto Kupreškić in December 1997 by 
NATO (Report of the International Tribunal 1998, p. 30). 
34 Bojičić-Dželilović notes that Bosnian Croat veterans groups use occasions when indictments are issued, 
an arrest or transfer has taken place or when a judgment is rendered to demand the creation of a separate 
Croat entity within BiH (2004, p. 12).  Additionally, at times Bosnian Croat opposition to inclusion in the 
FBiH has come close to violence, particularly in 2001 when the Croatian Democratic Union under Ante 
Jelavić attempted to dissolve the Federation and create a Bosnian Croat entity (BBC 2001). 
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demanded the prosecution of individuals responsible for serious violations of IHL and 
acts of genocide both within Bosnia-Herzegovina and at The Hague.  Matias Hellman of 
the ICTY Registry in Sarajevo observed that the Tribunal draws support from Bosnian 
Muslim victims groups within both of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s two entities.35  The ICTY 
drew considerable support from Srebrenica victims’ organizations, which mobilized 
within months of the July 1995 massacre.  Despite disappointment expressed by Bosnian 
Muslim victims’ associations regarding the brevity of sentences handed down by ICTY 
trial chambers, Bosnian victims’ groups have both lobbied for the expansion of 
prosecutions and have petitioned to keep the ICTY open past its planned 2010 closure 
date (Nettelfield 2006, p. 113). 
 
Despite the domestic impetus for war crimes prosecutions among the Bosnian Muslim 
community, demands for war crimes prosecutions among Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Serbs are substantially weaker.  With regard to Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb 
communities, powerful veterans’ organizations have emerged that act to pressure local 
elites into voicing opposition to war crimes proceedings.  The Bosnian Croat branch of 
the Croatian veterans’ organization, HVIDR-a HVO, organized social protest events, 
such as the blocking of roads, in response to the arrests of Bosnian Croat veterans.36   
But, unlike in Croatia and Serbia, compliance and non-compliance decisions are not 
exclusively in the hands of local elites, and therefore mobilization against compliance 
acts on the part of local elites has been muted.37  Therefore, when exploring causality 
behind compliance decisions we must turn to external actors. 
 
5. Compliance and International Organizations 
 
The DPA was aimed at both bringing an end to a devastating conflict which had by 1995 
resulted in the almost complete destruction of BiH as a state and establishing a 
                                                 
35 Personal interview with Matias Helmann of the ICTY Field Office in Sarajevo, 16 January 2007. 
36 In Septemeber 2000 protests were held in response to the arrest of Bosnian Croat veterans by 
international peacekeeping forces and local police (Pripadnici HVIDRE blokirali Mostar nakon uhicenja 
pripadnika HVO-a 2000). 
37 Compliance acts were carried out exclusively by NATO forces in the RS until Tolimir’s arrest at the RS-
Republic of Serbia border in 2007. 
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framework for post-conflict governance which included both a military and civilian 
component.  While the powers of the OHR, the civilian component, were outlined in an 
exploration of BiH’s international civilian administration, the military and security 
component of the international presence, which maintained a capability to execute ICTY 
arrest orders remains to be discussed.  Because the OHR does not exercise authority over 
NATO peacekeeping forces, compliance on the part of NATO must be examined before 
returning to a discussion of compliance on the part of the OHR.   
 
5.1. NATO: IFOR, SFOR and EUFOR38 
 
Although Annex 6 of the DPA bound signatories39 to a legal obligation to cooperate with 
the ICTY, the RS failed to honor ICTY arrest orders (Western 2004, p. 235).  Moreover, 
in 1996 there was no international authority in BiH willing to undertake arrest operations.  
The peace enforcement mandate assigned to the international military presence, through 
Annex I-A of Dayton, meant the initial deployment of peacekeeping forces to BiH was 
primarily tasked with separation of belligerent parties and the establishment of the Inter-
entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (Schear 1996, p. 92).  Meanwhile, law enforcement 
functions were left to entity level governments and local police forces, which were 
monitored by a United Nations led Police Task Force (IPTF); however, shortly after the 
IFOR presence was established, it quickly became apparent that were arrests of war 
crimes suspects in the Republika Srpska to occur, they would have to be carried out by 
NATO. Despite an initial aversion to law enforcement tasks, NATO eventually 
accumulated an impressive record when it came to the arrest and transfer of persons 
indicted by the ICTY.  Zhou reflected on the significance of an international military 
organization engaging in what was an essentially law enforcement function, ‘…NATO is 
the only organization in modern history that has been directly involved on a significant 
scale in the apprehension of persons indicted by an international criminal tribunal’ (2006, 
p. 204).  In fact, the importance of the relationship between the ICTY and international 
                                                 
38 IFOR (Implementation Force) was NATO’s first mission in BiH and transitioned into SFOR 
(Stabilization Force) in 1997.  Following NATO’s decision to draw to a close its SFOR mission in 2004, 
the European Union led EUFOR assumed control of the international security presence in BiH. 
39 Signatories include the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the warring parties 
of BiH. 
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organizations, such as NATO, was highlighted by the Tribunal itself in 1999, 
‘[p]roductive working relationships with [international] organizations in the former 
Yugoslavia continue to be critical to the success of the Prosecutor’s mandate’ (Report of 
the International Tribunal 1999, p. 35).  Yet, before we turn to an exploration of NATO’s 
active law enforcement role, it is first necessary to explore why NATO initially failed to 
carry out arrests during 1996. 
 
5.2. IFOR’s Failure to Arrest ICTY Suspects 
 
The immediate objectives for IFOR established in Annex I-A of the Dayton Agreement 
included the establishment of a ‘durable ceasefire’ and ‘lasting security and arms control 
measures’ (DPA, Annex I-A, Article I(2), 1995).  Any references to the execution of 
arrest and surrender orders were noticeably absent, and the arrest of high profile Bosnian 
Serbs was feared to raise the prospect of a return to violence thus posing a significant risk 
to IFOR (Gow 2006, p. 50; Kerr 2005, p. 320).  Instead, Annex I-A called specifically 
upon ‘the parties’ or local signatories to the DPA40 to comply with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders (DPA, Annex I-A, Article IX, 1995), while remaining silent on whether 
or not the multi-national peacekeeping force was obliged to comply with ICTY orders 
(Figà-Talamanca 1996, p. 172).41  The failure to specifically commit international 
peacekeeping forces to arresting individuals under ICTY indictment effectively ensured 
NATO forces would not undertake arrest and transfer missions in support of the Tribunal.  
A former British commander of Multinational Division South-West, General Mike 
Jackson, recalled: 
The Dayton Agreement had been well thought through, with enough detail to make 
it all work, a tribute to the work of Richard Holbrooke and his team.  Dayton laid 
out an end-state to which all the parties had agreed, with a clear mechanism for 
getting from start to finish.  This clarity would prove invaluable in the weeks and 
months to follow.  Dayton also stipulated strict timelines: what had to be done by 
D+30, D+60, D+90.  For us, the Dayton Agreement became kind of a ‘bible’ to 
                                                 
40 Three parties signed the Dayton agreement: the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
41 Recall, at Dayton military representatives of Contact Group member states opposed any obligation 
imposed upon the peacekeeping force to arrest war crimes suspects. 
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which I would refer whenever any kind of dispute arose. I carried a copy of Dayton 
around with me everywhere (2007, p. 201).42 
 
Unfortunately for the ICTY, securing the arrest of war crimes suspects was not part of 
Dayton’s ‘strict timelines.’  The lack of clarity regarding war crimes suspects brought 
about an almost complete obfuscation of any responsibility to arrest ICTY indictees on 
the part of multinational peacekeeping forces.  In fact, even when an indicted war 
criminal walked into a NATO base in July 1997, peacekeepers proved unable to secure 
custody of the accused: 
In July last year, Bralo walked into the Dutch SFOR base in Vitez in order to 
“inquire” whether he was indicted.  Confused Dutch soldiers checked the public list 
of those accused, and having established that he was not on it, they told him to go 
in peace.  Several hours later, they remembered to check the list of those wanted on 
the sealed indictments, but it was already too late: “Cicko” had vanished without a 
trace (Furundzija Trial: Accounts Of Sexual Violence 1998). 
 
Further complicating efforts to bring about the transfer of ICTY indictees to Tribunal 
custody was the fact local police forces retained law enforcement responsibilities and 
were only monitored by the IPTF, which had, ‘a vague mandate and no timetable’ (Sharp 
1997/98, p. 118).  Significantly, the IPTF mandate did not include the authority to make 
arrests (G.J. Bass 2002, p. 240).  Sharp noted the IPTF left local police forces, which 
often consisted of former paramilitaries, effectively unreformed and unmonitored: 
During 1996 the armies of the former warring factions were under the tight control 
of 60,000 NATO-led troops, but the police were being monitored by less than 2,000 
unarmed IPTF personnel.  This would not have been so serious if the local police 
had been trained in law enforcement and public service.  Most Bosnian police, 
however, were former paramilitaries who switched uniforms but retained their 
weapons and remained answerable to local warlords (1997/98, p. 118). 
 
In light of the failure on the part of IFOR to arrest a single war crimes suspect during 
1996, and the prohibition imposed upon the IPTF from making arrests, supporters of 
indicted war criminals in the Republika Srpska confidently assumed an increasingly high 
profile in domestic political life.  Radovan Karadžić’s influence behind the scenes in the 
RS began to threaten the very implementation of the  DPA (G.J. Bass 2002, pp. 249-250). 
 
                                                 
42 Emphasis added by author. 
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NATO’s failure to engage in any law enforcement activities during the first year of its 
presence in BiH led to serious criticisms of the alliance’s role in BiH and accusations 
NATO fueled a post-war breakdown of law and order (War Criminals in Bosnia’s 
Republika Srpska 2000, pp. 70-71; Sharp 1997/98, p. 118).  However, it must be noted 
describing NATO as a monolithic actor is itself problematic as certain NATO member 
states such as the United Kingdom and Canada would later prove more willing to commit 
forces to high risk task such as the apprehension of war criminals and providing security 
for refugee returns, while the US remained preoccupied with force protection (Western 
2004, p. 236).  Moreover, France was even accused of having foiled an attempt by NATO 
to apprehend Karadžić.  As a result of the above national variations pertaining to the 
willingness of NATO member states to pursue individuals indicted by the ICTY, certain 
regions within BiH developed a reputation for being ‘safe havens’ for persons alleged to 
have committed war crimes.  The Brussels-based International Crisis Group reported in 
November 2000: 
Many of the alleged and as yet unindicted war criminals in Bosnia appear to reside 
in either the French or US sectors.  The perception that, at least until quite recently, 
French and US forces have been reluctant to act against those suspected of war 
crimes – reflected in the relatively small numbers of arrests in the French and US 
sectors – has fostered an image of these areas as a safe haven (War Criminals in 
Bosnia’s Republika Srpska 2000, p. 70). 
 
This perception that French and US forces were reluctant to pursue the arrest of suspected 
war criminals even led to an alleged incident where neighboring Montenegro called off 
an attempt to arrest Radovan Karadžić who was located attempting to enter Montenegrin 
territory near the Bosnian border in 1996 in response to NATO activity in eastern BiH: 
Asked why the Montenegrin police had released Radovan Karadžić, a former high 
official of the Montenegrin Ministry of the Interior replied: ‘Karadžić was trapped.  
It was a stand off between our Special [forces] and Karadžić’s armed guards.  Long 
and difficult negotiations followed.  The Montenegrin political leaders considered 
the situation and decided that NATO preferred our boys to get killed arresting 
Karadžić rather than their own.  After much thought they decided to let him go’ 
('NATO Fears Karadžić’s Bodyguards' 2007). 
 
The question as to whether or not the ICTY could issue legally binding orders upon 
international organizations such as NATO has been the subject of significant debate, and 
Zhou points out, ‘…it has been suggested that while individual states participating in 
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IFOR could be required to execute an ICTY arrest warrant specifically addressed to them, 
the obligation would not extend upon NATO itself…’ (2006).43  Kerr, on the other hand, 
suggests: 
Even though States contributing forces to the multinational force were all bound by 
an individual obligation to cooperate, States were bound to carry out their 
obligations under international law within their own territory, and not in the 
territory of other States.  The NATO force was not the sovereign authority in the 
territory of Bosnia, so it was not obliged to cooperate on that basis (2004, p. 
154).44 
 
Therefore, because Dayton preserved BiH as a state under international law, international 
forces in post-Dayton BiH did not exercise de jure sovereign authority and could not be 
legally bound to enforce arrest and surrender orders.  Under NATO’s interpretation of 
Article 29, the obligation to comply with arrest and surrender orders applied almost 
solely to the Bosnian state.  However, under existing ICTY case law, an unambiguous 
obligation has been established for intergovernmental organizations to cooperate with the 
ICTY: 
A purposive construction of the Statute yields the conclusion that such an order 
should be as applicable to collective enterprises of States as it is to individual 
States; Article 29 should, therefore, be read as conferring on the International 
Tribunal a power to require an international organization or its component organ 
such as SFOR to cooperate with it in the achievement of its fundamental objective 
of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, by providing the several modes of assistance set out therein 
(Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance 2000).45 
 
While the extent to which NATO may have been legally bound to actively pursue the 
arrests of persons indicted by the Tribunal remains challenged, NATO did not perceive 
itself as being under a legal obligation to assist the ICTY secure custody of accused 
persons on the territory of BiH. 
 
 
                                                 
43 The ICTY has issued arrest orders directly to states with a military presence in BiH such as France, the 
United States and the United Kingdom (Figà-Talamanca 1996, p. 173). 
44 Emphasis added by author. 
45 See also the Decision on Defence Motion for Access to EUMM Archives, the Prosecutor v. Enver 
Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 13 December 2003 and the Order for the Production of Documents by 
the European Community Monitoring Mission and Its Member States, the Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic and 
Marko Cerkez, 4 August 2000. 
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5.3. Transition to Law Enforcement 
 
When NATO entered BiH, the alliance narrowly defined the conditions under which 
peacekeeping forces could arrest an individual under indictment by the ICTY endorsing, 
‘the apprehension of individuals indicted by the ICTY only when encountered in the 
course of IFOR/SFOR’s duties’ (Zhou 2006).  Yet, this clarification left open the 
prospect NATO commanders would intentionally avoid areas where ICTY fugitives were 
known to reside (Sharp 1997/98, p. 121).  Moreover, IFOR commanders were not 
authorized to engage in the search for individuals indicted by the ICTY.  Had IFOR been 
a state, it would have been in non-compliance with obligations to enforce Tribunal arrest 
and surrender orders.46  However, even though multinational peacekeeping forces did not 
actively pursue the arrest of persons indicted by the Tribunal during IFOR’s first year in 
BiH,47 this changed dramatically in 1997.  In 1999, it was even noted, ‘SFOR has 
provided exceptional support and attempted four apprehensions of indicted accused, of 
which three were successful and one resulted in the death of the accused’ (Report of the 
International Tribunal 1999, p. 35).   
 
NATO’s undertaking of arrest and surrender operations in 1997 was not a reflection of an 
acceptance of a legal obligation to assist the ICTY, but rather coincided with a change in 
how the ICTY issued indictments.  In 1997, Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour began to 
issue ‘secret indictments’ against individuals NATO routinely had contact with so that 
the arrest and transfer of ICTY indictees would fall within the international peacekeeping 
force’s own narrowly defined mandate.  Bass noted, ‘Arbour called the bluff the 
Pentagon had written into Dayton’ (2002, pp. 265-266).  ICTY Deputy Chief Prosecutor 
Graham Blewitt recalled Arbour’s secret indictments created: 
…an almighty ruckus in NATO and elsewhere.  There was a lot of resistance and 
pressure to get us to back off.  Because they were saying it was just unfair that 
these people were not given the opportunity to flee…  So we didn’t back off at all.  
We just said we’ll go public and expose you for the fraud you are (G.J. Bass 2002, 
p. 266). 
                                                 
46 Under ICTY Rules and Procedures the Tribunal claims to hold the authority to impose binding orders 
upon international peacekeeping forces. 
47 Sharp notes that during 1996 even when indicted persons were encountered by IFOR, no arrests were 
made (1997/98, p. 121). 
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Unlike publicly indicted individuals, who were aware of the need to avoid contact with 
international peacekeeping forces, individuals under secret indictment had no such 
advance warning. 
 
The first operation on the part of the multinational military force in BiH to arrest an 
individual indicted by the ICTY occurred on 10 July 1997 (Dayton: Two Years On 1997, 
p. 3; Gow 2006, p. 59) and this event proved to be a watershed moment when it came to 
the enforcement of arrest and surrender orders by NATO forces in BiH.  The radical shift 
from a strict peace enforcement role limited to maintenance of the IEBL to the pursuit of 
individuals indicted by the ICTY warrants an explanation, and it has been argued that 
NATO’s change in policy was the outcome of two key events that coincided with the 
ICTY’s shift from issuing public indictments to secretly indicting individuals believed to 
reside in BiH.  Two additional factors which have been argued to have facilitated 
NATO’s undertaking of arrest and surrender operations included former US Ambassador 
to the UN Madeleine Albright’s replacement of Warren Christopher as US Secretary of 
State and the election of a Labour government in the United Kingdom, which saw Robin 
Cook, a vocal supporter of the ICTY, assume the post of UK foreign minister (G.J. Bass 
2002, pp. 262-271; Sharp 1997/98, pp. 133-134).  Because a vast majority of arrests from 
1997-2000 occurred in the British sector, Multi-National Division Southwest (War 
Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska 2000, p. 71), there is considerable evidence to 
support the assertion that arrests post-1997 were the result of a British change of policy 
vis à vis the arrest of persons indicted by the ICTY.  Regardless of the immediate cause, 
it is clear that there was a change in perception on the part of key NATO member states.  
However, despite NATO’s shift to a more aggressive policy concerning the arrest of 
ICTY indicted persons in BiH, arrests themselves were carried out by international as 
opposed to local forces and the question of whether or not NATO could be obliged to 
enforce an arrest and surrender order remained to be answered.  In fact, as late as 2000, 
NATO continued to insist that the arrest of ICTY fugitives was not part of its peace 
enforcement mandate in BiH although by that time NATO had carried out a number of 
arrests (War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska 2000, p. 70). 
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More recently, following the transition from SFOR to EUFOR, the EU-led security 
presence increasingly depends on local authorities to execute arrests.  Although 
EUFOR’s website notes that providing support to the ICTY is among the mission’s key 
supporting tasks ('EU Military Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina' 2007), EUFOR’s 
mandate when it comes to the arrest of persons indicted by the ICTY is restricted to the 
ability to arrest an accused should EUFOR become aware of an accused’s location, which 
bears similarity to the restrictive mandate initially adopted by NATO in 1996.  In fact, in 
an unpublished EUFOR document provided to the author it was noted: 
EUFOR has authority to detain [persons under ICTY indictment], and would not 
hesitate to do so if it had reliable information on which to act. Nevertheless, the 
main responsibility for their detention and arrest lies with BIH authorities. One 
condition for concluding the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU 
is BIH’s full cooperation with the ICTY (‘EUFOR Role’ 2007). 
 
However, as EUFOR’s replacement of SFOR followed the apprehension of all but one 
senior ICTY indictee believed to be on the territory of BiH,48 EUFOR’s willingness to 
assist the ICTY enforce arrest warrants has not to this point been tested.49 
 
5.4. Compliance and the OHR 
 
Although the OHR was invested with a broad range of powers, the OHR was not in a 
position to execute arrest warrants and relied on the multi-national military presence to 
support cooperation with the ICTY.  However, the OHR had at its disposal a wide range 
of powers which could prevent persons indicted by the ICTY from serving in or receiving 
assistance from entity level governments.  Yet, these powers were not exercised during 
1996 as the OHR initially did not robustly pursue war crimes suspects at a time when the 
RS political leadership included individuals publicly indicted by the ICTY.  As late as 
November 2000, the OHR along with the OSCE, United Nations Mission in BiH 
(UNMBiH), UNHCR and SFOR were criticized for meeting regularly with individuals 
                                                 
48 As of writing only four ICTY indictees remain at-large.  Goran Hodžić, Ratko Mladić and Stojan 
Župljanin were believed to be in Serbia, while Radovan Karadžić was believed to be in BiH. 
49 The fact EUFOR has assisted local police forces in the enforcement of arrest warrants issued by the 
Special War Crimes Chamber in Sarajevo suggests, EUFOR would arrest ICTY fugitives should their 
locations become known to the peacekeeping force. 
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alleged to have committed war crimes (War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska 
2000, p. 68).  Moreover, many individuals suspected of war crimes were permitted to 
remain in office even after the powers of the OHR were amplified to include the ability to 
unilaterally remove individuals from office. 
 
When exploring the question of compliance with arrest and surrender orders it is 
important to emphasize the OHR lacked authority over the NATO presence in BiH and 
could not issue binding orders on peacekeeping forces under NATO command.  The 
OHR could, however, take action against local actors suspected of supporting war crimes 
fugitives.  But, because the OHR was dependent upon NATO to provide security, the 
robustness of the OHR’s support of the Tribunal could only shadow that of NATO.  The 
OHR could not take action against the RS without NATO support.  As a result, during 
1996 there was no action taken to facilitate the arrest of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko 
Mladić and instead NATO reassured war crimes suspects in the RS that the IFOR 
mandate did not include the execution of arrest warrants (W. Bass 1998, p. 107).  
Karadžić was even permitted to remain president of the RS during the first months of the 
OHR mission. 
 
When the OHR did begin to take action against individuals suspected of harboring 
persons indicted by the ICTY, following NATO’s shift in policy in 1997, the OHR was 
able to make it difficult for persons indicted by the Tribunal to openly participate in 
political life.  Also, action by the OHR against civilian support networks for persons 
indicted by the ICTY has been cited by the Tribunal as playing an important role in 
bringing about the arrests of war crimes fugitives.  By removing individuals from 
positions within entity level security services, the OHR is able to prevent local 
governments from obstructing international efforts to apprehend war crimes fugitives.  
An example of such action occurred in July 2007, when the ICTY requested Miroslav 
Lajcak remove from office RS police training director Dragomir Andan as Andan was 
suspected of supporting ICTY fugitives evade capture (Clifford 2007).  Lacjak promptly 
complied with the ICTY request. 
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5.5 International Criminal Law Enforcement as Capacity Building 
 
When exploring compliance in BiH it is important to distinguish between non-
compliance as a result of political obstruction and non-compliance as symptomatic of a 
lack of capacity.  The international presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina has often described 
its activities as ‘capacity building’ in order to assist the Bosnian state in its transition to a 
more traditional sovereign state actor (Jeffrey 2006, pp. 203-227).50  While previous case 
studies emphasized traditional enforcement models for compliance - coercion, 
inducement, and normative persuasion - such models prove difficult to apply to BiH as 
the boundaries between the state and external actors have been blurred.  As demonstrated 
above, compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders was brought about by 
international and not domestic actors, making an examination of state action on the part 
of BiH epiphenomenal to the question of compliance.  For example, the arrests of ICTY 
indictees within the RS, where the entity level government rejected its obligations to 
cooperate with the Tribunal, were carried out by international forces and not local 
governments, and therefore, it must be emphasized compliance acts did not reflect the 
preferences of local actors.  On the other hand, reliance upon international forces to carry 
out an arrest and surrender order is not necessarily a reflection of a rejection of legal 
obligations or on the part of local authorities.  Even in the FBiH, where there existed 
broader support for the ICTY than in the RS, the arrest of former Bosnian Army general 
Naser Orić was executed by NATO instead of FBiH security forces.  The failure of local 
authorities to carry out an arrest cannot always be interpreted as an act of deliberate non-
compliance as Figà-Talamanca points out even the ICTY recognized the manifest 
inability of BiH to independently comply with arrest orders (1996, p. 173). 
 
In a context where local governments can find themselves in non-compliance due to a 
lack of capacity to conduct an arrest, an additional mechanism through which compliance 
can be viewed is compliance through capacity building, especially when examining 
compliance in the FBiH.  In post-conflict states, judicial institutions and law enforcement 
                                                 
50 The European Commission delegation in BiH also frames its activities as capacity building ('EU 
Assistance to BiH: Administrative Capacity Building' 2007). 
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bodies are often either non-existent or unable to hold fair proceedings.  In the case BiH, 
the OSCE noted the almost complete destruction of judicial institutions: 
Domestic courts in BiH, civilian and military, did indeed proceed to try war crimes 
cases during and immediately after the conflict.  However, the loss of skilled 
members of the legal profession and the judiciary, as well as the physical 
destruction and lack of proper equipment or facilities significantly hampered the 
ability of the courts to administer justice properly or efficiently… The loss of many 
pre-war judges resulted in the judiciary and prosecutor’s offices, in different parts 
of the country, being dominated by the majority ethnicity.  New, inexperienced 
judges and prosecutors were appointed on ethnic and political grounds (War Crimes 
Trials 2005, p. 4). 
 
Widespread problems regarding the prosecution of war crimes cases at the entity level 
combined with the expiration of the ‘Rules of the Road’ program due to the ICTY 
completion strategy led to the 2005 establishment of an internationalized War Crimes 
Chamber, the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina (War Crimes Trials 
2005, p. 10).  While the proceedings before the internationalized War Crimes Chamber 
are not within the scope of this study, the inclusion of a temporary international 
component serves as an example of ongoing efforts to capacity build on the part of 
external actors.  Additionally, like the ICTY, the War Crimes Chamber has also relied on 
international forces to execute arrest warrants.51  However, as the ICTY completion 
strategy commits the Tribunal to closing in 2010 and as the War Crimes Chamber 
transitions from an internationalized court to an exclusively domestic court there is an 
expectation that domestic actors will assume ownership of war crimes trial processes. 
 
6. Conclusions: Challenged Obligations, Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
This Chapter has explored the politics of compliance in a partially sovereign state and has 
demonstrated a narrow theoretical focus on state compliance can provide for at best a 
distorted picture of the politics of compliance.  As noted in the introduction, shared 
sovereign entities are becoming increasingly common and both states and international 
organizations have found themselves increasingly engaged in post-conflict state building 
                                                 
51 Continued incidents of torture being used by local police forces in post-war Bosnia to extract confessions 
and the abuse of arrest warrants as a pre-text for torture (Garms & Peschke 2006, p. 263) raises serious 
questions about whether local police forces should, even when ‘capable,’ be utilized to execute warrants in 
war crimes cases. 
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projects acting with robust legal mandates that curtail the autonomy of local actors.  BiH 
is one such state building project.  BiH’s contradictory legal identity as both a UN 
member state and a state under international civilian and military administration, 
highlights a gap within contemporary conceptions of international law which continues to 
view states as the almost exclusive subject of international legal obligations (Cassese 
2005, p. 3).  NATO and EUFOR’s denial of a legal obligation to execute ICTY arrest 
orders serves to underline the extent to which the relationship between international 
tribunals and multi-national peacekeeping forces needs to be further defined. 
 
While domestic support for the ICTY varied substantially between BiH’s two entities, 
international support for the work of the Tribunal gradually increased as NATO moved 
from a strict adherence to a peace enforcement mandate to the acceptance of law 
enforcement responsibilities, although not obligations.  This shift from an initial 
willingness to tolerate the continued presence of indicted war criminals to conducting 
arrest operations was an outcome of the growing acceptance among NATO member 
states, in particular the US and UK, that the removal of war crimes indictees from BiH 
political life would be conducive to the implementation of the DPA.  For example, 
Kovačević’s transfer to ICTY custody in 1997 strengthened Bosnian Serbs moderates at 
the expense of Radovan Karadžić, who himself eventually withdrew from Bosnian Serb 
politics.  Post-1997 instead of fearing Bosnian Serb retaliatory violence in response to the 
execution of ICTY arrest warrants, arrests were increasingly perceived as providing for 
increased security while war crimes suspects remaining at-large were increasingly 
perceived as a threat to security (Gow 2006, pp. 58-60). Yet, the causation of this shift 
from non-compliance to compliance was not initiated by the Bosnian state or its two 
entities, but was rather the outcome of a transformation within NATO and PIC member 
states.  In fact, when it comes to exploring the arrest and surrender of ICTY indictees, 
local governments were often completely excluded from the decisionmaking process.  
Moreover, the shift from compliance did not coincide with an acceptance of a legal 
obligation to cooperate with the ICTY under Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute, but rather 
was the outcome of the recognition of pragmatic gains which could be achieved through 
the marginalization of individuals under ICTY indictment.  Thus, the arrest and transfer 
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of ICTY accused in July 1997 was not dictated by perceptions of appropriate action, but 
rather it was the logic of expected consequences which guided NATO member states into 
undertaking arrest and transfer operations. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
 
The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo: International Justice in an International Protectorate 
 
 
 
On or about 19 May 1998, Ivan Zarić, a Serb, accompanied by two Roma/Egyptians, Agron 
Berisha and Burimi Bejta, left their home village of Dolac/Dollc and traveled to the flour mill in 
the village of Grabanica/Grabanicë.  They were arrested by KLA soldiers, taken to an abandoned 
house, and severely beaten… Following the mutilation of Ivan Zarić, Lahi Brahimaj, in the 
presence and hearing of Ramush Haradinaj, ordered the execution of Ivan Zarić, Agron Berisha, 
and Burim Bejta…They were killed while in KLA custody. Their bodies have not been recovered. 
 
Excerpt from The Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj, Fourth 
Amended Indictment - October 2007 
 
 
This is not the kind of cooperation we expect from a UN sister organization. 
 
Anonymous ICTY official describing the United Nations Mission in Kosovo’s assistance 
provided to the Tribunal in a personal interview with the author - January 2007 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Compliance in an International Protectorate 
 
On 10 June 1999 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 
establishing the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to 
govern Serbia’s southern province in the aftermath of NATO’s 78 day air campaign 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna republika Jugoslavija, SRJ).  
Resolution 1244 called for the creation of ‘…an international civilian presence in Kosovo 
in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of 
Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…,’ 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 181
(1999, p. 3) and transformed Kosovo into the only case study that pertains to a territory 
which lacks international legal recognition as a state.  Krasner notes: 
When NATO forces occupied Kosovo in 1999 they ignored conventional rules of 
Westphalian/Vattelian and domestic sovereignty.  The major powers did not 
attempt to establish Kosovo as an independent state, nor did they seek to make it 
part of a larger Albania. Rather they seized effective control of the territory while 
still recognizing it as part of Yugoslavia (2001, p. 244). 
 
Kosovo, therefore, confronts the student of compliance with a territory which remained 
de jure part of the SRJ but under the sovereign control of UNMIK.  The assumption that 
states are the subjects of international legal obligations constitutes an a priori assumption 
behind rationalist theories of compliance grounded in neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism.  After all, neorealists construct compliance as a reflection of the 
distribution of state power, while neo-liberal institutionalists construct compliance as a 
reflection of state interest.  Remove the state as the subject of international legal 
obligations and the explanatory power of existing rationalist approaches to IR evaporates.  
The absence of a state actor makes Kosovo fundamentally different than the preceding 
Bosnian case study.  Whereas the Bosnian state retained its independent international 
legal identity, along with corresponding legal obligations, UNMIK was tasked with 
governing a territory that remained legally within the SRJ.1  UNMIK was the sole 
sovereign authority in Kosovo.2  Throughout the period of time covered in this case study 
(1999-2006) UNMIK presided over the international civilian presence in Kosovo and 
drafted a framework for self-government for the province, which culminated in the 2001 
Constitutional Framework for Self-Government.  UNMIK was also obliged to cooperate 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as Resolution 
1244 explicitly demanded cooperation from the international presence in Kosovo (1999, 
p. 4). 
 
                                                 
1 The SRJ (after 2002, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) consisted of two constitute republics, the 
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.  Kosovo was an autonomous province within the 
former and thus remained within Serbia once the Republic of Serbia declared independence in 2006 
following the secession of Montenegro from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
2 It must be emphasized that despite remaining within the sovereign shell of the SRJ, UNMIK had no 
obligation towards Belgrade (Brand 2001, p. 463).   
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When the ICTY Statute was drafted in 1993 the prospect that the Tribunal would be 
confronted with enforcing orders upon an international protectorate, as opposed to a state, 
was not considered given the reluctance at the time of international actors to countenance 
the use of force in the former Yugoslavia to seize territory (Gow 1997, pp. 299-300); 
hence, the restrictive and state-centric wording of Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute.3  As 
demonstrated in Chapter Five, the establishment of an international civilian 
administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, along side a robust international military 
presence, raised significant questions regarding the extent to which Article 29 obligations 
could be considered binding upon external actors such as NATO and the OHR given 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remained the legal subject of an obligation to cooperate with the 
Tribunal. 
 
In Kosovo, UNMIK and the NATO-led KFOR mission could not deny their obligations 
to carry out Tribunal orders.  At the time of Resolution 1244’s drafting, Security Council 
member states recognized that the legal subject of Article 29 obligations would have to 
be clarified.  Therefore, Article 14 of Resolution 1244 went beyond Dayton’s obligations, 
which were imposed exclusively upon the local parties to the 1995 peace agreement, and 
demanded cooperation with the ICTY on the part of the ‘international security presence’ 
in Kosovo (Resolution 1244 1999, p. 4).  Having established an obligation to cooperate 
with the ICTY, it should be expected that UNMIK would demonstrate a greater degree of 
cooperation with the Tribunal than that which was observed in the previous case studies.  
After all, UNMIK was neither a state nor a party to the 1998-1999 conflict.  Moreover, 
like the ICTY, UNMIK was a Chapter VII creation of the UNSC.  Unfortunately, as will 
be demonstrated, UNMIK proved reluctant to assist the ICTY and in 2006 the ICTY 
reported UNMIK’s non-cooperation to the UNSC (Report of the International Tribunal 
2006, p. 666).  Despite the enforcement of arrest and surrender orders, UNMIK failed to 
assist the Tribunal in a wide range of functions from providing assistance to Tribunal 
personnel in Kosovo to providing adequate witness protection.4 
                                                 
3 It should also be noted that at the time the Tribunal Statute was drafted the ICTY was, according to 
former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, ‘widely viewed as little more than a public 
relations device’ (1999, p. 190). 
4 Personal interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY Field Office in Belgrade, 23 January 2007. 
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While non-compliance on the part of states can be viewed through existing mainstream 
theories of IR, non-compliance on the part of an international administration or 
peacekeeping forces requires theories of compliance to grapple with the question of 
international legal obligations imposed upon non-traditional international legal entities 
which exercise sovereign authority over a given territory.  In order to explore the 
interaction between UNMIK and the ICTY, the historic and institutional context of 
compliance will first be established.  This will include both an exploration of UNMIK 
and Kosovo’s institutions of self-government.  Second, the domestic politics of 
compliance will be discussed with a special emphasis on Fatmir Limaj and Ramush 
Haradinaj’s5 surrenders to ICTY custody in 2003 and 2005 respectively.  Finally, the 
international politics of compliance will be addressed.  It will be noted the overriding 
concern of the states which created UNMIK did not include cooperation with the ICTY 
(Williams & Scharf 2002, p. 208); however, given Priština’s struggle for recognition as 
an independent state, cooperation with the ICTY was perceived as a means of 
demonstrating local institutions of self-government were ‘responsible’ members of the 
international community (Dedushaj 2007, p. 10).  As a result, Kosovo’s institutions of 
self-government embraced human rights norm affirmation as part of a public diplomacy 
campaign to demonstrate Kosovo’s ability to meet human rights standards for 
membership into the international community of states. 
 
2. Contextualizing Compliance 
 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force was brought to an end shortly after Martti Ahtisaari and 
Viktor Chernomyrdin secured SRJ president Slobodan Milošević’s acceptance of an 
international security presence in Kosovo on 2 June 1999.6  A week after the Ahtisaari-
                                                 
5 Fatmir Limaj and Ramush Haradinaj were both senior commanders within the Kosovo Liberation Army 
who went on to play an active role in politics in post-conflict Kosovo preceding their indictments by the 
ICTY. 
6 Viktor Chernomyrdin was Russia’s envoy tasked with bringing an end to the conflict between NATO and 
the SRJ and acted as a contact between Milošević and US State Department officials throughout Operation 
Allied Force.  Martti Ahtisaari was chosen by Chernomyrdin to accompany him on his final trip to 
Belgrade during NATO’s air campaign so as to include someone ‘with stature in Europe but no connections 
to NATO’ (McGeary 1999). 
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Chernomyrdin talks in Belgrade, NATO and the Yugoslav Army agreed to a Military-
Technical Agreement, which established a timetable for the withdrawal of Serb forces 
from Kosovo (Jackson 2007, pp. 248-254).  Although the SRJ is often described as 
having capitulated to NATO (Hosmer 2001, pp. 123-128; Lambeth 2001, p. 82), Herring 
notes that the terms of Resolution 1244 were more favorable to Belgrade than those 
offered preceding Operation Allied Force at Rambouillet (2001, p. 232).  Importantly for 
Belgrade, whereas Rambouillet granted NATO access rights to the SRJ in its entirety, 
Resolution 1244 was much more restrictive and granted the international security 
presence access only to Kosovo (H. Clark 2000, p. 183; Herring 2001, p. 232).  Also, 
Rambouillet’s rigid three year time frame for a final status agreement, which was to grant 
Kosovo recognition as an independent state, was not included in Resolution 1244 (H. 
Clark 2000, p. 183).  Moreover, Belgrade continued to attempt to negotiate concessions 
from NATO following the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement.  For example, during 
negotiations for the Military-Technical Agreement, Belgrade insisted the military mission 
in Kosovo should be placed under UN and not NATO command (Jackson 2007, p. 251).  
While NATO did assume command of the KFOR security mission, Resolution 1244 
stipulated the international security presence was to be under ‘UN auspices’ (H. Clark 
2000, p. 183; Herring 2001, p. 232).7 
 
2.1 Establishing UNMIK 
 
In June 1999, external actors8 were once again confronted with the task of establishing an 
international civilian administration in the former Yugoslavia.  Matheson described the 
international civilian presence created for Kosovo as ‘unprecedented in scope and 
complexity’ (2001, p. 79).  Indeed, the administration that emerged in Kosovo was 
considerably more robust than in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  UNMIK was initially granted full 
legislative and executive powers over the province (Carlowitz 2004, p. 307) and even 
after devolving certain powers to self-governing authorities established through the 2001 
                                                 
7 It must be emphasized that this does not mean UNMIK exercises any form of command and control over 
KFOR. 
8 As Russia was a member of the G8, but not NATO, the Cologne G8 summit held in May 1999 became the 
venue at which compromise between NATO member states and Russia was reached on a post-war Kosovo 
administration that would be acceptable to Moscow (G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting 2002).  
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Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, UNMIK retained 
‘reserved powers’ over law and order, judicial appointments, minority rights, customs, 
monetary policy, external relations, property rights, and supervision of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps (KPC) (Kosovo Standards Process: 2003-2007 2007, pp. 4-5).9 
 
Before the creation of Kosovo’s self-governing institutions in 2001, UNMIK assumed a 
vast array of powers over a territory that lacked functioning governing structures.10  In 
fact, as Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Interior troops departed Kosovo in June 1999, 
most elements of the existing judicial order from police to judges and prosecutors fled 
because at the time almost all members of Kosovo’s police forces and judiciary were 
ethnic Serbs (Jackson 2007, p. 291).  Therefore, the task facing Sergio de Mello, 
temporarily appointed the United Nations Secretary General’s Special Representative 
(SGSR) to Kosovo, was daunting and required the immediate imposition of an 
international police force and judiciary to counter campaigns of arbitrary violence and 
retribution (Jackson 2007, p. 290).  Unfortunately, UNMIK was unable to quickly recruit 
police forces.  The result was the triumphant Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlimtare 
e Kosovës, UÇK), which had fought the ground war in Kosovo during NATO’s air 
campaign, was able to ‘walk into town halls and take possession’ of local governments 
(Hopkinson 2006, p. 170) allowing the UÇK to establish itself as the dominant ruling 
body within the province (Demjaha 2000, p. 37; Hopkinson 2006, p. 170; Jackson 2007, 
p. 285).  Furthermore, the inability of UNMIK to rapidly recruit police forces 
compounded the negative effects of UÇK ‘self-establishing’ local authorities, and 
Kosovo was left un-policed for the first several weeks of UNMIK’s mandate (Hopkinson 
2006, p. 170).11  
 
                                                 
9 The KPC was created by UNMIK as a successor organization of the Kosovo Liberation Army.  The KPC 
was not an armed forces and acted to provide employment to disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army 
personnel. 
10 This does not include ad hoc self-governing authorities established by the UÇK, which exercised justice 
in a violent and arbitrary manner.  These self-governing authorities will be described in greater detail 
below. 
11 It was during this period of time violent reprisals were carried out against Kosovo Serbs.  As of October 
1999, the UNHCR estimated 130,000 Kosovo Serbs had fled the province (Herring 2001, p. 233). 
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In a development that further complicated efforts to establish UNMIK, Hopkinson notes 
that the United Nations was unprepared for the return of Kosovo’s refugees, who returned 
to the province before UNMIK was able to establish itself (2006, p. 170).  Although the 
UNHCR had drawn up detailed plans for an orderly return of Kosovar refugees from 
Macedonia and Albania, once the conflict ended refugees failed to wait for the UNHCR 
to put into place its plans and returned to the province en masse (Jackson 2007, p. 287).  
The head of British forces in Macedonia, General Mike Jackson used less than flattering 
terms to describe the effect the massive flow of refugees had on the deployment of KFOR 
to the province.  Jackson recalled, ‘[t]he bloody idiots were blocking our route into 
Kosovo’ (2007, p. 264). 
 
2.2 Challengers to UNMIK 
 
In 1999 UNMIK was confronted with three immediate potential challengers to its 
authority.  Two challengers emerged from the Kosovar Albanian community, while the 
latter consisted of Kosovo Serbs.  With regard to the two Kosovar Albanian challengers, 
the first was the UÇK, which claimed the right of ‘conquest’ and the second was 
Kosovo’s pre-war parliament and government under Ibrahim Rugova (Hopkinson 2006, 
p. 171).  The UÇK initially represented a significant obstacle to KFOR’s attempts to 
establish control over security in the province because of reluctance on the part of the 
UÇK to disarm.  In fact, it was only with great difficulty that the UÇK was convinced to 
re-brand itself as the KPC (Jackson 2007, pp. 294-301).  As a result of the UÇK’s 
acceptance of its new KPC status, the former Kosovar army was transformed into a 
‘quasi-police force,’ which was granted legal status by UNMIK.  Oddly, for a quasi-
police force, the KPC was prohibited from participation in any law enforcement activities 
(Kola 2003, p. 370).12 
 
With regard to the second challenger, Kosovo’s pre-war ethnic Albanian governing 
structures had coalesced into a parallel state following Serbia’s revocation of Kosovo’s 
autonomy in 1989 and were later described by Clark as a ‘state-in-embryo’ (H. Clark 
                                                 
12 Instead, the KPC was to provide assistance during natural disasters. 
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2000, p. 177).  Kosovo’s parallel state, which effectively governed ethnic Albanian 
communities in the province from 1989-1999, was led by Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic 
League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK).  The LDK’s parallel structures 
could have served as the basis for a post-war government had UNMIK not dissolved all 
pre-existing institutions of government.  However, this may not have been desirable as 
Clark noted that one of the characteristics of Kosovo’s parallel governing structures was 
a tendency to imitate the negative features of pre-existing single party state bodies.  In 
fact, despite being reliant on voluntary participation, Kosovo’s pre-war parallel 
government was described as follows: 
While the structures were brought into existence and crucially depended on 
voluntary activity, at the same time they had a traditional hierarchy: command 
structures and other features of the old one-party style mixed with pre-communist 
authority patterns (H. Clark 2000, p. 177). 
 
Devic noted when Rugova established the LDK-led parallel government in 1989, Rugova 
modeled the ruling party on the province’s branch of the Yugoslav League of 
Communists (2006, p. 260).  Thus, parallel governing structures were not only 
intrinsically linked to the party but were also inclusive of unions and civil society (A 
Changing Society, A Changing Civil Society: 2005, pp. 5-6; Devic 2006, p. 260).  But, 
rather than inhibit the growth of NGOs, Devic notes many of Kosovo’s indigenous NGOs 
emerged in the period following the establishment of Kosovo’s parallel government and 
preceding NATO’s Operation Allied Force.  Kosovo’s post-1989 NGO community 
included the Mother Teresa Society, the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and 
Freedoms and the Kosovo Helsinki Council (2006, p. 260). 
 
Due to the upheaval of the 1999 conflict Rugova’s pre-war government was displaced 
leaving the UÇK to assume control of the province in the weeks after the NATO air 
campaign through the aforementioned ‘self-establishing’ local authorities; however, UÇK 
rule was short lived as a December 1999 agreement between UNMIK and leaders of 
Kosovo’s parallel governing structures required local leaders to relinquish all pre-
UNMIK claims to authority and dismantle all non-UNMIK sanctioned governing 
structures (Brand 2001, p. 468).  In a development which would further reduce the 
influence of the UÇK, Rugova’s LDK triumphed over a party formed by the UÇK’s 
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political leader Hasim Thaçi, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e 
Kosovës, PDK), in Kosovo’s first post-war elections held in 2001. 
 
While the LDK returned to ‘power’ in 2001, there remains significant tension between 
UNMIK and Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian political parties given the latter’s desire to 
assume greater control over governance through a process known as ‘Kosovarization.’  
There is a programmatic consensus among ethnic Albanian parties in support of 
Kosovo’s independence from the Republic of Serbia, a position which is supported by 
SGSR Joachim Rücker.13  Because UNMIK has largely been perceived as facilitating a 
process, which will bring about Kosovo’s independence rather than serving as an obstacle 
to independence, anti-UNMIK sentiment has remained muted during the period of time 
under examination in this case study.  
 
On the part of Kosovo’s Serb minority, who for the most part were driven north of the 
Ibar River or left isolated in enclaves in southern Kosovo (Hehir 2006, p. 203), there was 
an almost complete non-recognition of UNMIK’s authority and instead Belgrade assisted 
Kosovo Serb enclaves in establishing their own parallel administration (Yannis 2004, p. 
73).  Although the non-recognition of UNMIK was not consequential to compliance 
episodes under examination here, as no ethnic Serbs under ICTY resided in postwar 
Kosovo, the appeals of Kosovo Serbs to Belgrade’s continued legal sovereignty over 
Kosovo is illustrative of the difficulties encountered by UNMIK in imposing an 
international administration upon Kosovo.  Belgrade also symbolically asserted control 
over the province by protesting almost every piece of legislation ratified by UNMIK as 
violations of SRJ sovereignty (Yannis 2004, p. 70).  Moreover, violence against Kosovo 
Serbs remained routine throughout the period of time under examination in this case 
study (Hehir 2006, pp. 203-204).  It took a great deal of cajoling on the part of UNMIK 
to secure Kosovo Serb participation in Kosovo’s first post-conflict elections in 2001; 
however, in 2004, Kosovo Serbs boycotted Kosovo’s second post-conflict elections 
                                                 
13 Rücker argues absent a rapid move toward there would be a potential for anti-UNMIK mobilization 
within the province would increase (Kosovo envoy tells Security Council delay of status proposal raised 
tension 2006).   
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(Hehir 2006, p. 207).  In addition, Kosovo Serbs continued to exercise their right to vote 
in Republic of Serbia elections. 
 
2.3 UNMIK Consultative Bodies 
 
UNMIK recognized the need to engage local actors in order to prevent the exacerbation 
of local grievances when it established the temporary Joint Interim Administrative 
Structures (JIAS) in February 2000 (see Figure 6.1).  Although the JIAS was established 
in order to replace ‘all previous parallel structures for revenue collection and provision of 
public services,’ there was an attempt to include major Kosovar political parties into ad 
hoc consultative bodies (UNMIK-JIAS Fact Sheet 2000).  The first of these bodies was 
the eight member Interim Administrative Council (IAC), which included Kosovar 
Albanians who were present at Rambouillet, a representative of Kosovo’s Serb 
minority,14 and representatives from UNMIK.  The IAC could only make policy 
recommendations and could not independently legislate.  The second consultative body, 
the Kosovo Transitional Council, was described by UNMIK as being ‘the highest-level 
consultative body’ of the JIAS (UNMIK-JIAS Fact Sheet 2000) and included 
representatives of Kosovo’s three major political players, the UÇK, the LDK and Kosovo 
Serbs (Kola 2003, p. 371). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The ethnic Serb representative was not a full member of the Interim Administrative Council, and 
maintained ‘observer’ status.  Other observers included a representative of Kosovo’s civil society and a 
UNMIK representative for humanitarian affairs (UNMIK-JIAS Fact Sheet 2000). 
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Figure 6.1: UNMIK Consultative Bodies under JIAS (2000-2001) 
 
 
 
Like the IAC, the 35 member KTC held no executive or legislative powers, but members 
were regularly briefed by KFOR representatives on the security situation in the province, 
and the SRSG was committed to ‘taking into account’ KTC recommendations when 
formulating policy.  Both the IAC and KTC were dissolved along with the JIAS 
following the enactment of the Constitutional Framework on Interim Self-Government.  
 
2.4 Institutional Structure of UNMIK 
 
The wide range of powers assumed by UNMIK necessitated a considerable delegation of 
responsibilities.  As in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a number of international organizations were 
integrated into the international civilian administration; however, unlike Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where the international administration was placed under the Peace 
Implementation Council, in Kosovo the United Nations Security Council headed the 
international civilian presence.  In order to clarify responsibilities, four areas of 
governance were delineated.  These four areas of governance, police and justice, civil 
administration, democratization and institution building and reconstruction and economic 
development, were known as UNMIK’s four pillars:15  
 
                                                 
15 Despite a formal delineation of responsibilities ‘turf battles’ between international organizations were 
common during the period of time under examination (Demjaha and Peci, 2004: 69). 
Joint Interim 
Administrative 
Structures (JIAS) 
Interim 
Administrative 
Council (IAC) 
-Kosovo Albanian, 
Kosovo Serb, and 
UNMIK 
representatives  
Kosovo 
Transitional 
Council (KTC) 
-Representatives of the 
UÇK, LDK and 
Kosovo Serbs 
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Table 6.1: UNMIK’s Four Pillars 
 
 PILLAR I PILLAR II PILLAR III PILLAR IV 
Issue Areas Police and 
Justice 
Civil 
Administration 
Democratization 
and Institution 
Building 
Reconstruction 
and Economic 
Development 
Institution 
Delegated 
Responsibility 
United Nations United Nations Organization for 
Security and 
Cooperation in 
Europe 
European Union 
 
In addition to establishing a four pillared system of governance, UNMIK was presided 
over by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who was granted 
significantly greater powers than the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
UNMIK’s first SRSG to serve a full term was Bernard Kouchner of France, who replaced 
the temporary SRSG Sergio de Mello.16  The powers granted to the SRSG included: 
• The power to dissolve parliament and call for new elections 
• Exercises final authority over appointment of judicial officials 
• Exercises control over law enforcement 
• The power to veto the budget 
• Conducts Kosovo’s foreign relations 
(Constitutional Framework 2001) 
 
Furthermore, the following positions were subject to appointment exclusively by the 
SRSG: 
• Economic and Fiscal Council 
• Governing Board of the Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo 
• Chief Executive of the Customs Service and Tax Inspectorate 
• Auditor General 
(Constitutional Framework 2001) 
 
Legislation was considered binding once signed by the SRSG, and the SRSG even had 
the authority to impose retroactive legislation (Brand 2001, p. 470).  The first piece of 
legislation promulgated by UNMIK confirmed the SRSG’s investment with all legislative 
and executive powers, while also noting that the laws of the SRJ would continue to apply 
in the province insofar as they did not conflict with UNMIK’s mandate or specific 
regulations enacted by UNMIK (Matheson 2001, p. 80).  Yet, UNMIK’s exclusive hold 
over all executive and legislative functions was to only be a temporary measure because 
                                                 
16 For a full list of SRSGs see Appendix XI. 
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under Resolution 1244, UNMIK was expected to devolve limited governing 
responsibilities to local bodies once such institutions came into existence (1999 p. 4).  
Moreover, UNMIK’s broad range of powers was a reflection of the fact that unlike the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, which essentially legitimized pre-existing governing bodies,17 
UNMIK was tasked with establishing governing bodies instead of legitimizing pre-
existing governing structures.   
 
2.5 Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self Government 
 
In keeping with Resolution 1244, which committed UNMIK to transferring 
administrative responsibilities to institutions of self-government (1999 p. 4), UNMIK 
enacted Regulation 2001/9 in May 2001, which brought into force the ‘Constitutional 
Framework on Interim Self-Government,’ hereafter referenced as the Constitutional 
Framework.  The Constitutional Framework established Kosovo’s first post-war 
institutions of self-government replacing the ad hoc consultative councils established by 
UNMIK in 1999.  Kosovo’s institutions of self-government included a parliamentary 
assembly, an office of president, a government and courts (Constitutional Framework 
2001, p. 9).  The Constitutional Framework reserved significant powers for the SRSG, 
which included those powers previously outlined, while also devolving a number of tasks 
to the newly created self-governing bodies.18  In the event of an overlapping of 
competencies between UNMIK and self-governing bodies, the SRSG reserved final 
authority to interpret the Constitutional Framework. 
 
The main legislative body created by the Constitutional Framework was the Assembly, 
which was composed of 120 members. 100 seats were elected through proportional 
representation and the remaining 20 seats were reserved for ethnic minorities.  
Significantly, Article 9.1.6(d) and (e) of the Constitutional Framework made specific 
reference to the ICTY.  The Constitutional Framework stated any individual ‘[s]erving a 
sentence imposed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or 
                                                 
17 Dayton recognized the pre-existing war times entities of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and imposed an overarching OHR and state-level institutions, 
18 See Appendix XII. 
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under indictment by the Tribunal and has failed to comply with an order to appear before 
the Tribunal; or [d]eprived of legal capacity by a final court decision’ could not stand in 
Assembly elections (Constitutional Framework 2001, p. 20).  Notably, an individual who 
was indicted by the Tribunal, but voluntarily appeared before the court could be 
permitted to stand in elections.  This loophole permitted UNMIK to allow Ramush 
Haradinaj to head his party’s lists in elections scheduled for 2007, despite protests from 
the ICTY (Weekly Press Briefing 2007). 
 
Although the Constitutional Framework established self-governing bodies, the powers of 
Kosovo’s self-governing institutions were significantly limited by UNMIK.  The 
Assembly was granted the authority to form a government, to adopt laws,19 and to elect a 
president (Constitutional Framework 2001, pp. 22-23).  The president lacked the 
authority to dissolve the Assembly or call for elections and could only ‘request’ the 
SRSG take such action (Constitutional Framework 2001, p. 26).  The president was to be 
the nominal ‘head of state’ for the province and had the authority to propose a prime 
minister, in close consultation with political parties in Assembly (Constitutional 
Framework 2001, p. 26).  The president could also work in close consultation with the 
SRSG when taking action ‘in the field of external relations.’20   
 
3. The Politics of Compliance in an International Protectorate 
 
Domestic politics in Kosovo throughout the period under examination was defined by a 
contest between UNMIK and institutions of local government, in which local institutions 
demanded increasing rights to self-government (Hopkinson 2006, p. 173) and the pursuit 
of a final status agreement for the province.  Although external relations, including 
Kosovo’s relationship with the ICTY, remained a reserved competency even after the 
2001 Constitutional Framework, Kosovo’s self-governing bodies nonetheless attempted 
                                                 
19 Of course legislation could only be adopted on issues that fell within it Assembly’s delegated 
responsibilities.  See Appendix XII. 
20 As matters of external relations were reserved for the SRSG, the president could not take independent 
action on questions of external relations without the approval of the SRSG.  In fact, UNMIK maintained the 
sole authority to conduct external relations.  However, UNMIK did permit grant the Kosovo Assembly a 
consultative role in the ratification of bilateral or multilateral agreements (Peci 2007, p. 6). 
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to engage in foreign policymaking.  Because the 2001 Constitutional Framework did not 
create a foreign ministry, Kosovo’s informal foreign policymaking centered around the 
Office of International Cooperation and Regional Dialogue (OICRD), which was an 
office within the Office of the Prime Minister.  However, as Peci notes the OICRD failed 
to function as a credible alternative to a foreign ministry (2007, p. 8).  Moreover, the 
creation of a foreign office within the office of the Prime Minister created a considerable 
degree of confusion as the 2001 Constitutional Framework delegated a consultative role 
to the Office of the President as oppose to the head of Kosovo’s parliamentary 
government.  The ensuing demands from the Office of the Presidency to be granted 
similar competencies, which were rejected by UNMIK, led to paralysis and bureaucratic 
infighting between the Presidency and Office of Prime Minister.  In fact, as of 2007, 
despite having been invited to open representative offices in Washington and Brussels, 
these positions were left vacant due to the aforementioned conflict (Peci 2007, pp. 28-
29).  Nevertheless, Kosovo’s institutions of self-government engaged in a public 
diplomacy campaign to secure external support for a final status agreement that would 
affirm Kosovo’s independence.  This campaign will be addressed in greater detail in a 
discussion of the international politics of compliance. 
 
Ownership of legal obligations to cooperate with the ICTY was no exception to a 
‘Kosovarization’ process pursued by Kosovo’s self-governing institutions.  Mirroring 
laws on cooperation with the ICTY adopted in Croatia and Macedonia, the Kosovo 
Assembly passed a law on cooperation with the ICTY in 2003, which effectively 
established a dual obligation upon local authorities and UNMIK to cooperate with the 
ICTY (Local Media 2003).  Despite the initiative shown on the part of the Assembly to 
assume ‘ownership’ of obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal, Kosovo’s self-
governing institutions lacked a legal mandate to independently respond to ICTY requests 
and orders.21 
 
 
                                                 
21 In an interview with UNMIK spokesperson Alexandar Ivanko, it was emphasized that legal obligations 
toward the ICTY were assumed exclusively by UNMIK and the international security presence under 
KFOR.  Personal interview, 8 November 2007. 
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3.1 UNMIK and Compliance 
 
UNMIK’s record on cooperation has been mixed.  The Tribunal noted in its 2006 annual 
report to the Security Council, ‘… the Prosecutor had serious concerns regarding the lack 
of full cooperation provided by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo’ (Report of the International Tribunal 2006, p. 666).  Unlike in the Tribunal’s 
detailed criticisms of non-compliance in Croatia and Serbia, the ICTY annual report 
failed to specifically identify acts of non-compliance on the part of UNMIK and limited 
its discussion of cooperation on the part of Kosovo to two sentences.  However, an ICTY 
official identified serious concerns with regard to UNMIK assistance provided to 
Tribunal officials in Kosovo.22  Moreover, there are two episodes where the ICTY 
transmitted arrest and surrender orders to UNMIK and KFOR that demonstrated a 
hesitance on the part of the international presence to execute arrests in support of the 
Tribunal.  These two episodes, the first occurring in 2003 and the second in 2005, will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 
3.1.1 UNMIK and the Limaj Incident 
 
The ICTY’s indictments of Haradin Balaj, Fatmir Limaj, Isak Misliu and Agim Murtezi 
marked the first time KFOR and UNMIK received sealed indictments from the Tribunal.  
Although Balaj, Misliu and Murtezi were detained within weeks of UNMIK and KFOR’s 
receipt of the ICTY’s indictments, the fact Limaj, the most senior of the four indictees 
and head of the PDK’s parliamentary delegation, was permitted to leave Kosovo for 
Slovenia two weeks after his indictment caused ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
to publicly criticize Kosovo’s international administration.  Moreover, UNMIK’s 
attempts to avoid Limaj’s arrest through encouragement of a voluntary surrender were 
                                                 
22 Personal interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY Field Office in Belgrade, 23 January 2007.  
UNMIK spokeperson Alexander Ivanko responded to the above allegations by noting that UNMIK has 
only been criticized by the Office of the Prosecutor and has never been found to be not cooperating by the 
Tribunal’s Trial Chambers.  However, it must be noted that compliance assessments are made by the Office 
of the Prosecutor and not the Trial Chambers.  Personal interview with UNMIK spokesperson Alexander 
Ivanko, 8 November 2007. 
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rejected by the Tribunal, which demanded Slovenian authorities prevent the accused’s 
return to Kosovo. 
 
UNMIK’s non-compliance act proved the most spectacular public display of contempt 
for the ICTY on the part of the UN mission in Kosovo.  While at this point it remains 
difficult to deconstruct the decisionmaking process behind this act, the Kosovo daily, 
Koha Ditore, provided a sketch of events leading up to Limaj’s eventual arrest in 
Slovenia.  On the 27 January 2003 KFOR commander Fabio Mini received the ICTY’s 
indictments and met with UNMIK chief administrator Michael Stiener, who granted 
KFOR operational authority to carry out the arrests as ordered by the Tribunal.  Two 
weeks later Fatmir Limaj left Kosovo unchallenged by UNMIK border security officials.  
Only after Limaj’s departure were the lower ranking indictees, Balaj, Misliu and Murtezi, 
arrested.  With Limaj in Slovenia, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte publicly 
accused KFOR of having failed to arrest Limaj and despite assurances from UNMIK that 
Limaj would voluntarily surrender to the Tribunal at the end of his ski vacation, Del 
Ponte requested Slovene police prevent Limaj from returning to Kosovo and transfer the 
accused to ICTY custody (Local Media 2003).  In the aftermath of the Limaj incident, 
Del Ponte told the BBC, ‘It escapes all understanding… that Fatmir Limaj could be 
allowed to leave Kosovo with such ease.’  Del Ponte when on to note Limaj, ‘…simply 
booked the flight ticket like an ordinary citizen… It was that simple.  And it is 
outrageous’ ('Kosovo Suspects Taken to The Hague' 2003).  The following year Del 
Ponte publicly accused UNMIK of failing to cooperate in the Tribunal’s ongoing 
investigations against UÇK officials ('Trial of Kosovo Albanians Begins' 2004).  Two 
years later UNMIK and KFOR would once again received ICTY arrest orders; however, 
in 2005, Kosovo’s sitting prime minister was among those indicted by the Tribunal. 
 
3.1.2 UNMIK and Haradinaj 
 
Two years after the Limaj incident, the ICTY once again transmitted an indictment 
against a senior member of Kosovo’s self-governing institutions.  The indictment of 
Kosovo’s sitting prime minister, Ramush Haradinaj, was feared to have the potential to 
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destabilize UNMIK’s fragile political order in the province.  While UNMIK has been 
singled out for criticism by the ICTY, it is important to note that the indictment of 
Ramush Haradinaj met with significant popular opposition within the province.  
Moreover, as illustrated in the preceding discussion of challengers to UNMIK, UNMIK 
was dependent upon the continued support of the local population to carry out its 
administrative mandate.  Although UNMIK was not democratically accountable to 
Kosovar public opinion, UNMIK did take into account Haradinaj’s popularity when 
confronted by the ICTY’s indictment of the former UÇK commander.  Preceding 
Haradinaj’s indictment, threats of violence against UNMIK were transmitted through the 
local media, which ominously warned ‘nobody has surrendered all the weapons from 
war-time’ (Nosov 2005, p. 523).  In addition, the head of a UÇK veterans’ association 
even described UNMIK as neo-colonial and compared the international administration to 
Serbian rule (Hehir 2006, p. 205).  The Kosovar media also reinforced the popular 
perception of the UÇK as a liberating army that could not have committed war crimes 
(Nosov 2005, p. 523), and local print media launched personal attacks against individuals 
testifying against UÇK leaders already on trial before the Tribunal using such headlines 
as ‘the Prosecutor is using a drug addict against Limaj’ (Nosov 2005, p. 606).  Following 
the indictment of Ramush Haradinaj, the Kosovar media widely proclaimed Haradinaj as 
a ‘hero’ (Nosov 2005, pp. 609-610) and even local NGOs protested the indictment 
(Nosov 2005, p. 610).23 
 
The perception of Haradinaj as having been ‘unjustly’ indicted was reinforced by 
statements made in support of Haradinaj by foreign leaders such as former UK Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook (Cook 2005).   US Representative Eliot Engel of the House 
Subcommittee on Europe also issued a press release that emphasized Haradinaj’s 
‘indictment is not proof of guilt’ (Steinbaum 2005).  Furthermore, perhaps the most 
explicit statements in support of Haradinaj came from UNMIK’s SGSR, Søren Jessen-
Petersen who had developed a close working relationship with the accused and visited 
Haradinaj’s family shortly after his surrender to the ICTY (Nosov 2005, p. 611).  Jessen-
                                                 
23 Kosovo’s indigenous prewar NGO community had been largely marginalized by UNMIK and is 
supportive of Kosovo’s independence.  See Constructing International Justice on p. 199. 
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Petersen, in an official statement delivered in response to Haradinaj’s decision to resign 
as prime minister and voluntarily surrender himself to ICTY custody, claimed to 
empathize with ‘the sense of shock and anger over [the indictment]’ (Kosovo after 
Haradinaj 2005, p. 2; SRSG's Statement on the Prime Minister's Resignation 2005).  
Moreover, Jessen-Petersen expressed regret at Haradinaj’s decision to resign: 
I have taken note of Ramush Haradinaj’s decision to step down with immediate 
effect as Prime Minister of Kosovo.  I do, of course, respect his decision, but I 
cannot hide the fact his departure will leave a big gap…  Personally, I am saddened 
to no longer be working with a close partner and friend (SRSG's Statement on the 
Prime Minister's Resignation 2005). 
 
The SRSG even went on to describe the ICTY’s indictment of Haradinaj as ‘painful’ for 
UNMIK: 
The decision announced by Mr. Haradinaj to co-operate with the Tribunal, despite 
his firm conviction of innocence, and although painful for him, his family, Kosovo 
and for his many friends and partners, including UNMIK, is at the same time an 
example of Kosovo’s growing political maturity as a responsible member of the 
international community (SRSG's Statement on the Prime Minister's Resignation 
2005).24 
 
Absent from Jessen-Petersen’s statement was a reference to the ICTY’s charges against 
Haradinaj, which included 37 counts of crimes against humanity, or a reference to the 
UÇK’s wartime victims. 
 
UNMIK’s praise of Haradinaj’s voluntary surrender act and Haradinaj’s appeals for calm 
have been credited with ensuring stability was maintained in Kosovo following 
Haradinaj’s transfer to The Hague.  The International Crisis Group singled out 
Haradinaj’s voluntary surrender and appeals for calm along with the actions of UNMIK 
officials for averting violence in the province (Kosovo after Haradinaj 2005).  
Haradinaj’s appeal calm following his indictment (Kosovo after Haradinaj 2005, p. 2) 
had the effect of blunting public manifestations of anger toward the Tribunal and 
UNMIK.  Moreover, Haradinaj emphasized his actions were in Kosovo’s interest given 
any final status outcome which affirmed Kosovo’s independence would require the 
support of the United States and European Union member states (Local Media 2005).  
                                                 
24 Emphasis added by author. 
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Failure to comply with an ICTY arrest and surrender order and the political crisis which 
would have followed could have undermined progress in reaching a final status 
agreement favorable to Priština.  In response to Haradinaj’s appeal the UÇK veterans’ 
organization even cancelled a planned anti-ICTY demonstration. In addition to Jessen-
Petersen and Haradinaj’s appeals for calm, security precautions taken by KFOR, which 
included preventative arrests, (Kosovo after Haradinaj 2005, p. 3); however it is not clear 
to what extent preventative arrests contributed to the absence of violence following 
Haradinaj’s transfer to ICTY custody.25 
 
4. Constructing International Justice in an International Protectorate 
 
In describing the impact of UNMIK upon the development of a local human rights 
community, Mertus laments, ‘…not only has a principled human rights culture failed to 
emerge, but many of the positive aspects of the previously existing human rights culture 
have disappeared’ (2004, p. 339).  The marginalization of Kosovo’s pre-existing human 
rights culture was attributed to UNMIK’s failure to constructively engage local human 
rights activists who had held prominent positions within Kosovo’s human rights NGO 
community before the 1999 Kosovo War (Mertus 2004, p. 339).26  Mertus noted one such 
activist, Vjosa Dobruna resigned from her UNMIK position in protest of the refusal of 
UNMIK to permit local input in the drafting of Kosovo’s Constitutional Framework 
(2004, p. 339).  The result is that the gap between international administrators in UNMIK 
and their constituents in Kosovo grew substantially.  Daut Dauti, a Kosovar journalist, 
used an anecdotal example of a UNMIK appeal for Kosovars to return to their jobs in the 
face of widespread ethnic violence in 2004 as having been met with derision to illustrate 
the extent to which UNMIK administrators were perceived as being out of touch with the 
local population (Kostovicova & Bechev 2004).  Kosovo’s unemployment rate, according 
to a 2004 UN Human Development Report, was 44.4 percent (Human Development 
Report Kosovo 2004, p. 19).  
                                                 
25 NATO also deployed additional troops to Kosovo in anticipation of a violent reaction to the Haradinaj 
indictment (Reuters 2005). 
26 Mertus cites Dobruna as noting that unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the war in Kosovo there was 
a strong local civil society.  However, local NGOs were marginalized once UNMIK assumed control of the 
province (2004, p. 340). 
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4.1 The Internationalization of Civil Society 
 
UNMIK’s disbanding of pre-war parallel government and marginalization of local NGOs 
sidelined Kosovo’s leading indigenous human rights activists in favor of international 
NGOs which entered the province following NATO’s 1999 air campaign.  In addition, 
local NGOs that formed after 1999 were encouraged to function as ‘cheap service 
providers’ for the international administration, rather than engage in substantive human 
rights activism:27 
Internationals reward the local NGOs that were willing to be cheap service 
providers for international programs and penalize those who fail to obey the 
international agenda.  In this regard, local human rights organizations that monitor 
the international community for human rights violations are particularly unwelcome 
(Mertus 2004, p. 341). 
 
Thus, a considerable percentage of the population came to view the NGO community as 
acting on behalf of foreign governments rather than acting as a ‘transmission belt’ 
between civil society and government (A Changing Society, A Changing Civil Society: 
2005, p. 1; Mertus 2004, p. 341).28  In fact, Mehmet Kraja, a writer for Kosovo’s leading 
daily newspaper vocalized this distrust of NGOs when accusing UNMIK of having 
directed funding towards, ‘…those channels which seek the destruction of Kosovo’s 
Albanian identity and the creation of so-called civil society,…’ (A Changing Society, A 
Changing Civil Society: 2005, p. 1).29  Dauti even described the international 
administration as forming a barrier to locals from entering the political process, which 
was the domain of ‘internationals’ (Kostovicova & Bechev 2004).  Absent a linkage 
between the externally funded NGO community and indigenous civil society, NGOs are 
unable to carry out the function identified in Sikkink and Keck’s boomerang model 
                                                 
27 In an interview with Andrej Nosov, it was suggested that human rights groups from the former 
Yugoslavia that express concerns regarding the practices of ‘internationals’ are branded as ‘extremists’ and 
thus risk their own access to international financial assistance, 23 January 2007. 
28 Such an analogy may be inappropriate here as given the highly restricted mandate of institutions of self-
government.  NGO lobbying of local government institutions on human rights issues (refugee returns, 
prosecution of war crimes) that largely remain the prerogative of the international administration is not 
perceived as a means of exercising meaningful influence over policy (Devic 2006, p. 262). 
29 Note strong parallels here with attacks on foreign funded NGOs in the Croatian media (see Chapter 
Two). 
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(Keck & Sikkink 1998) of notifying transnational civil society groups of human rights 
violations on the part of governing authorities, in the case of Kosovo UNMIK. 
 
4.2 Mobilization against the ICTY 
 
As observed in Croatia, a substantial segment of Kosovo’s non-internationalized NGO 
community did not support cooperation with the ICTY.  While UÇK veterans’ 
organizations may be included among these, it should be noted opposition to the 
Haradinaj indictment was widespread within local civil society and not restricted to 
veterans groups (Kosovo after Haradinaj 2005, pp. 2-4).  However, as pointed out earlier, 
Kosovar veterans’ groups proved receptive to appeals for calm from Haradinaj and 
therefore did not mount large scale anti-ICTY demonstrations such as those witnessed in 
Croatia and Serbia.  Moreover, even in the event of widespread public mobilization 
against the ICTY, there was no democratic means for Kosovars to demand non-
compliance with arrest and surrender orders on the part of governing authorities.  
Cooperation with the ICTY fell to UNMIK and not the provisional institutions of self-
government.  Absent a means for the local provisional self-government to effect 
compliance, the cooperation the ICTY would receive in Kosovo would be determined by 
international administrators within UNMIK. 
 
5. Compliance and International Organizations 
 
Prefacing any discussion of the international politics of compliance, it is important to 
emphasize three characteristics of Kosovo which highlight the difficulties of tracing 
compliance causality.  First, at the time of writing Kosovo was not a sovereign state, but 
rather remained legally within the Republic of Serbia.  Thus, a strict reading of Article 29 
of the Tribunal Statute would suggest Belgrade remains the legal subject of any 
obligation to transfer persons wanted by the Tribunal from Kosovo to The Hague.  Of 
course, Kosovo operates as a de facto sovereign territory under UNMIK’s sovereign 
authority established through UNSC Resolution 1244.  Second, UNMIK and KFOR, the 
two institutions with both a capability and obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal are 
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not accountable to local bodies of government established through the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo.  Third, unlike in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where local police forces were not disbanded post-Dayton but rather 
‘monitored’ by the International Police Task Force, in Kosovo, UNMIK established an 
independent international police force drawn from contributing UN member states.  
Equipped with an independent police force, UNMIK could directly secure custody of 
individuals indicted by the ICTY, whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina the OHR was entirely 
reliant upon cooperation from NATO, and later EU, led international forces, or the local 
police.  Given the above restraints upon local actors, the international politics of 
compliance would dictate the level of cooperation between Priština and the ICTY. 
 
5.1 The International Politics of Compliance 
 
Despite Resolution 1244’s imposition of an obligation upon UNMIK and KFOR to 
cooperate with the ICTY, the Security Council did not establish enforcement mechanisms 
to counter non-compliance acts.  When the Kosovo Albanian delegation arrived at 
Rambouillet in January 1999, the Kosovars sought to include a robust mandate for the 
ICTY within a peace agreement for the province.  Much like the Bosnian delegation at 
Dayton, the Kosovars requested that any peace agreement with Belgrade include an arrest 
and surrender regime for ICTY fugitives on the territory of Kosovo and the SRJ.  
Furthermore, given NATO’s obfuscation of its responsibilities to assist the Tribunal in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovar delegation requested the inclusion of a clause which 
would obligate NATO to enforce Tribunal orders upon the SRJ through ‘the use of force 
under the NATO Activation Order’ (Williams and Scharf, 2002: 197-198).  Belgrade, of 
course, opposed any mention of the ICTY.  The Contact Group sided with Belgrade and 
rejected the Kosovars’ proposals, with French and OSCE representatives at Rambouillet 
going so far as to accuse the Kosovar delegation of attempting to ‘derail’ the peace 
process by demanding an ICTY compliance regime that was unacceptable to Belgrade 
(Williams & Scharf 2002, p. 200).  The result was that Rambouillet included only an 
obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal, and enforcement mechanisms were discarded 
(Williams & Scharf 2002, pp. 200-203). 
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Although the Rambouillet agreement was rejected by Belgrade, Rambouillet did serve as 
the basis for UNSC Resolution 1244 which established the institutional framework for 
the post-war international civilian administration.30  Notably, Resolution 1244, like the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, failed to put in place a robust sanctions regime to counter non-
compiance with Tribunal orders.  As Williams and Scharf note: 
…the Security Council missed an opportunity to craft a sanctions regime that 
would have empowered the Tribunal to compel compliance with its orders and to 
obtain access to Serbia proper.  Again though, such a regime would have had little 
chance of being adopted given the Russian and French opposition (2002, p. 208). 
 
Resolution 1244, did however, differ slightly in language from the Dayton accords, 
which committed ‘the parties,’ Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and the SRJ, to cooperation 
with the Tribunal.  Article 14 demanded, ‘…full cooperation by all concerned, including 
the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (UNSC Resolution 1244 1999, p. 4).31  Nonetheless, no sanctions regime 
was put in place for non-compliance on the part of the concerned parties.  And crucially, 
for the SRJ, UNSC Resolution 1244 did not include specific language obligating 
Belgrade to grant Tribunal personnel access to the SRJ outside of Kosovo.  Thus, 
Resolution 1244 had no positive impact on SRJ cooperation with the Tribunal.  However, 
when it came to securing custody of ICTY suspects in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR 
benefited from the fact Kosovo’s most high profile war crimes suspect, Ramush 
Haradinaj, voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY.32   
 
5.2 Explaining Voluntary Cooperation 
 
Kosovo’s self governing institutions, throughout the period under examination, were 
engaged in a process of attempting to secure international recognition.  Much like Croatia 
                                                 
30 Herring points out UNSC Resolution 1244 included a commitment to only ‘take into account’ 
Rambouillet. It is important to emphasize Rambouillet was never implemented (2001, p. 232).  Also see 
UNSC Resolution 1244 1999, p. 3. 
31 In the preamble to Resolution 1244 reference to the ICTY is also made by ‘recalling the jurisdiction of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.’ 
32 Haradinaj emphasized, at the time of his surrender, his decision was in the best interest of Kosovo (Local 
Media 2005, pp. 3-5). 
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during 1991, Priština saw membership in international institutions as means of affirming 
recognition as an independent state.  Kosovo’s institutions for self-government also 
sought to demonstrate Priština’s ability to meet international human rights standards as 
part of a campaign to demonstrate Priština’s self-governing bodies were prepared to 
preside over an independent state.  In December 2003, the UNSC endorsed a plan drafted 
by UNMIK called ‘Standards for Kosovo’ which committed Kosovo to demonstrating 
compliance with international human rights norms, particularly with regard to the 
protection of ethnic minorities, before a final status agreement would be reached for the 
province (Kosovo Standards Process: 2003-2007 2007).  Two years later, the final status 
process was initiated as Martti Ahtisaari opened final status talks through the newly 
created United Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for the 
Future Status Process for Kosovo in Vienna (Ahtisaari 2005). 
 
The pursuit of a final status agreement that would confirm Kosovo’s status as an 
independent state was perceived as extremely urgent due to the fact Kosovo’s ambiguous 
status under international law prevented Kosovo from participating on an equal footing in 
international institutions designed to promote regional cooperation in southeastern 
Europe such as the European Union’s Stability Pact and Stability and Association Process 
(Yannis 2004, p. 72).  In addition, Kosovo’s institutions of self-government were unable 
to enter into contractual agreements with the EU, such as the Stability and Association 
Agreement, which formed the foundation of EU accession processes.33   
 
Absent a foreign ministry, embassies or even a diplomatic corps, Kosovo’s institutions of 
self-government have engaged in an informal foreign policymaking process. In fact, a 
policy paper financed by the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society reminded readers, 
‘Even as a non-sovereign entity, Kosovo has conducted foreign relations in the last two 
decades’ (Peci 2007, p. 6).  Dedushaj pointed out: 
Today with the global information revolution the Government of Kosovo does not 
need that large network of embassies around the world to get their message heard.  
                                                 
33 Instead, Kosovo participates in the Stabilization and Association Process Tracking Mechanism, a 
precursor to the Stability and Association Process. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 205
They can contact their counterparts abroad by telephone and e-mail.  Their message 
does not need to pass through ambassadors (2007, p. 11). 
 
Dedushaj noted that the surrender of Haradinaj was a positive public diplomacy exercise 
for Kosovo that served to counter Serbian claims Kosovo was a lawless failed state, 
through demonstrating a commitment to adhering to international legal obligations.  A 
domestic political crisis that would have followed Haradinaj’s failure to surrender to the 
ICTY would have threatened to delay if not derail Kosovo’s final status process.  
Interestingly, in response to Belgrade’s claims Kosovo’s institutions of self-government 
would be unable to ensure the rule of law, Dedushaj contrasted Haradinaj’s transfer to 
ICTY custody with the continued failure of Serbia to surrender the ICTY’s most wanted 
fugitives (2007, p. 10). 
 
5.3 Kosovo and the European Union 
 
While Chapters Two and Three dealt with the impact of EU membership conditionality 
on compliance.  The European Union, despite direct involvement in governing Kosovo 
through Pillar Four of UNMIK, has been unable to utilize ‘conditionality’ to improve 
cooperation with the Tribunal on the part of UNMIK.  As previously noted, the EU was 
unable to enter into contractual accession agreements with Priština, and neither UNMIK 
nor the provisional institutions of self-government could formally request the initiation of 
an EU accession process for the province.  Furthermore, given Serbia’s SAA negotiations 
with the EU, the intitiation of a separate accession process for what was legally a 
province of Serbia would have been an unprecedented act.  Nonetheless, the EU began to 
lay the foundations for Kosovo’s accession by decoupling Serbia’s and Kosovo’s 
interactions with the bloc.  Beginning in June 2004, the EU began a process that would 
effectively allow Kosovo to interact with the EU as an independent entity, if not as a 
state.  First, the European Council adopted the ‘European Partnership for Serbia and 
Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 
10 June 1999,’ which issued independent assessments for Kosovo, Serbia and 
Montenegro.  Then, in 2005 the European Council emphasized, ‘the Western Balkans 
including Kosovo’ were considered potential future members of the EU; however, the 
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Council explicitly stated its role in preparing the province for EU integration would not 
prejudice the final status process, which had yet to determine whether or not Kosovo 
would be recognized as an independent state (Press Release: 2641st Council Meeting 
2005).  Then in 2006, in the clearest single yet that Kosovo was being prepared for an EU 
accession process, the Council called upon UNMIK to draft a separate plan to prepare the 
province for EU membership (Council Decision of 30 January 2006). 
 
Despite the fact the EU engaged UNMIK in a pre-accession process for Kosovo, ICTY 
conditionality was never deployed against UNMIK.34  Moreover, European Union 
member states never took action to sanction UNMIK for non-cooperation with the ICTY.  
Whereas the European Commission publicly condemned non-cooperation with the ICTY 
on the part of Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb, the European Commission remained silent 
on non-cooperation on the part of UNMIK.  Only, in instances were responsibilities have 
been devolved from UNMIK to the institutions of self-government, conditionality has 
been utilized by the European Commission.  For example, in January 2006, the European 
Commission included UNMIK’s standards process into the European Partnership for 
Kosovo and the EC requested self-governing authorities establish an Action Plan to 
oversee the implementation of goals established by UNMIK in its 2004 Kosovo 
Standards Implementation Plan (Kosovo Standards Process: 2003-2007 2007).  The 
establishment of the Action Plan in 2006 spurred a series of reforms to the organizational 
structure of Kosovo’s self-governing bodies, which included the creation of an Office of 
European Integration within Kosovo’s Office of the Prime Minister.  Moreover, 
following UNMIK’s authorization of the creation of a self-governing ministry of the 
interior and justice, the Action Plan was able to target improving the rule of law in 
Kosovo (Kosovo Standards Process: 2003-2007 2007). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 This is for the obvious reason that UNMIK itself was not seeking membership into the European Union, 
but rather was engaged in making preparations for EU accession on behalf of a future Kosovan state. 
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5.4 International Administrations and Contested Norms 
 
UNMIK’s hesitancy to cooperate with the ICTY and uphold the norm to prosecute war 
criminals should not be viewed in a vacuum as other norms such as ensuring the right of 
return for ethnic minorities to the province have also fallen victim to a desire to ensure 
short-term stability in the province.  In fact, the UNHCR even advised against the return 
of Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Ashkaelia, Egyptian and other minorities as ‘such returns could 
contribute to further destabilize the situation in Kosovo’ (Blitz 2006, p. 259).  The 
UNHCR’s warning was probably the direct result of KFOR, UNMIK’s international 
police and local police all having failed to provide security for Kosovo’s ethnic minority 
communities during an outbreak of anti-Serbian violence during 2004 (Responsibility to 
Protect 2004).35  The failure of the international security presence to protect ICTY 
witnesses from violence and intimidation can be provided of an additional consequence 
of attempts to minimize risk to international personnel in Kosovo.  Within UNMIK and 
KFOR compliance decisions, like decisions on whether or not to provide protection to 
ethnic minorities or encourage refugee returns, were dominated by a weighing of the 
expected consequences of a given act on the security situation in the province. 
 
As in Bosnia-Herzegovina the preference of international peacekeeping forces was the 
minimization of risk to their personnel and the maintance of stability.  Intervention in 
interethnic clashed that erupted in 2004 or the arrest of high profile war crimes suspects 
were perceived as potentially jeoparadizing both of the above.  Because of risk aversion 
on the part of international peacekeeping forces, it can be expected that in order to ensure 
the enforcement of arrest warrants a clear legal obligation must be accepted by 
international peacekeeping forces.  However, as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while 
international peacekeeping forces are willing to assume the authority to carry out arrests, 
there remains an unwillingness to acknowledge an obligation to do so. 
                                                 
35 Human Rights Watch provided a few illustrative examples of how risk adverse international forces 
refused to carry out their security mandate.  First, French forces refused to leave their base to protect a Serb 
enclave within just yards of the base leaving the village to be burnt to the ground.  Second, Ashkeli homes 
were destroyed within the vicinity of two French bases.  Third, German KFOR troops refused to come to 
the assistance of UNMIK international police trapped in Prizen as crowds destroyed all traces of Serbian 
life in the town (Responsibility to Protect 2004, p. 21).   
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6. Conclusions: Legal Obligations and International Administrations 
 
Theories of compliance with international law have yet to attempt to explain compliance 
on the part of international administrations or other non-state governing bodies.  Unlike 
the previous four case studies, Chapter Six addressed the question of compliance in the 
absence of a state actor or state legal subject.  UNMIK, which assumed sovereign control 
over the territory of Kosovo through UNSC Resolution 1244, was the legal subject of 
demands for assistance from the ICTY.  As both the ICTY and UNMIK were UN 
organizations created by UNSC fiat, the fact that the latter organization failed to assist the 
former requires explanation.  It has been demonstrated that while the ICTY was focused 
on efforts to prosecute individuals suspected of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, UNMIK’s primary concern was the maintenance of stability in the 
province and a minimization of risk to international peacekeeping forces.  The ICTY was 
unable to effectively counter non-cooperation on the part of UNMIK due to the fact that 
traditional methods of coercion and inducements could not be deployed against an 
international administration operating under a UNSC mandate.  Moreover, as UNMIK 
and the ICTY were both established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the two 
organizations enjoyed a more horizontal relationship.  In the previous case studies, where 
we have examined the ICTY and states, the relationship between the Tribunal and the 
legal subjects of Tribunal orders was unambiguously vertical.  The horizontal legal 
relationship that exists between UNMIK and the ICTY limits the ability of ad hoc 
tribunals to enforce their orders and conduct investigations in territories under 
international civilian or military administration and creates a situation whereby tribunals 
are dependent upon voluntary assistance provided by international administrations.  
Absent the ability to issue legally binding orders, compliance outcomes will reflect the 
extent to which international administrations are prepared to assist the work of 
international criminal courts. 
 
Kosovo’s provisional institutions of self-government, on the other hand, were more 
receptive to norm affirmation in support of the ICTY and sought to demonstrate 
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compliance with international human rights norms as part of a public diplomacy 
campaign to build international support for Kosovo’s independence.  In fact, Haradinaj’s 
decision to voluntarily surrender to the ICTY was framed as legitimizing Kosovo’s self-
governing institutions.  When traditional methods for bringing about compliance, 
coercion and inducements, are the only tools available to challenge non-compliant 
behavior, non-compliance on the part of multi-national administrations operating under a 
UNSC mandate is unlikely to be challenged.  States seeking to negotiate or maintain their 
status in international institutions, such as Croatia during the 1990s, are far more 
susceptible to coercive threats on the part of third party states.  With regard to non-state 
multi-national administrations, alternate compliance methods can be deployed such as 
public shaming of the non-compliant institution, as seen in the ICTY’s 2006 report to the 
UNSC which highlighted UNMIK’s non-compliance.  However, in the case of UNMIK 
public shaming proved ineffective in improving compliance as UNMIK was once again 
singled out for non-compliance by the ICTY in 2007.  Moreover, it is important to 
emphasize that UNMIK’s encouragement of voluntary surrenders in the Limaj and 
Haradinaj transfers is indicative of a level of cooperation with the ICTY that Belgrade 
exhibited in 2005. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
 
 
Conclusions: The International Politics of Compliance with Tribunal 
Orders 
 
 
 
Unfortunately, cooperation with the Tribunal is seen as some sort of necessary evil. 
 
Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY Field Office in Belgrade in personal interview, 23 January 
2007 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Compliance and International Criminal Tribunals 
 
Despite the prolific growth in tribunal literature that followed the establishment of the 
ICTY (1993), the ICTR (1994) and the ICC (1998[2002]), examinations of compliance 
and non-compliance with tribunal orders remain a lacuna in international justice 
scholarship.  This thesis set out to explain compliance with international criminal tribunal 
arrest and surrender orders through competing theories of IR and IL which can be broadly 
dichotomized into rationalist and constructivist approaches to compliance (see Chapter 
One: Table 1.1).  While the number of state subjects of international criminal tribunal 
requests and orders remains relatively small,1 the ICTY offers an opportunity to test 
theories of compliance across a diverse spectrum of states and territories under 
international civilian or military administration which were all subject to the same legal 
regime, the Statute of the Tribunal.  Moreover, with the coming into effect of the Rome 
Statute in 2002, we can expect an ever increasing number of states to come into contact 
                                                 
1 As of the time of writing, 11 states have either been requested or executed an order by an international 
criminal tribunal to transfer an accused from state to tribunal custody.  This figure does not include requests 
by hybrid or ‘internationalized’ tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the War Crimes 
Chamber in Sarajevo. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 211
with an emerging international judiciary making compliance focused research agendas 
ever more relevant to understandings of international justice.2 
 
The failure to integrate the study of compliance into tribunal scholarship can be at least 
partially explained by the fact existing explorations of post-cold war international 
criminal tribunals which focus on legal precedent and law creation often fail to take into 
account that the emerging international judicial infrastructure differs fundamentally from 
its predecessors at Nuremberg and Tokyo.  In fact, as mentioned in Chapter One, the 
post-Second World War military tribunals bear little functional resemblance to the post-
cold war tribunals as the former were established in the aftermath of the total military 
defeat of Germany and Japan and therefore did not depend upon or require cooperation 
from states or local administrations over which the tribunals’ exercised jurisdiction.  
Thus, whereas the military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo were integrated into post-
war occupation administrations that exercised both de jure and de facto sovereignty over 
the defeated powers, the ICTY was a court that lacked a willing constabulary.  When the 
ICTY issued its first indictments in 1995, which were transmitted to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
[BiH],3 Croatia and Serbia [SRJ], the Tribunal could not compel any supranational actor 
or occupation police force acting in support of the Tribunal to carry out arrest and 
surrender orders in the face of local non-compliance.  Even in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo, where external actors assumed varying degrees of control over police and 
security functions, the ICTY could not depend upon the cooperation of international 
civilian administrations or military peacekeeping missions. 
 
Instead, the international judicial apparatus that emerged in the 1990s rested upon the 
foundation of the cooperation of external actors.  In Chapter One it was emphasized that 
the ICTY was invested with an unprecedented legal mandate to obligate states to 
cooperate with the Tribunal which established a vertical relationship between ICTY Trial 
                                                 
2 While the International Criminal Court operates under the Rome Statute which differs from the ICTY 
Statute of the Tribunal, Sudan’s referral to the ICC through Resolution 1593 under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter has established an enforcement regime identical to that which exists for the ICTY. 
3 Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić’s indictments, which were certified by the Tribunal in July 1995, 
preceded the deployment of the NATO-led IFOR mission to BiH in December 1995/January 1996.  
However, it should be pointed out that the UN-led UNPROFOR mission was in-country at the time and 
failed to carry out a single arrest and transfer operation in support of the ICTY. 
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Chambers and potentially all UN member states.  Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute 
created an unambiguous legal obligation upon all states to cooperate with Tribunal 
requests and orders.  This legal obligation was then reaffirmed by a 2002 ICTY Appeals 
Chamber decision on Croatia’s appeal of the Bobetko indictment.  States, according the 
Appeals Chamber, were under a legal obligation to exercise ministerial functions in 
support of the Tribunal and were not in a position to question, challenge or reinterpret 
Tribunal orders (Decision on Challenge by Croatia 2002).  Yet despite the Tribunal’s 
robust legal mandate, the ICTY was not imbued with any direct enforcement capabilities.  
As the Appeals Chamber noted in the Prosecutor v. Blaškić, the ICTY could not even 
subpoena states, as failure to respond to a court subpoena would necessitate legal 
consequences.4  Taken together the Appeals Chamber’s findings in the Prosecutor v. 
Bobetko and the Prosecutor v. Blaškić, it becomes apparent that the Tribunal enjoyed a 
hierarchical legal relationship with states while also lacking any direct means to sanction 
non-compliance. 
 
Given the above disconnect between the ICTY’s legal mandate and the ICTY’s ability to 
independently compel compliance with Tribunal orders, the preceding case studies 
provided an opportunity to discern the extent to which legal obligation or material 
incentives and disincentives framed compliance decisions on the part of states.  While 
Chapters Two and Three identified third party state coercion and inducements as the 
intervening variable which brought about state compliance with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders on the part of Croatia and Serbia, it was noted that in the case of Serbia 
coercion proved significantly less effective than in neighboring Croatia.  Moreover, 
Chapter Four confronts us with a state that voluntarily complied with not just an ICTY 
arrest and surrender order, but also cooperated voluntarily with the Tribunal’s in-country 
investigations.  Macedonian state cooperation forms a contrasting backdrop to difficulties 
the ICTY encountered in securing assistance from international peacekeeping forces in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the subjects of Chapters Five and Six.  Chapters Five 
                                                 
4 Therefore, the ICTY could only subpoena state officials in their ‘private capacity.’  Also, it should be 
noted that the ICTY retained the ability to order states to undertake certain activities in support of the 
Tribunal; however, failing to comply with an order does not grant ICTY Trial Chambers the authority to 
impose legal consequences on a non-compliant state. 
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and Six highlighted the fact that the legal position of the ICTY vis à vis the subjects of 
Tribunal orders is significantly blurred when taking into account multi-national civilian 
administrations or peacekeeping forces which exercised de facto or de jure sovereignty 
over Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-   ) and Kosovo (1999-    ).  In both BiH and Kosovo 
multinational administrations derived their mandates directly from the UNSC under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.5  The result was that while the relationship 
between the ICTY and states was unambiguously vertical, the relationship between the 
Tribunal and IFOR (later, SFOR then EUFOR), the OHR, UNMIK and KFOR was, to a 
greater extent, horizontal.  Despite an Appeals Chamber decision suggesting the opposite 
(Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance 2000), UNMIK and EUFOR explicitly 
claimed the Tribunal lacked the authority to impose ‘legal obligations’ upon the above 
entities through Article 29, which addressed states specifically.  Instead, UNMIK and 
EUFOR argued their legal obligations derived solely from their respective UNSC 
mandates.6  
 
2. The Gap between Legal Obligation and Compliance 
 
A common observation evident throughout the case studies, with the possible exception 
of Chapter Four, is that the mere establishment of legal obligation alone cannot explain 
compliance with Tribunal arrest and surrender orders.  In fact, from 1993-1996 the 
Tribunal was confronted with almost complete non-cooperation on the part of the states 
of the former Yugoslavia.  The first accused transferred to Tribunal custody, Duško 
Tadić, was only delivered to The Hague due to the fact Tadić had already been charged 
and arrested in Germany.7  Furthermore, in 1995, despite certifying 36 indictments, not a 
single accused was transferred to Tribunal custody by local authorities in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Then, in 1997, four years after the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 
827, the almost complete absence of voluntary state cooperation and the failure of NATO 
                                                 
5 NATO’s mandate in BiH UNSC Resolution 1031, whereas UNMIK and KFOR derived their mandates 
from UNSC Resolution 1244. 
6 This argument was put forward by officials of UNMIK and EUFOR in personal communications with the 
author. 
7 Duško Tadić went on to become the first defendant to stand trial before the ICTY. 
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to arrest ICTY fugitives in BiH led Scharf to suggest the ICTY would require an 
independent police force to effectively function (1997, p. 228). 
 
A decade after Scharf’s assessment that compelling state cooperation might be an 
unachievable goal, the ICTY had successfully secured custody of all but four accused 
under Tribunal indictment.  With the assistance of NATO in BiH, the transfer of Bosnian 
Croats under Tribunal indictment by Zagreb and even Milošević’s transfer of Erdemović, 
during the last three years of the 1990s the ICTY gradually began to secure custody of 
war crimes indictees (see Chart 7.1).  At present, twelve years after the ICTY issued its 
first indictments, only four ICTY fugitives remain at-large8 and the Tribunal’s 2006 
annual report to the UNSC emphasized cooperation received from Croatia, Macedonia 
and the multi-national presence in BiH (Report of the International Tribunal 2006).  In 
fact, only UNMIK, Serbia and the Bosnian Serb republic were cited for continued non-
cooperation with the Tribunal.  It is this transformation of preferences from non-
compliance to compliance and in some cases the persistence of non-compliance that this 
thesis has sought to explain.  However, before exploring the ICTY’s interactions with 
international peacekeeping missions and multinational civilian administrations, let us first 
return to Part One of this thesis: state compliance. 
Chart 7.1: Transfers to ICTY Custody (1995-2007) 
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8 Among the four fugitives that remain at-large at the time of writing are two of the ICTY’s most high 
profile indictees, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. 
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3. State Compliance: Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia 
 
In the cases of Croatia and Serbia we found that coercion and inducements could prove 
effective in bringing about compliance; however, the level of coercion or inducements 
required to transform state behavior varied greatly between the two states.  Because 
similar material incentives and disincentives produced divergent compliance outcomes, 
the explanatory power of rationalist theories of IR must be drawn into question.  Instead, 
if we turn to ideational structures, which are illuminated by the rhetorical appeals of 
states, it becomes apparent that Croatia and Serbia adopted divergent trajectories of legal 
argumentation to rationalize non-compliance acts.  Croatia never characterized a non-
compliance act as an act of total non-recognition of ICTY’s jurisdiction, and Croatia 
never claimed the UNSC lacked the authority to establish the ICTY.  Rather non-
compliance acts were always attributed to either legal questions regarding a specific 
indictment or an inability to transfer accused persons due to reasons of ill health or an 
inability to locate an accused.9  Thus, when policymakers in Zagreb shifted from non-
compliance to compliance, compliance acts could be more easily rationalized as a 
fulfillment of international legal obligations. 
 
In Chapter Two it was illustrated that from 1996, when the first Croat indictee was 
transferred to ICTY custody, until 2005, when the last Croatian citizen under indictment 
for serious violations of IHL was transferred to The Hague, compliance acts were framed 
in the context of fulfillment of legal obligations – even if the compliance act was itself 
coerced.  Moreover, Croatia proved significantly more receptive to cooperation with the 
ICTY than Serbia, although there were periods where Croatian compliance with Tribunal 
orders was not forthcoming, particularly during the late 1990s and between 2001 and 
2003.10  Because domestic civil society mobilized against the ICTY during the 1990s and 
early to mid-2000s, the demand for state cooperation with the ICTY was almost 
                                                 
9 See for example Croatia’s rationalization of non-compliance which framed non-compliance as occurring 
within the Tribunal Statute (Statement Delivered by the Croatian Delegation 1998). 
10 Interestingly, this observation was particularly true during from 1994-1998, during a period of time when 
ICTY indictments targeted almost exclusively Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs leaving elites in Belgrade 
and Zagreb un-indicted.  Thus, divergent levels of compliance during the 1990s cannot be dismissed as the 
outcome of Serbia being the recipient of indictments which targeted state elites, which only occurred in 
1999.   
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exclusively external.  Thus, periods of non-compliance were marked by a mobilization of 
veterans’ organizations against specific arrest and surrender orders.  The result of 
domestic anti-ICTY mobilization was that absent significant external coercion and 
inducements, the Croatian state was vulnerable to a significant domestic non-compliance 
pull.  In fact, Chapter Two demonstrated that the failure of the ICTY to cultivate a 
domestic ‘justice constituency’ within the former Yugoslavia through sustained efforts at 
communicating indictments and trial processes directly to domestic public opinion or the 
identification and establishment of links with domestic civil society through an outreach 
program during the 1990s, permitted anti-ICTY groups and a hostile media to 
monopolize the international justice debate within the region. 
 
Even though at first glance an exploration of Croatian interaction with the ICTY, in 
isolation from the accompanying case studies, seems to confirm rationalist assumptions 
regarding international law enforcement, when Croatian interaction with the ICTY is 
contrasted with Serbia, it is important to emphasize Zagreb accepted the norm of 
international criminal justice and would thus resort to contesting ICTY indictments 
through legal mechanisms that fell within the Tribunal Statute.11   Thus, while in both 
states cooperation with the ICTY was domestically unpopular, Zagreb’s acceptance of the 
normative and legal framework of the tribunal system meant that coercion and 
inducements, when applied, were more effective in altering non-compliant behavior 
because the Croatian government was not faced with the prospect of violating a 
countervailing normative framework.12 
 
Our exploration of Serbia has imparted that norms and ideational structures can act to 
constrain states in their interactions with international criminal tribunals.  However, while 
Finnemore, Risse, Sikkink and Walling suggest the normative and ideational power of 
human rights can transform state behavior (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Risse 2001; 
Sikkink 1993; Sikkink & Walling 2005), here it was demonstrated that states can act to 
                                                 
11 Croatia characterized the July 1998 adoption of the Statute of Rome as a ‘political, legal and moral 
victory’ for international criminal justice and the tribunal system (Statement Delivered by the Croatian 
Delegation 1998). 
12 In a sense, there was considerably less risk of what Putnam described as an ‘involuntary defection’ 
(1988, pp. 427-460). 
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create and entrench countervailing norms which can constrain a state’s ability to 
cooperate with international criminal tribunals.  Our explorations of Croatia and Serbia 
have demonstrated compliance regimes are more effective when a given rule or law is 
internalized by states as conforming to domestic norms of appropriate action.  In extra-
legal terms, Fisher’s distinction between a non-compliance act which is malum in se (bad 
in itself) and a non-compliance act that is merely malum prohibitum (bad because it is 
prohibited) (1981, p. 108) can serve to illustrate the power of domestic normative 
structures.13  Fisher, Henkin and Moravcsik have all identified a causal relationship 
between domestic norms and compliance with international legal regimes (R. Fisher 
1981, pp. 141-235; Henkin 1968; Moravcsik 1995, pp. 157-189).  However, existing 
liberal theories of IR limit theorizing compliance to a community of liberal democratic 
states where the rule of law has already been internalized.  Take for example the 
following, ‘[t]he most important preconditions for the creation of and compliance with 
the sort of highly refined regime norms found in Europe are strong pre-existing norms, 
practices and institutions of liberal democracy,…’ (Moravcsik 1995, p. 184).  
Nevertheless, this thesis has demonstrated that because even illiberal states rationalize 
policy choices through an appeal to legal norms, both internally and externally, an 
illiberal regime which accepts legally binding human rights obligations can find itself 
constrained by domestic norm internalization.14 
 
Because Serbian public opinion’s rejection of the ICTY’s claim to exercise jurisdiction 
over the territory of the SRJ was reinforced by the position of the SRJ judiciary, which 
considered the transfer of an SRJ citizen to the ICTY to be an unconstitutional act, 
Belgrade faced significant difficulties in rationalizing compliance with Tribunal arrest 
and surrender orders.  When compliance acts occurred they were characterized as sui 
generis events.  For example, when Dražen Erdemović, an ethnic Croat member of the 
Bosnian Serb Army, was transferred to ICTY custody by Belgrade in 1996, Erdemović’s 
                                                 
13 Franck makes a similar observation in his study of why states obey the law in the absence of coercion 
(Franck 1988, p. 708).  Of course, this study is inclusive of why states violate international law in the 
presence of coercion. 
14 As Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui note, mere acceptance of international human rights accords alone is 
insufficient (2007, pp. 407-425).  Rather, here is argued the state in question must have engaged in 
substantive legal argumentation in support of a given norm.  
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lack of SRJ citizenship was said to provide the legal basis for the accused’s transfer.  The 
difficulty surrounding the Erdemović transfer, even given the fact Erdemović expressed a 
personal preference to voluntarily surrender to Tribunal custody, illustrates the extent to 
which non-compliant behavior had been internalized as legitimate action within the SRJ 
and the extent to which any form of cooperation with the Tribunal was perceived as 
illegitimate.  The internalization of the norm of state sovereignty, as articulated in the 
foreign ministry’s legal challenge to the ICTY, restricted the scope for compliance on the 
part of Serbia’s post-Milošević elites in the aftermath of the collapse of the Milošević 
regime in October 2000. 
 
The Milošević transfer in 2001 was perhaps the most spectacular display of compliance 
as an outcome of coercion.  However, after Milošević’s transfer to the ICTY, Serbia once 
again failed to comply with arrest and surrender orders as the United States proved less 
willing to coerce Belgrade into surrendering the remaining ICTY indictees on the 
territory of the SRJ.  Moreover, although Serbian prime minister Zoran Đinđić supported 
Serbian fulfillment of ICTY obligations and the transfer of all individuals under ICTY 
indictment to The Hague, Đinđić’s compliance strategy was never fully implemented and 
eventually brought about his own assassination through a security services led operation 
(Vujačić 2003, p. 12). 
 
While the linkage of EU accession to compliance with Article 29 obligations did not 
bring about actual arrests, by 2005 the Serbian government began to increasingly 
perceive the presence of ICTY fugitives on its territory as a liability and actively 
encouraged persons indicted for war crimes on the territory of Serbia to ‘voluntarily 
surrender’ themselves to the Tribunal.  However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, 
Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY field office in Belgrade noted that these surrenders were 
always characterized as ‘patriotic’ acts and no mention was ever made of the contents of 
the ICTY indictments against persons accused of war crimes.15  Furthermore, in instances 
where voluntary surrenders were not forthcoming such as with regard to Ratko Mladić, 
the Serbian government failed to take action to bring about an arrest.  Andrej Nosov of 
                                                 
15 Personal Interview with Alexandra Milenov of the ICTY Field Office in Belgrade, January 2007. 
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the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Belgrade’s observation that post-Milošević state 
cooperation with the ICTY has been exclusively rationalized in functional or material 
terms as opposed to moral or legal obligation illustrates the extent to which the norm of 
state sovereignty and non-cooperation with the ICTY has been internalized by 
Belgrade.16   
 
In Chapter Four we were confronted with the only instance of a state which has 
consistently complied with its obligations toward the Tribunal.  Although Macedonia was 
only required to execute a single arrest, Macedonia proved cooperative when it came to 
cooperation with the Tribunal over a broad range of investigative issues over a period of 
five years. Macedonia’s acceptance of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which 
ended a brief civil conflict, marked a watershed moment in shaping the identity of the 
Macedonian state as Macedonia accepted its transformation from nation-state into a 
decentralized multi-ethnic state (Brunnbauer 2002, p. 4).  The extent of Macedonia’s 
post-Ohrid transformation can be illustrated by the fact that in 2002 the head of the 
political wing of the National Liberation Army, an ethnic Albanian paramilitary force, 
which led a violent campaign against Macedonian government forces in 2001, entered a 
coalition government with an ethnic Macedonian political party.  Moreover, Ohrid 
enmeshed the Macedonian state in international institutions such as the OSCE and the 
EU, which were invited to oversee and advise domestic governance (Ohrid Framework 
Agreement 2001).  At the time of Tarčulovski’s 2005 indictment there was an elite 
consensus in Skopje which favored not just EU and NATO membership, but a deepening 
enmeshment of the Macedonian state into international institutions.  Apart from an 
isolated independent MP, who felt Macedonia’s cooperation with the ICTY threatened 
‘state sovereignty,’ all major political parties adopted integrationist foreign policies 
directly into their party programs.  Thus, when the ICTY began its investigations into 
violations of IHL on the part of Macedonian security forces, cooperation with 
international institutions was already a deeply entrenched norm.  Moreover, due to the 
                                                 
16 Personal interview with Andrej Nosov of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Belgrade, 23 January 
2007. 
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lack of intensity and duration of the 2001 conflict, powerful veterans’ organizations did 
not emerge to challenge Macedonian state cooperation with the Tribunal. 
 
An examination of three states to which ICTY arrest and surrender orders were addressed 
demonstrates multiple policy options for the recipient states.  In the event a state is able 
to locate an accused, the recipient state can a) comply with the ICTY arrest and surrender 
order or b) not comply with the ICTY arrest and surrender order.  If a state selects the 
latter option then the state is confronted with the task of rationalizing its non-compliant 
behavior (see Chart 7.2).17  Given cooperation with the ICTY is a legal obligation 
imposed upon all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the burden 
was upon the non-compliant state to explain non-cooperation with the Tribunal. 
Chart 7.2: The ICTY and States 
 
 
In the event a state opts for non-compliance there are multiple rationalizations available 
through which states can characterize non-compliance acts.  As demonstrated in our 
exploration of Croatia and Serbia, an appeal to a countervailing norm has the effect of 
locking-in non-compliance while mounting legal challenges to individual indictments or 
                                                 
17 In no instance did a state fail to comply with an ICTY order without publicly rationalizing the non-
compliant act. 
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citing an inability to locate an accused allows for the non-compliant state to rationalize a 
compliance act as fulfillment of an accepted legal obligation at a later date. 
 
Given non-compliance has proven a general norm when it comes to initial state reactions 
to ICTY arrest and surrender orders,18 it is important to understand how non-compliance 
was confronted by the ICTY.  The ICTY was limited in ways it could confront non-
compliant behavior on the part of states.  First, the Tribunal could adhere to the legal 
processes set out in the Tribunal Statute, referral of the non-compliant state to the UNSC, 
or, second, the Tribunal could pursue an extralegal bargaining process through a 
utilization of third party states.  Because the UNSC was not prepared to take enforcement 
action under Article 41 or 42 of the UN Charter, ICTY reports to the UNSC were not 
expected to generate enforcement action on the part of the Council, but rather served as a 
public forum in which non-compliant states could be publicly named.  Despite naming 
and shaming before the UNSC having not been effective in itself transforming non-
compliant behavior on the part of recalcitrant states, ICTY reports submitted before the 
UNSC provided an powerful normative tool with which the Tribunal could galvanize 
third party state enforcement action outside the Council. 
 
3.1 State Compliance and Third Party Coercion 
 
While the establishment of legal obligation nevertheless remains an integral antecedent 
condition for explaining compliance, we must look elsewhere for causation.  As 
previously noted, in the event a state failed to fulfill its legal obligations toward the 
ICTY, the Tribunal was invested with only a single mechanism for legally challenging 
non-compliance: referral of the recalcitrant state to the UNSC (see Chart 7.3).  In 
practice, however, the UNSC never authorized enforcement action against state non-
compliance with ICTY Article 29 obligations.  Russia and China only reluctantly 
supported the creation of the ICTY and were not prepared to authorize sanctions against a 
state for failing to cooperate with the court.  Therefore, despite persistent non-compliance 
on the part of the SRJ throughout the 1990s, UNSC Resolution 1044, which both 
                                                 
18 Macedonia is the only notable exemption to this general observation. 
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‘deplored’ Belgrade’s non-cooperation with ICTY and ‘demanded’ improved cooperation 
on the part of Belgrade, demonstrated the only action the UNSC was prepared to take 
against non-compliant states was restricted to the rhetorical realm.   
Chart 7.3: ICTY Referral and Reporting to UNSC 
       
In the absence of UNSC enforcement action, the ICTY approached third party states in 
order to coerce compliance from Croatia and Serbia through the application of sanctions 
or inducements (see Chart 7.4).  It was the utilization of third party state coercion which 
former Croatian foreign minister Mate Granić labeled as the ‘coercive model’ for 
securing custody of individuals under Tribunal indictment. 
Chart 7.4: The ICTY and Third Party States 
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either denying the legality of UNSC imposed obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal 
through an appeal to countervailing norms or accepting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia chose the latter option, while Serbia went 
with the former.  Acceptance of a legal obligation alone did not in turn lead to compliant 
behavior as seen with regard to Croatia because the state retained the ability to challenge 
indictments through ICTY Trial and Appeals Chambers.19  Moreover, rejection of a legal 
obligation toward the Tribunal does not entirely preclude cooperative behavior as 
illustrated by the Erdemović transfer from SRJ custody in 1996.  Here it is argued that 
while the legal arguments deployed by states do not establish absolute parameters in 
which state actions are constrained, states can transform ideational incentive structures 
through appeals to legal norms.  The compliance pull identified by Franck is not an 
entirely autonomous exogenous force,20 but rather it is vulnerable to normative 
deconstruction on the part of state actors (1990). 
 
Despite the above findings which indicate a causal relationship between ideational 
perceptions of appropriate action and compliance, the ICTY perceived itself as reliant 
upon third party state coercion and inducements in order to secure compliance with 
Tribunal orders from recalcitrant states in the former Yugoslavia.  The isolation of 
spectacular coercive threats, such as the US threat to block Serbian access to international 
financial institutions led Goldsmith and Posner to dismiss the prospect of international 
criminal courts exercising any normative pull over states: 
The [ICTY] has had modest success in trying war criminals, including Slobodan 
Milosevic.  But, it was not the gravitational pull of the ICTY charter that lured 
these defendants to The Hague.  Rather, it was NATO’s (and primarily American) 
military, diplomatic, and financial might’ (2005, p. 116). 
 
In fact, former ICTY spokesperson Florence Hartmann’s claim that the ICTY was largely 
dependent upon and vulnerable to the assistance of the ‘great powers’ (2007) coincides 
with Goldsmith and Posner’s rationalist state and power centric assessment.  Hartmann 
suggested the ICTY had little independent agency and was entirely dependent upon the 
                                                 
19 Although more fragrant violations, such as simply ignoring arrest and surrender orders absent a legal 
rationale grounded in the Tribunal Statute, are not compatible with an acceptance of ICTY jurisdiction. 
20 Henkin also identified the existence of a compliance pull; however, Henkin argued this pull toward 
compliance was based on the prudential desire to ‘keep the system intact’ (1979, p. 51) 
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support of third party states to secure arrests (2007).  Perhaps as a result of this state 
power-centric focus in The Hague, the ICTY invested minimal resources into attempts at 
engaging in normative persuasion or engagement with regional civil society groups 
receptive to the ICTY, which permitted the unchallenged emergence of a powerful 
domestic non-compliance pull in Croatia and Serbia.  However, because of Zagreb’s 
acceptance of the normative framework of the tribunal system, the non-compliance pull 
exerted against Zagreb was significantly weaker than that which confronted post-
Milošević elites in Belgrade. 
 
3.2 State Compliance and the European Union 
 
One instrument of coercion often appealed to by the ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte was the threat to obstruct or block the EU accession processes of non-compliant 
states in the event of non-cooperation with the Tribunal.  In October 2007, Del Ponte 
noted: 
Without the strong support of the EU and its member States, the implementation of 
my mandate would be an impossible mission. Permit me to remind you that, since I 
took office in 1999, we have brought 91 individuals into the custody of the 
Tribunal. Much of that great success could not have been achieved without the 
strong, principled and consistent support of the European Union… The European 
Union's policy of pre-accession and accession conditionality has thus far proven to 
be the sole successful tool in the recent past in stimulating States to fully cooperate 
with the Tribunal and obtaining the arrest of fugitives (Del Ponte 2007b). 
 
However, the preceding Chapters have illustrated that Del Ponte’s assessment has 
overstated the effectiveness of EU pre-accession and accession conditionality.  In the 
case of Croatia, while the linkage of the initiation of EU accession negotiations to 
cooperation with the Tribunal stimulated the Croatian government’s search for the 
fugitive general Ante Gotovina, a similar linkage failed to produce a compliance outcome 
in Serbia.  Moreover, during the 1990s it was the US, not the EU, which coerced Croatian 
compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders.  Prefacing our discussion of EU 
coercion induced compliance, it should be first pointed out that there does not appear to 
be any correlation between distance from EU accession and compliance.  As of 2007, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia were all at different stages of the EU accession process; 
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however, no correlation can be drawn between a state’s distance from accession and 
compliance.21 
 
Cooperation with the ICTY itself appears not to have affected the speed of accession 
processes for the states of the former Yugoslavia as the EU has lacked consistency in 
applying ICTY conditionality over the period of time covered in the case studies (1993-
2007).  Moreover, as EU accession and pre-accession agreements are conditioned upon 
the fulfillment of numerous criteria, compliance with Article 29 obligations cannot in 
itself secure an acceleration of a state’s EU accession.22  For example, Croatia secured 
recognition as an EU candidate state before Macedonia despite Croatia being cited by the 
Tribunal for having failed to fully cooperate with efforts to locate Ante Gotovina.  
Meanwhile, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s EU accession process was frozen due to a failure to 
strengthen the powers of BiH’s central state institutions over entity level governments. 
 
The absence of policy coherence in regard to the obligations of accession states toward 
the ICTY also greatly impaired the ability of the EU to coerce compliance through the 
threat of freezing accession processes.  Even after March 2005, when the EU cancelled 
Croatia’s accession negotiations, EU member states such as Austria and Hungary 
unsuccessfully attempted to decouple the linkage between cooperation with the ICTY and 
Croatia’s EU accession process.  Similarly, with regard to Serbia, a bloc of primarily 
southern and central European member states argued against linking Serbia’s EU 
accession process to the transfer of ICTY fugitives to Tribunal custody.  While Croatia 
was unsuccessful in securing a decoupling of ICTY obligations and Croatia’s EU 
accession process, Serbia’s minister for Human Rights, Rasim Ljajić articulated an 
expectation that Belgrade’s EU accession process could progress absent full cooperation 
with the ICTY (B92 2007). 
 
 
                                                 
21 Croatia achieved candidate status in 2004 before Macedonia, which achieved candidate status in 2005.  
In addition, as of March 2008 neither Serbia nor Bosnia-Herzegovina signed a Stability and Association 
Agreement with the EU. 
22 Although non-compliance acts could result in the suspension of an accession process as observed in 
Chapter Two. 
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3.3 State Compliance and Norms 
 
Existing norm-focused studies of compliance with international human rights regimes 
identify norms as causal phenomena which explain compliances outcomes; however, this 
thesis has noted that appeals to countervailing norms can establish an ideational context 
for non-compliant acts.  When states make legal appeals to countervailing norms, 
compliance acts prove much more difficult to effect.  Belgrade, through appeals to the 
norm of state sovereignty, raised the domestic costs of compliance by de-legitimizing the 
ICTY.  While the existence of Kocs’ ‘legal structure’ of international politics (1994, pp. 
535-556) remains to be demonstrated, long-term path dependent constraints can be 
attributed to state legal argumentation.  In the case of non-compliance with ICTY arrest 
and surrender orders, non-compliant states never conceded that they were in non-
compliance with their imagined international legal obligations.  Instead, two divergent 
legal rationalizations for non-compliance were articulated by Croatia and Serbia, which 
involved either the challenging of individual indictments or a challenging of the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal itself.  The former constituted an acceptance of the 
international criminal justice regime, while the latter constituted an appeal to the norm of 
Westphalian state sovereignty. 
 
Even though Croatia proved susceptible to coercion during the 1990s, it was Zagreb’s 
early acceptance of an international criminal tribunal regime that facilitated cooperation 
after Croatia’s transition from authoritarianism to parliamentary democracy.  Although 
the Croatian government proved reluctant to execute ICTY arrest and surrender orders, 
once Zagreb exhausted all legal avenues through which it could challenge the ICTY 
within the institution of the court, Croatian compliance was either forthcoming or Croatia 
fell back upon a claimed functional inability to effect an arrest.  As in the case of Serbia, 
Croatia’s interaction with the Tribunal was also framed in the context of considerable 
inter-state negotiation, first on the part of the US and later the EU, but coercion and 
inducements alone offer only a partial picture of Croatian cooperation with the ICTY.  
One negative effect of the bargaining process which took place during the 1990s between 
Zagreb and Washington was an internalization of an expectation for material rewards in 
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return for fulfillment of legal obligations toward the Tribunal.  Belgrade also increasingly 
perceived the presence of indicted war criminals as a bargaining ‘asset.’  Both of the 
above suggest consequentialist approaches to human rights regime enforcement may 
undermine human rights norm internalization as compliance is no longer perceived as a 
legal obligation but rather a subject of inter-state negotiation. 
 
It is revealing that the only state which was never found to be in non-compliance with 
ICTY obligations was Macedonia.  Although the fact that Macedonia received only a 
single ICTY indictment must limit any conclusions drawn from the Macedonian case 
study, Macedonian compliance suggests domestic norms of appropriate action may serve 
to better explain compliance and non-compliance outcomes.  After all, while coercion 
and inducements have often been the focus of rationalist research agendas, Freedman 
reminds us that the effectiveness of coercive threats remains dependent upon the 
constructed reality of those states which are the targets of coercion (2003, p. 36).  This 
thesis has demonstrated that states were suseptable to endogenous ideational and material 
non-compliance pulls which served to reduce the effectiveness of exogenous material 
incentives or disincentives.  Rather than focus solely on external coercion, it is the 
demand for justice within the very states to which arrest and surrender orders are 
addressed upon which ultimately the future success or failure of international criminal 
justice will depend.  Thus, an understanding of why domestic civil society failed to 
mobilize in support of international criminal justice across the three case studies may 
serve to illuminate why causal pathways associated with the boomerang pattern and spiral 
effect were not observed in this thesis. 
 
4. Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty or International Protectorates 
 
Compliance literature, much like international law itself, remains to a large degree state-
centric (Cassese 2005, p. 3).  Despite the increasingly frequent deployment of 
multinational peace enforcement forces, which often assume de facto if not de jure 
sovereign authority over a given territory or state, the question of legal obligations to 
enforce international legal obligations upon local actors responsible for crimes against 
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humanity or crimes of war has received little attention.  As existing studies of compliance 
assume the state to be the subject of international legal obligations, the relationship 
between international judicial bodies and intergovernmental organizations has yet to 
coalesce.  In the former Yugoslavia, international peacekeeping missions preferred to 
exercise the ‘authority’ to arrest and transfer local officials wanted by the ICTY for 
serious violations of IHL, but denied a legal obligation to carry out such arrests.  
However, a state centric interpretation of Article 29, which permits intergovernmental 
organizations to deny a legal obligation to assist the Tribunal, runs counter to established 
ICTY case law.23  Despite the fact Article 29 of the ICTY Statute appears to suggest 
states are the sole subjects of a legal obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal, Rule 59bis 
of the ICTY’s RPE makes references to an ‘appropriate authority or international body’ 
(Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2007, pp. 49-50).  Moreover in 2000, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber explicitly affirmed an obligation imposed upon intergovernmental organizations 
to comply with Tribunal orders (Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance 2000). 
 
Despite the Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and 
Others in the Prosecutor v. Simić et al. case, non-cooperation on the part of multinational 
peacekeeping forces and civilian administrations proved a significant and persistent 
challenge to the Tribunal.  Neither enforcement mechanism identified in Charts 7.3 nor 
7.4 could be applied to exert pressure upon the multinational civilian and military 
missions in BiH and Kosovo, which both derived their mandates from the UNSC under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Moreover, the primary contributing states for 
peacekeeping missions and civilian administrations in BiH and Kosovo were in many 
cases the very same states upon which the ICTY was dependent for voluntary 
contributions and seconded personnel.  Instead, as has been demonstrated, the ICTY was 
almost entirely dependent upon shaming and persuasion as mechanisms to transform non-
compliant behavior.  But, before returning to the theoretical implications of Chapter Five 
and Six, the variance in international legal identities between BiH and Kosovo requires us 
to first assess the implications of each of the case studies independently. 
                                                 
23 For example, criminal liability for command responsibility is inclusive of irregular or paramilitary forces 
operating in a territory under the functional control of a national military force. 
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4.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina: Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 
 
In the case of BiH, the subject of ICTY legal obligations was diffused among 
international and local actors as BiH maintained its international legal personality as an 
independent UN member state while de facto sovereign control over the territory of BiH 
was ceded to the NATO-led peacekeeping mission and its civilian counterpart, the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), in December 1995 (see Chart 7.5).  Furthermore, two 
powerful entity-level governments were established through the 1995 Dayton Peace 
Agreement at the sub-state level, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republika Srpska.  The entities secured control over policing and judicial powers, thus 
leaving the control of law enforcement functions outside the control of state-level 
institutions. 
Figure 7.5: Diffuse Subjects of Article 29 Obligations 
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domestic war crimes trials through its support of the Rules of the Road agreement which 
prohibited local police forces from carrying out arrests of war crimes suspects without 
first having the indictment certified by the ICTY.24  With regard to indictments 
transmitted from the ICTY, IFOR commander Admiral Leighton Smith appeared on 
Bosnian Serb television to reassure those under indictment that NATO forces would not 
carry out police functions. 
 
However, in 1997 NATO reversed its position on policing duties, and NATO member 
states began to carry out arrest and transfer operations in support of the ICTY.  During 
1997 both the NATO led international peacekeeping mission, SFOR, and the 
international civilian administration led by the OHR also began to play a significantly 
more robust role in domestic Bosnian politics.  At a time when the Republika Srpska was 
torn by an internal power struggle between Radovan Karadžić’s anti-Dayton nationalists 
and Biljana Plavišić’s relatively more moderate nationalists, the US and UK acted to 
strengthen Plavišić’s moderates by undermining Karadžić’s support base through targeted 
arrests of Karadžić supporters under ICTY indictment.  Thus, it was no coincidence that 
in July 1997 that NATO carried out its first arrest and transfer operation against an ICTY 
accused and the OHR was granted the ‘Bonn powers’ which granted the OHR’s High 
Representative the ability to remove local politicians for a number of offenses against the 
post-Dayton order including office for non-cooperation with the ICTY. 
 
The July 1997 arrest and transfer of Milan Kovačević by UK peacekeeping forces in BiH 
marked the first time multinational forces operating under SFOR carried out an arrest of 
an individual under indictment by the ICTY.  The fact that Kovačević’s arrest was 
subsequently followed by similar arrest operations carried out by US, Canadian and later 
French forces illustrates that there was a significant change in perception regarding the 
utility of carrying out arrest missions in support of the ICTY during the latter half of the 
1990s.  However, what was the causal phenomenon behind NATO’s shift from a refusal 
to undertake policing missions to the pursuit of war crimes suspects?  It appears that 
                                                 
24 As the ICTY’s ability to review domestic war crimes indictments was inhibited by a lack of funding (see 
Chapter 5), the Rules of the Road effectively halted domestic war crimes proceedings during the 1990s. 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 231
NATO’s pursuit of war crimes suspects can be explained by either a ‘coincidence of 
interest’ that emerged during the 1997 power struggle within the Republika Srpska, 
former ICTY Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt’s threat to publicly reveal NATO’s 
obstruction of the pursuit of ICTY accused after NATO’s initial refusal to accept sealed 
ICTY indictments, or the outcome of elections in the US (1996) and the UK (1997).  
While it is difficult to disentangle the extent to which the ICTY’s threat of public 
shaming, the desire on the part of NATO to remove pro-Karadžić nationalists from RS 
political life or the 1997 change in UK government and Clinton’s reelection as US 
president in 1996 brought about a transformation on the part of NATO governments in 
their willingness to engage in arrest operations in support of the ICTY, the fact that 
arrests and transfers continued beyond 1997 suggests that continued compliance goes 
beyond a ‘coincidence of interest’ and demonstrates an acceptance of a responsibility to 
assist the ICTY, if not an obligation to do so.  However, it is important to qualify the 
above observation by noting that NATO and later the EU never demonstrated a 
willingness to undertake high risk arrest and transfer missions against the former Bosnian 
Serb president Radovan Karadžić or the former head of the Bosnian Serb armed forces 
Ratko Mladić, who remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina until 2000.  As former ICTY Chief 
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone noted, risk averseness on the part of international 
peacekeeping forces illustrates the gap between perceptions of international and domestic 
justice: 
On a national level, policemen are not infrequently obliged to arrest people who are 
armed and dangerous.  Yet, it is inconceivable that an attorney general would call 
off the arrests because of the risks to the lives of the arresting officers’ (Scharf 
1997, p. 225). 
 
It is the above described risk aversion that perhaps explains why there remains 
considerable reluctance on the part of EUFOR to engage in high risk arrest operations or 
even accept a legal obligation to fulfill ICTY arrest and transfer requests.  Thus, NATO 
and EUFOR’s challenging of Article 29 obligations while also undertaking selective 
arrest and transfer operations suggests that rather than challenge the normative 
framework of international criminal justice, international peacekeeping forces seek to 
retain the flexibility to determine whether or not to undertake operations in support of  
international criminal tribunals.  However, flexibility in executing arrest and surrender 
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orders does contradict and undermine the assumed universally binding character of 
Tribunal orders. 
 
4.2 Kosovo: Compliance in an UN Protectorate 
 
In Kosovo, UNMIK and the NATO-led KFOR mission could not transpose their 
obligation to carry out Tribunal orders upon a state actor which lacked the capabilities or 
willingness to arrest and transfer accused persons to ICTY custody.  At the time of 
Resolution 1244’s drafting Security Council member states recognized that the legal 
subject of Tribunal obligations would have to be clarified given Kosovo’s status as a 
province within the Republic of Serbia.  Article 14 of Resolution 1244, therefore, went 
beyond Dayton’s obligations, which were imposed exclusively upon the local parties to 
the 1995 peace agreement, and demanded cooperation with the ICTY on the part of the 
‘international security presence’ in Kosovo (Resolution 1244 1999, p.4).25  Having 
established an obligation to cooperate with the ICTY, it should be expected that UNMIK 
would demonstrate a greater degree of cooperation with the Tribunal than that which was 
observed in the previous case studies.  After all, UNMIK itself was neither a state nor a 
party to the 1998-1999 conflict.  Moreover, like the ICTY, UNMIK was a creation of the 
UNSC.  Unfortunately, as has been demonstrated, UNMIK proved reluctant to assist the 
ICTY and in 2006 the ICTY reported UNMIK’s non-cooperation to the UNSC (ICTY, 
2006: 666).  In fact, as recently as December 2007, ICTY Chief Prosecutor claimed to be 
‘stupefied’ by the relationship between UNMIK officials and Ramush Haradinaj, who 
was indicted in 2005 by the ICTY for serious violations of IHL (Lee 2007). 
 
Despite executing arrest and surrender orders,26 UNMIK failed to assist the Tribunal in a 
wide range of functions from providing assistance to Tribunal personnel in Kosovo to 
providing adequate witness protection.  Moreover, UNMIK also rejected any legal 
                                                 
25 Interestingly, UNMIK argues its obligations toward the Tribunal stem exclusively from Resolution 
1244’s two vague references to the Tribunal and not from Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute which provides 
a detailed list of obligations. 
26 Of course the two most high profile Kosovar indictees, Limaj and Haradinaj, were not arrested by 
UNMIK or KFOR.  Limaj fled to Slovenia where he was subsequently arrested at the request of the ICTY 
while Haradinaj voluntarily surrendered to ICTY custody. 
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obligation to the ICTY under Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute.  Paradoxically, while 
Resolution 1244 made reference to UNMIK obligations toward the ICTY, the very fact 
that UNMIK was an institution created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter meant that 
UNMIK enjoyed a horizontal legal relationship with the ICTY.  This horizontality meant 
that the ICTY lacked any mechanism to legally challenge UNMIK non-cooperation.  In 
fact, the only means by which non-cooperation on the part of UNMIK could be 
challenged would be by a UNSC revision of Resolution 1244 that would have explicitly 
stated UNMIK’s relationship with the ICTY fell under Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute.  
It is important that UNMIK’s contestation of Article 29 obligations not be dismissed as 
representative of a sui generis entity especially given the fact the proliferation of Chapter 
VII mandated UN peace enforcement operations has occurred concurrent to the 
proliferation of international criminal tribunals.  Instead, UNMIK’s contestation of legal 
obligations imposed universally upon all UN member states should be seen as illustrative 
of the failure of IL or IR to grapple with the human rights obligations of non-traditional 
sovereign entities.  As will be demonstrated below, the failure to incorporate non-
traditional sovereign entities into studies of compliance with international law has 
severely limited the explanatory power of existing compliance theories. 
 
4.3 Compliance, Diffuse Sovereignty and International Peacekeeping 
 
The rationalist neoliberal and neorealist theoretical framework must be almost entirely 
abandoned when explaining compliance on the part of non-traditional sovereign entities. 
Instead, the only available mechanism through which the ICTY could exert pressure upon 
NATO and UNMIK was through the public shaming of non-compliance acts and 
attempts at persuasion.  With regard to the former, the ICTY’s public Rule 61 hearings 
against Karadžić and Mladić and Graham Blewitt’s threat to expose fraudulent behavior 
on the part of NATO illustrates the Tribunal’s potential normative power over 
multinational peace enforcement missions.  Additionally, when KFOR failed to 
apprehend Fatmir Limaj, Carla Del Ponte engaged in ‘shaming’ when she publicly 
condemned UNMIK and KFOR.  Del Ponte then requested Slovenia arrest and transfer 
Limaj to ICTY so as to prevent the accused’s return to Kosovo.  However, unlike in BiH, 
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where the OHR, NATO and later EUFOR have acted to support the Tribunal, albeit while 
also failing to accept a legal obligation to do so or secure the custody of Radovan 
Karadžić, UNMIK has proved consistently unreceptive to ICTY requests for assistance.  
Yet, UNMIK does nonetheless attempt to portray itself as cooperating with the Tribunal, 
which does suggest UNMIK is sensitive to accusations of non-cooperation. 
 
Meanwhile, attempts at persuasion, while including both a moral and legal dimension, 
primarily focused on attempts to demonstrate a convergence of interest between the 
ICTY and the NATO presence in BiH.  As early as 1996 Richard Holbrooke suggested 
that the capture and transfer of individuals under ICTY indictment could have a 
transformative effect on the internal politics of the Bosnian Serb republic as more radical 
nationalist elements of the RS political community would be removed from the post-
Dayton political process (1999, pp. 339-342).  The perception that ICTY indictees in the 
RS were a growing threat to the Dayton process could explain NATO’s willingness to 
arrest and transfer Bosnian Serbs to Tribunal custody; however, it cannot explain 
NATO’s arrest and transfer of former Bosnian Muslim combatants.  Moreover, EUFOR 
has acted in support of BiH police forces in carrying out arrests of individuals under 
indictment by the Special War Crimes Court in Sarajevo, which suggests that, at least to a 
limited degree, there has been an internalization of the norm that international 
peacekeeping forces should act in support of efforts to prosecute individuals responsible 
for serious violations of IHL.  However, unlike national judiciaries, which are prepared to 
undertake significant risks to secure custody of an accused, international peacekeeping 
forces remain unwilling to engage in high risk operations.  Additionally, policing duties 
such as intelligence led activities required to locate an accused have not been undertaken 
by EUFOR, which instead depends upon other actors, such as the ICTY or local 
governments, ‘informing’ EUFOR as to the whereabouts of an accused.  The failure of 
EUFOR to engage actively in the search of ICTY indictees is relevant given the fact 
Article 29 was interpreted as to require states to undertake aggressive intelligence led 
operations to locate persons under ICTY indictment.  In the case of Croatia, the failure to 
actively search for Ante Gotovina was interpreted as a breach of Croatia’s Article 29 
obligations.  Should non-traditional sovereign entities such as peacekeeping forces and 
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civilian administration come under Article 29 obligations, the ICTY could demand a 
much greater level of assistance in efforts to locate and transfer war crimes suspects to 
Tribunal custody. 
 
5. Conclusions: Compliance Reconsidered 
 
This thesis’ exploration of compliance with ICTY arrest and surrender orders has sought 
to introduce the question of compliance into international criminal justice literature, 
which has for the most part, either assumed compliance to be a function of legal 
obligation or has neglected the question of compliance altogether.  Moreover, this thesis 
illustrated that compliance with international criminal tribunal arrest and surrender orders 
cannot be assumed to be forthcoming or automatic.  It was also demonstrated that the 
rationalist focus on material coercion or inducements offers only a partial picture of 
compliance.  Goldsmith and Posner’s focus on US military, diplomatic and financial 
power fails to capture the domestic rationalization processes behind compliance acts.   
Domestic norms of international justice can be both constituted and deconstructed by 
states, particularly when a justice constituency within domestic civil society is lacking.  
In the case of Croatia, Zagreb’s affirmation of norms of international justice served to 
lead Croatia into a dialogue with the ICTY that occurred within the Tribunal’s Appeals 
and Trial Chambers. 
 
The lack of compliance on the part of multinational peacekeeping missions in the former 
Yugoslavia illustrates that compliance based research agendas must move beyond the 
state centric focus of IL.  Rigid IR realist and neoliberal institutionalist 
conceptualizations of sovereignty and the state were also unable to either describe or 
explain the interaction between the ICTY and multinational missions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Kosovo, nor can the realist and neoliberal focus on rational choice 
explain divergent compliance outcomes when states are faced with similar material 
incentives or disincentives.  Instead, it has been demonstrated that state rationalizations of 
compliance acts and the identification of domestic justice constituencies, or the lack 
thereof, can illuminate ideational constraints to state compliance that can act to amplify 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 236
or counteract the effectiveness of external material incentives or disincentives.  The 
rationalization of compliance acts is particularly relevant when exploring compliance on 
the part of NATO in BiH and UNMIK in Kosovo given that neither accepted legal 
obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal under Article 29 of the Tribunal Statute.  
Therefore, the study of compliance would greatly benefit from integrating a focus on why 
states comply with a given law and how states rationalize compliance and non-
compliance acts into existing rationalist research agendas that focus on interest and 
power. 
 
With the coming into effect of the Statute of Rome in 2002 and the UNSC’s referral of 
Sudan to the International Criminal Court through Resolution 1593 in 2005, states and 
post-conflict international civilian administrations and military peacekeeping forces can 
be expected to come into ever greater contact with the emerging infrastructure of 
international criminal justice.  This thesis has explored compliance with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders in an effort to integrate understandings of compliance into international 
criminal justice scholarship.  Although this thesis has been restricted in scope, it has been 
demonstrated that compliance with ICTY orders can only be understood through both 
material and ideational incentives. 
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Appendix I 
 
State Obligations under the Statute of the Tribunal (ICTY) 
 
 
Article 29 
 
1. States shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and 
prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. 
 
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an 
order issued by the Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: 
 
a. the identification and location of persons; 
b. the taking of testimony and the production of evidence; 
c. the service of documents; 
d. the arrest or detention of persons; 
e. the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.  
 
 
(Statute of the Tribunal 1993) 
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Appendix II 
 
Croatia: War Veterans’ Organizations and Human Rights NGOs 
War Veterans 
Organizations 
Primary Source(s) 
of Funding 
Internationally 
funded NGOs 
Primary Source(s) of 
International Funding 
Union of Associations of 
Croatian Military 
Invalids of the Homeland 
War 
Croatian Government Documenta – Centre 
for Dealing with the 
Past 
Open Society Institute 
Association of Croatian 
Homeland War Veterans 
Croatian Government Centre for Peace 
Studies 
Open Society Institute, 
European Commission, 
OSCE, US and UK 
Embassies 
Association of Croatian 
Volunteers of the 
Homeland War 
Croatian Government Centre for Peace, 
Non-violence and 
Human Rights 
US Government 
(USAID), European 
Commission, UNHCR 
Union of Widows’ 
Associations 
Croatian Government Croatian Helsinki 
Committee for 
Human Rights 
International Helsinki 
Federation for Human 
Rights, US Government 
(USAID) 
Alliance of Associations 
of Captured and Missing 
Croatian Defenders 
Croatian Government Citizens’ Committee 
for Human Rights 
Open Society Institute 
Union of Associations of 
Families of Deceased 
Croatian Defenders 
Croatian Government   
Association of Croatian 
Volunteer Defenders of 
the Homeland War 
Croatian Government   
Croatian Home Guard Croatian Government   
Union of Associations of 
Croatian Civilian 
Sufferers of the 
Homeland War 
Croatian Government   
First Croatian Police Croatian Government   
Association of Volunteer 
Doctors 90/91 
Croatian Government   
Alliance of Associations 
of the Croatian Defense 
Forces 
Croatian Government   
Croatian Society of 
Captives of Serbian 
Concentration Camps 
Croatian Government   
Union of Associations of 
Croatian Defense Force 
Volunteers 
Croatian Government   
Union of Associations of 
Croatian Volunteers of 
the Homeland War 
Croatian Government   
Data for war veterans and victims organizations available in (S. Fisher 2003), while data regarding human 
rights NGOs advocating the investigation of war crimes committed by Croatian forces during the 
Homeland War has been compiled by the author. 
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Appendix III 
 
Political Parties and Support for Cooperation with the ICTY 
 
 
Croatia: as of November 2003 parliamentary 
elections 
Serbia: as of December 2003 parliamentary 
elections 
Party Seats Supports compliance 
with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders 
Party Seats Supports compliance 
with ICTY arrest and 
surrender orders 
Croatian 
Democratic 
Union 
66 Yes 
 
Serbian Radical 
Party 
82 No 
 
Social 
Democratic 
Party* 
43 Yes Democratic Party 
of Serbia* 
53 Yes 
Croatian Peoples 
Party* 
11  Yes 
 
Democratic 
Party* 
37 Yes 
Croatian Peasants 
Party* 
10 Yes G17+* 34 Yes 
Croatian Party of 
Rights* 
8 Yes Serbian Renewal 
Movement – New 
Serbia 
22 Yes 
Croatian Social 
Liberal Party 
1 Yes Socialist Party of 
Serbia 
22 No 
Democratic 
Center Party 
1 Yes    
Croatian 
Pensioners Party 
3 Yes    
Independent 
Democratic 
Serbian Party* 
4 Yes    
*In coalitions with minor or regional parties 
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Appendix IV: Croatia and the European Union 
 
 
 
15 January 1992 The European Community recognizes the Republic of Croatia 
as an independent state 
 
29 October 2001  Stability and Association Agreement signed between Croatia 
and the European Union 
 
21 February 2003  Croatia submits application for membership to the European 
Union 
  
1 April 2004  The European Parliament positively assesses Croatia’s 
application for membership 
 
20 April 2004  The European Commission grants a positive avis to Croatia’s 
application for membership 
 
18 June 2004  The European Council officially grants Croatia EU candidate 
status 
 
17 December 2004  The European Council recommends EU membership 
negotiations begin with Croatia in March 2005, 
commencement of negotiations linked to ‘full cooperation’ with 
the ICTY 
 
1 February 2005  The Stability and Association Agreement takes effect following 
ratification by all EU member states. 
 
16 March 2005  The European Union agrees upon a framework for 
membership negotiations; however, the commencement of 
membership negotiations is blocked by Croatia’s failure to 
apprehend the fugitive general Ante Gotovina. 
 
3 October 2005  Membership negotiations begin following Carla Del Ponte’s 
certification of Croatia as being in full cooperation with the 
ICTY. 
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Appendix V: Serbian Public Opinion and War Crimes 
Polling data from the Belgrade Center for Human Rights report, Public Opinion in Serbia: 
Opinions on the Domestic War Crimes Judiciary and The Hague Tribunal, April 2005 
 
Chart 1: Trust in International Institutions  
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Chart 2: Public Opinion and War Criminals 
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Appendix V - cont’d 
 
Chart 3: Public Opinion and War Crimes 
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Appendix VI: UNPREDEP Troop Contributing States 
 
 
States Contributing Troops to the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia (as of February 1999) 
 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Canada 
The Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Egypt 
Finland 
Ghana 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Poland 
Portugal 
The Russian Federation 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
The Ukraine 
The United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: UNPREDEP) 
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Appendix VII: Macedonian Public Opinion and EU and NATO 
Membership 
 
Do you support Macedonia becoming a member of the EU?
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(Source: International Republican Institute 2006) 
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Appendix VIII: High Representatives of the OHR (1995-2007) 
 
Carl Bildt    December 1995 – June 1997 
Carlos Westendorp   June 1997 – July 1999 
Wolfgang Petritsch   August 1999 – May 2002 
Paddy Ashdown   May 2002 – January 2006 
Christian Schwartz-Schilling February 2006 – June 2007 
Miroslav Lajcak   July 2007 – present 
Lamont, C. 2008 
 247
Appendix IX: Peace Implementation Council Membership 
 
PIC Members and Participants: 
States: 
Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China (resigned 
in May 2000), Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Finland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of America 
Others: 
The High Representative, the Brcko Arbitration Panel (dissolved in 1999), the Council of 
Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European 
Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN), the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the UN Transitional Administration of Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES; dissolved 
in 1998) and the World Bank. 
PIC Observers: Australia, Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, European 
Investment Bank (EIB), Estonia, Holy See, Human Rights Ombudsperson in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Iceland, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC), International Mediator for Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Liechtenstein, South Africa and 
the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. 
PIC Steering Board: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), represented by Turkey. 
Source: Office of the High Representative 
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Appendix X: European Union in BiH 
 
 
 
The European Union in BiH 
EUSR: Established in 2002, coordinates EU activities in BiH also serves as OHR 
EUFOR: Assumed control over peacekeeping operations in BiH from NATO in 2004 
EUPM: Replaced UN Police Task Force in 2003. Monitors, mentors and inspects local police forces 
 
EUMM: EU Monitoring Mission monitors political and security developments in BiH 
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Appendix XI: Special Representatives of the Secretary General 
 
 
 
SRSG 
 
Bernard Kouchner 
Hans Haekkerup 
Michael Steiner 
Harri Hermani Holkeri 
Søren Jessen-Petersen 
Joachim Rücker 
 
Nationality 
 
France 
Denmark 
Germany 
Finland 
Sweden 
Germany 
 
Dates 
 
1999 – 2001 
2001 – 2001 
2001 – 2003 
2003 – 2004 
2004 – 2006 
2006 – present 
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Appendix XII: Responsibilities of the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government 
 
 
 
• Economic and Fiscal Policy 
• Fiscal and Budgetary Issues 
• Administrative and Operation Customs Activities 
• Domestic and Foreign Trade, Industry and Investments 
• Education, Science and Technology 
• Youth and Sport 
• Culture 
• Health 
• Environmental Protection 
• Labor and Social Welfare 
• Family, Gender and Minors 
• Transport, Post, Telecommunications and Information Technologies 
• Public Administration Services 
• Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development 
• Statistics 
• Spatial Planning 
• Tourism 
• Good Governance, Human Rights and Equal Opportunities 
• Non-Residential Affairs 
 
Source: Constitutional Framework for Interim Self-Government 2001, p. 13 
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Appendix XIII: Interviews 
 
 
Interviews for this research were carried out in both the former Yugoslavia and The 
Hague.  Interview consent forms were provided to all interview subjects, which offered 
three levels of anonymity.  In the case of two telephone interviews verbal consent was 
agreed.  Three members of staff of the ICTY’s Outreach Offices were interviewed along 
with a representative of the ICTY’s Registry over the course of two trips to the former 
Yugoslavia in March 2006 and January 2007.  An interview was also provided by a Legal 
Officer at the ICTY in The Hague on 4 December 2007.  Of a total of 28 interview 
subjects 22 opted for anonymity.  Five individuals who did not request anonymity were 
representatives of the ICTY or UNMIK, while the other was head of a Belgrade-based 
NGO.  All other requests for anonymity came from local government or political party 
representatives and reflected continued sensitivity regarding questions of state 
compliance with ICTY orders in both Croatia and Serbia.  Moreover, although the 
Croatian Ministry of Justice was approached for interviews as suggested by a 
representative of Croatia’s Foreign Ministry, officals working on cooperation with the 
ICTY within the Justice Ministry did not respond to a request to participate.  One 
interview subject with the OSCE declined a formal interview, but instead opted for an 
informal discussion of the topic. 
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Glossary 
 
BiH   Bosnia-Herzegovina 
DPA   Dayton Peace Agreement 
DS   Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka) - Serbia 
DSS   Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska stranka Srbije) - Serbia 
EU   European Union 
EUSR   European Union Special Representative 
FBiH   Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica) – 
Croatia 
ICC   International Criminal Court 
ICTR   International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
IEBL Inter-entity Boundary Line 
IFOR   Implementation Force 
IHL   International Humanitarian Law 
IPTF   International Police Task Force 
JIAS   Joint Interim Administrative Structures 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
KTC   Kosovo Transitional Council 
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) - 
Kosovo 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NLA   National Liberation Army 
OFA   Ohrid Framework Agreement 
OHR   Office of the High Representative 
OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OTP Office of the Prosecutor within the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia 
PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës) - 
Kosovo 
RS  Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Republic) 
SAA  Stability and Association Agreement 
SDP  Social Democratic Party 
SFOR  Stabilization Force 
SiCG State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Državna zajednica Srbija i 
Crna Gora) 
SKH   League of Communists of Croatia (Savez komunista Hrvatske) 
SKS   League of Communists of Serbia (Savez komunista Srbije) 
SPS   Socialist Party of Serbia (Socijalistička partija Srbije) 
SRJ   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna republika Jugoslavije) 
SRSG   Special Representative of the Secretary General 
SSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (Socijaldemokratski Sojuz 
na Makedonija) – Macedonia 
UÇK Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlimatare e Kosovës) 
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UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UNPREDEP  United Nations Preventative Deployment to Macedonia 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
UNTAES  United Nations Transitional Administration Eastern Slavonia 
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity (Vnatrešno Makedonska 
Revoluciona Organizacija – Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko 
Nacionalno Edinstvo) - Macedonia 
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